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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUCHAREST 001072 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR NATO AF IZ RO
SUBJECT: SUPREME DEFENSE COUNCIL NIXES PRIME MINISTER'S 
CALL TO WITHDRAW ROMANIAN TROOPS FROM IRAQ 
 
REF: BUCHAREST 1058 
 
Classified By: DCM Mark Taplin for Reasons 1.4(a), (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1.  (C) Summary.  Romania's Supreme Council for National 
Defense (CSAT) flatly rejected June 30 the unexpected call by 
Prime Minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu and Defense Minister 
Teodor Atanasiu for a Romanian troop pullout from Iraq. (Ref) 
 Announcing the CSAT's decision, President Basescu rebuked 
Tariceanu, Atanasiu and other members of the National Liberal 
Party (PNL) for undermining Romania's international 
credibility.  Basescu reaffirmed Romania's strong strategic 
relationship with the United States as well as its links to 
the EU.  Following the CSAT decision, the PM reaffirmed his 
call for a troop withdrawal, asserting that Romania had 
completed its mission in Iraq.  Leaders of the opposition 
center-left Social Democratic Party (PSD), however, 
criticized the PM and his supporters for an "unprofessional" 
approach to foreign policy.  Foreign Minister Ungureanu, who 
has lined up against the Prime Minister despite their common 
party affiliation, told the Ambassador that the Prime 
Minister's political gambit was entirely improvised, and that 
he and his Defense Minister did not expect the harsh reaction 
to which they have been subjected. End Summary. 
 
Basescu Blasts PM - CSAT Rejects Iraq Withdrawal Bid 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
¶2. (C) A subdued but confident Basescu appeared live on 
national TV on June 30 to announce that the Supreme Council 
for National Defense (CSAT) had rejected by a 9 to 2 vote the 
previous day's call by Prime Minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu 
and Defense Minister Teodor Atanasiu for a withdrawal of 
Romania's troops from Iraq.  Acknowledging that Romania was 
discussing with its coalition partners "reconfiguring" 
Romania's troop presence in Iraq, Basescu made it clear that 
the CSAT had flatly rejected the call for a withdrawal.  (He 
was referring to London discussions among U.K., Italian and 
Australian representatives on June 23 in which Romania had 
indicated it would "reconfigure" its troops in Iraq 
participating in coalition activities from 784 to 628 
personnel.)  Basescu also acknowledged that a public debate 
was necessary regarding Romania's role in Iraq, but the 
solution was "not to flee" from peacekeeping and stability 
operations.  "Romania must demonstrate seriousness and 
stability in its international relations," Basescu continued 
and "must not base foreign policy on emotion...nor change its 
policy overnight."  Basescu chided the PM for a "lack of 
coherence in foreign and military policies" and for failing 
to consult with him, other members of the GOR and coalition 
partners.  He also criticized the PM and DefMin for failing 
to present an "analysis" to the CSAT explaining the basis and 
potential consequences of their recommendation for a 
withdrawal. 
 
¶3. (C) Basescu singled out for criticism National Liberal 
Party (PNL) Tariceanu loyalist and Chamber of Deputies 
President Bogdan Olteanu who in televised remarks earlier in 
the day had tried to justify his mentor's call for a 
withdrawal from Iraq to the ostensible opposition of the EU 
to the war in Iraq.  Basescu reaffirmed the centrality of the 
U.S.-Romanian strategic relationship, noting that Romania 
needs "strong relations" with both the United States and 
Europe and the "EU and the U.S. need each other."  He 
stressed that, despite initial criticism from some EU states 
of Romania's engagement in Iraq, most European states now 
accept Romania's position.  He faulted Olteanu for 
demonstrating a "lack of understanding" and undermining 
Romanian credibility. 
 
¶4. (C) Basescu's June 30 statements following the CSAT 
meeting were presaged in a June 29 nationally televised 
interview in which a visibly angry Romanian president accused 
the PM of undermining Romania's national security interests 
and seeking to destroy Romania's good relations with the U.S. 
and UK.  He noted that the U.S., and NATO, guaranteed 
Romania's national security.  Basescu added that he 
"reproaches" himself for appointing Tariceanu PM, whom he 
accused of failing to carry out needed reforms of government 
institutions. 
 
FM Ungureanu:  Stunned By PM's "Off-the-Cuff" Initiative 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶5. (C) Foreign Minister Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu told the 
Ambassador on June 30 that Basescu conducted today's CSAT 
meeting in an "impeccable, calm, tactful and mature fashion." 
 According to the FM, DefMin Atanasiu attempted to present a 
"memorandum" in support of a troop withdrawal from Iraq. 
 
