VZCZCXRO8101
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0094/01 1561523
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051523Z JUN 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0369
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0388

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000094 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CONFIDENTIAL//REL USA AND MCFI 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/5/2016 
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PGOV PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI DECLARES STATE OF EMERGENCY IN BASRAH 
 
REF: A) BASRAH 67, B) BASRAH 79, C) BASRAH 84, D) BAGHDAD 1745 
 
BASRAH 00000094  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO 
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a press conference in Basrah on May 31, Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki declared a one-month state of emergency 
in Basrah and requested that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) 
devise a security plan to stabilize the city.  This announcement 
follows a May 29 press conference in Basrah in which the Deputy 
Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) Chair, Nassaif Jassim Ali 
(Fadillah), publicly denied that a security problem existed in 
Basrah.  REO Basrah saw a temporary decrease in indirect fire 
after the May 16 increase of British military patrols and arrest 
operations, but continues to manage a number of challenges in 
carrying out mission-related activities due to the poor security 
situation in the city.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
Press Conference 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (U) In a May 31 press conference at the Basrah South Oil 
Company Cultural Center, PM Maliki declared a state of emergency 
for one month in Basrah and requested that the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF) devise a security plan to stabilize the city.  The 
PM had delivered a public speech about security in Basrah that 
morning, followed by a press conference.  The PM held smaller 
group meetings with political party heads and clerics, Governor 
Mohammed Al Wahili and other BPC members, the Chief of Police 
and other security personnel, and finally with tribal leaders. 
The state of emergency was declared at the end of the day after 
the last of the small group meetings. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Basrah Politicians Deny Existence of Security Problem 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3. (U) On May 29, Deputy BPC Chair Nassaif Jassim Ali (Fadillah) 
gave a press conference in which he publicly denied that a 
security problem existed in Basrah.  The few isolated incidents 
that occurred, he said, were tribal battles.  He criticized 
media reports that characterized the security situation in 
Basrah as "unstable" and excoriated the central government for 
focusing on security in Basrah when Baghdad was much worse. 
 
¶4. (C) Other BPC members have admitted that the streets of 
Basrah are dangerous, that there is an informal curfew from 2200 
to 0800, and that investments have suffered as a result (Basrah 
86).  Since May 17, the only issue addressed in the BPC has been 
voting out and replacing Governor Mohammed.  However, three 
weeks later, the BPC has been unable to muster the necessary 
votes or agree on a replacement for the Governor (Basrah 85). 
 
------------------------------------- 
Intimidation of Locally Engaged Staff 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) On May 29, pamphlets again were posted and distributed in 
the city warning all those who worked with the Coalition Forces 
to quit or face death.  Locally Engaged Staff (LES) reported 
seeing individuals handing out these pamphlets in broad 
daylight.  The pamphlets were marked "Release No. 2" and signed 
by "Media Office, Imam Hussein Brigades."  The document ended 
with the warning, "We will never show any mercy to anyone 
working or dealing with the occupation forces including 
interpreters, local workers who are serving them and some 
traitors from the security forces.  We warn anybody who goes to 
their locations." 
 
¶6. (C) The British Consul General told the Deputy Regional 
Coordinator (DRC) on May 31 that the above pamphlet was probably 
released as a result of British and Iraqi military operations in 
Basrah that led to numerous arrests and seizures of large 
weapons caches.  In a meeting with the DRC and RSO on May 29, 
the Brigade Commander, Brigadier General James Everard, outlined 
extensive operations being carried out by the 20th Brigade and 
the Iraqi Army.  Everard stated that the number of both day and 
night patrols had increased, as well as the number of hours per 
patrol.  The general public, he said, appears to be "sleeping 
better with the sound of Warriors (Armored Fighting Vehicles) on 
the streets." 
 
-------------- 
REO Operations 
-------------- 
 
 
BASRAH 00000094  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (C) Following the appearance of "Release No. 2," the number 
of local KBR workers at REO Basrah fell.  Prior to the 
appearance of the pamphlet, the numbers of local workers had 
reached an average of 135 per day (out of a total of 212 local 
positions).  The day after the pamphlet was distributed, the 
number fell to 95.  The REO continues to have KBR expatriates 
drive Sewer Sanitation Trucks (SSTs) that empty directly into 
the Shat al-Arab River and pick up the garbage for burning on 
the compound.  Regarding the lack of drivers for fuel trucks 
coming to the REO, the British military is providing escort 
until KBR can have storage tanks installed on the compound. 
 
¶8. (C) On May 25, the REO's air bridge to Kuwait -- managed by 
the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) based in 
Camp Arifjan -- resumed operations and completed one round-trip 
flight.  The current plan for the air bridge is for it to 
continue to provide one flight per week, predicated on a minimum 
of 20 passengers. 
 
¶9. (C) The British military has indicated it will sustain the 
increased tempo of its operations indefinitely and move the UK 
Battle Group headquarters located at Shat al-Arab Hotel to the 
Basrah Palace Compound, consolidating forces here and at the 
Basrah Air Station.  This will make more UK troops available at 
the Basrah Palace Compound for patrols and arrests.  (COMMENT: 
Coalition bases may experience a violent backlash due to the 
recent increase in arrest and patrol operations of the British 
military and the Iraqi Army.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT: The poor security situation in Basrah involves 
a number of factors including militia infiltration of the police 
(Basrah 63); sectarian violence between the Sunni minority and 
Shia majority; corruption in the BPC; and outside interference, 
most likely from Iran, in the form of supplying resources to 
militias.  Militias and death squads are dominated by men who 
currently have few other options for employment.  Investments, 
business, and even the REO are not able to staff positions 
because of harassment and intimidation of local staff. 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: From REO Basrah's perspective, PM 
Maliki's declaration of a state of emergency is a bold step 
forward in addressing the complexity of the security situation 
in Basrah.  We expect the majority of Basrah's residents to 
welcome or at least accept the declared state of emergency, as 
long as it results in an increase in security within a short 
amount of time.  There may be tense confrontations between the 
Iraqi police and the Iraqi Army as the state of emergency is 
implemented.  It remains to be seen if a month will be 
sufficient to correct the situation.  Central government 
involvement is essential to resolving the security impasse, and 
PM Maliki's visit to Basrah is timely and has the potential to 
set Basrah back on track.  END COMMENT. 
MARRANO