BUCHAREST 00001072  002 OF 004 
 
 
Instead, Basescu insisted that Atanasiu submit a "defense 
capabilities report," which Romanian law requires the Defense 
Minister to present each year to the CSAT by June 30.  The 
meeting was adjourned, for about one hour, to allow Atanasiu 
time to retrieve the report from his office at the Defense 
Ministry.  (It was duly approved by the CSAT, but both 
Basescu and the Romanian media took note of the Defense 
Minister's lack of preparation.) 
 
¶6. (C) Per Ungureanu, the PM presented a "political 
justification" for his proposed withdrawal, asserting that a 
continued Romanian troop presence unnecessarily risked 
Romanian lives and was too costly.  Tariceanu also argued 
"other European countries have withdrawn from Iraq and lost 
nothing thereby."  Basescu retorted that the question of 
Romanian deployments was a matter "for analysis, not 
politics, and requires a military assessment."  All CSAT 
participants, except the heads of the internal and external 
intelligence services, offered their views during the 
meeting.  The FM said he argued the PM/DefMin proposal had 
been improperly launched in the public arena without 
appropriate consultation.  In a break with the CSAT tradition 
of consensus-based decision-making, Basescu called for a 
"symbolic vote" on the issue of whether Romania should 
withdraw troops from Iraq.  Only the PM and DefMin voted in 
favor of withdrawal.  Ungureanu told the Ambassador, without 
elaborating, that in the course of the CSAT meeting the PM 
appeared very uncomfortable and "became aware of his 
mistake", but Ungureanu predicted that the PM would not 
publicly admit his error. 
 
¶7. (C) Ungureanu also confirmed other reports that many PNL 
party leaders were "taken by surprise" and "shocked" by the 
PM's June 29 announcement.  Even many within the PM's 
entourage "did not know what happened," Ungureanu related. 
He said he himself was "stunned" and confided to the 
Ambassador that he was still considering resignation as FM if 
Tariceanu did not backtrack.  Ungureanu said the PM met with 
senior party leaders, including the FM and fellow CSAT 
member, Finance Minister Sebastian Vladescu, prior to the 
meeting.  The FM insisted that the PNL's senior leadership, 
except for the DefMin, expressed their opposition to the PM's 
call for a withdrawal.  Ungureanu opined that the PM's  June 
29 announcement was the product of a last minute, "off the 
cuff" decision; both the PM and DefMin "did not anticipate" 
the resulting brouhaha. 
 
 
PM, Defense Minister Stick to Their Guns 
---------------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) In a televised press conference from PNL headquarters 
a few hours after the CSAT decision, Tariceanu reaffirmed his 
call for a troop withdrawal, asserting that the time was ripe 
for a withdrawal as "our mission in Iraq draws to a close." 
With the DefMin seated to his right, Tariceanu complained 
that the CSAT decision had attempted to "close the debate" on 
Romania's Iraq deployment.  He characterized this a "mistake" 
and called for a referendum on Romania's overseas military 
presence, including in Iraq.  The PM defended his decision 
not to consult with other GOR officials, averring that 
"certain steps" needed to be taken.  In what was likely a 
veiled threat aimed at dissident PNL members, Tariceanu said 
future PNL meetings would examine the "problem" of party 
members who had opposed the proposal to withdraw.  (Note. 
This was probably a reference to, inter alia, Foreign 
Minister Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu and Finance Minister 
Sebastian Vladescu, both PNL and CSAT members, who opposed 
the call to withdraw.  End Note.) 
 
The Liberal Reaction 
-------------------- 
¶9. (C) The Prime Minister's PNL loyalists trotted out various 
explanations for the PM's actions, some of which were more 
plausible than others.  Chamber of Deputies President Bogdan 
Olteanu, a close confidante of Tariceanu and the most senior 
PNL official aside from the PM himself, was the most active 
public voice calling for a Romanian withdrawal from Iraq, 
which he linked to Romania's EU commitments.   In a June 30 
meeting with Olteanu, PolChief expressed dismay that neither 
the GOR nor the PNL -- with which the Embassy has maintained 
a regular dialogue -- had consulted with the U.S. or other 
partners prior to the call for an Iraq withdrawal.  It was 
particularly surprising in light of the PM and DefMin's 
repeated assurances that Romanian troops would remain in Iraq 
as long as they were needed and that no changes would be made 
without prior consultation.  Even European diplomats without 
troops in Iraq had called the Embassy to express concern 
 
BUCHAREST 00001072  003 OF 004 
 
 
about Romania's reliability as a partner. 
 
¶10. (C) Olteanu acknowledged that that the PM and DefMin's 
proposal had similarly taken many in his party off-guard, but 
that the PNL leadership had made the decision in light of 
public opposition to and concern for the high cost of the 
troop presence in Iraq.  Olteanu apologized for any 
"misunderstanding" by the U.S. or others with regard to 
Romanian intentions, which he claimed were not intended to 
bring into question Romania's commitment as a NATO ally or 
strategic partner in other areas.  At the same time, he 
admitted that the proposal was based "just as much on 
domestic politics" as it was on the PNL's views about 
military spending priorities.  He insisted that the PNL had 
learned Basescu was himself on the brink of announcing a 
drawdown of Romanian troops in Iraq, and that Tariceanu 
sought to "steal the wind" from the president on the issue. 
He also asserted that the PM believed that the U.S. had come 
to "overly focus" on the staunchly pro-American president. 
He lamented that the U.S. dialogue with the PM was "thin" and 
had overly emphasized negative aspects of our bilateral 
relationship.  This, he stressed, had also been part of the 
PM's calculations in launching his proposal for a Romanian 
withdrawal from Iraq.   highlight.  At the same time, Olteanu 
said he would seek to keep the debate over Romania's 
contribution in Iraq did not lapse into broader anti-American 
rhetoric.  He said he would also work to keep the issue from 
impacting other areas in our bilateral relationship. 
 
¶11. (C) Other PNL officials were more forthcoming in 
admitting that the PM had made a mistake in not consulting 
more widely, including with U.S. and U.K. officials.  Still, 
PNL Deputy and party youth leader Cristian Adomnitei insisted 
to PolMilOff that a "public discussion" about Iraq was 
necessary, and Tariceanu had launched that discussion. 
PolMilOff countered that the PM and DefMin had, in fact, 
launched not a discussion but a surprise attack on both their 
political rival Basescu and Romania's long-standing, 
bipartisan policy of Euro-Atlantic engagement. 
 
Opposition Rejects "Frivolous," "Unprofessional" Approach 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
¶12. (C) Senate Foreign Relations Committee President and 
President of the center-left opposition Social Democratic 
Party (PSD) Mircea Geoana told the Ambassador June 30 that he 
was "outraged" by the PM's and DefMin's "frivolous 
orchestration" of the call to withdraw from Iraq.  Noting 
that DefMin Atanasiu failed to disclose the withdrawal plan 
to both the President and parliamentary leaders, Geoana 
stated that PSD would call for his resignation.  He observed 
that strategic decisions needed to be handled 
"institutionally" and transparently, not through political 
showmanship.  Geoana predicted, however, that the PM would 
not back down on his political gamble but would continue to 
call for a complete withdrawal from Iraq based on the 
financial and human cost to Romania of a continued 
deployment. 
 
¶13. (C) Senate Defense Committee President and senior PSD 
member George Cristian Maior likewise emphasized that it was 
imperative for Romania to have "a predictable international 
policy."  Alluding to his own tenure as MOD State Secretary 
under the previous PSD-led government, Maior continued that 
"we worked very hard" to establish a strong security 
relationship with the U.S. and it was "unprofessional" and 
"contrary to the spirit of our alliance" for the PM and 
DefMin to announce support for withdrawal from Iraq without 
first speaking with the USG, HMG and other coalition 
partners.  He predicted that the CSAT would maintain 
Romania's troop presence in Iraq and the current flurry of 
media attention would pass "within three days." 
 
¶14. (C) Comment.  Although polling indicates that many 
Romanians oppose a troop presence in Iraq, public opposition 
to Romania's engagement has been muted.  Support for the 
strategic partnership with the U.S., on the other hand, 
remains strong across the political spectrum and has been the 
centerpiece of Romania's foreign policy under the last three 
presidential administrations.  Ironically, the PNL has in 
fact long been a  strong proponent of  U.S.-Romanian 
strategic links.  Consequently, many even in the PNL were 
taken aback by Tariceanu's unexpected move.  A number of PNL 
insiders have suggested to us privately that Tariceanu's 
position against a Romanian troop presence in Iraq reflects 
less a policy conviction than a poorly calculated attempt to 
gain the upper hand in his ongoing political feud with 
Basescu.  We have heard, as well, about the Prime Minister's 
 
BUCHAREST 00001072  004 OF 004 
 
 
resentment over the close engagement Washington has with his 
rival Basescu.  The fact that Basescu will travel to 
Washington in July for a second official visit, while the 
Prime Minister has not yet earned a trip, also grates. 
Tariceanu's failure to consult in advance on this proposal, 
even with his closest advisors, lends credence to Ungureanu's 
assertion that the PNL President made up his mind at the last 
minute, and with little consideration of the long-term 
consequences of his statement.  It is possible that this 
latest political stumble by the Prime Minister could prove to 
be fatal, although he has displayed surprising staying power 
until now.  While we can feel some measure of satisfaction at 
Basescu's political strength and his skillful handling of 
this unexpected challenge from the Prime Minister and his 
Defense Minister ally, the episode has brought the question 
of Romania's continued military presence in Iraq to the front 
burner of public debate. 
TAUBMAN