VZCZCXRO7105
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0093/01 1551733
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041733Z JUN 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0367
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0386

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000093 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/4/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KISL ASEC IZ
SUBJECT: SERIOUS CONCERNS WITH NEWLY-APPOINTED BASRAH SECURITY 
COMMITTEE 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 1869 
 
BASRAH 00000093  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO 
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  It is unlikely that the 5-person emergency 
security committee appointed by PM Nouri Al Maliki will be able 
to positively impact on the security situation in Basrah.  Three 
of its members, Badr Corps head Hadi al-Amiri, former Minister 
of Transportation Salam al-Maliki, and Minister of Provincial 
Affairs Dr. Safa al Saafi, have close ties to Basrah Governor 
Mohammed Wa'hili, who has been identified by numerous sources as 
one of the main reasons for Basrah's deplorable security 
situation.  Security in Basrah continues to be a main concern, 
as a direct attack on the REO compound, a bomb in a marketplace, 
and an attack on a Sunni mosque all occurred within the past 24 
hours (to be reported in septel).  End Summary. 
 
Emergency Committee Has No Plan, Wants to Leave Basrah 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The British Consul General reported that in a June 2 
meeting, the emergency committee spent the initial few minutes 
of the meeting outlining a plan to establish 24-hour vehicle 
police checkpoints in order to arrest unmarked cars.  This was 
the extent of their security plan. During the remainder of the 
meeting, the committee members, and Dr. Safa in particular, 
chastised the British representatives on detainee issues.  After 
an hour on the subject of British military failures, the 
committee then requested British military transport back to 
Baghdad on Sunday. 
 
¶3.  (C) The British Consul General expressed concern that the 
emergency plan as outlined in the June 2 meeting was 
insufficiently developed to adequately address Basrah's numerous 
security concerns.  He also expressed disbelief that this was 
the outcome that the PM had been hoping to achieve, and 
questioned the decision to put the governor in charge of 
security.  He noted that Dr. Safa has come out strongly in 
support of the governor. 
 
Emergency Committee Compromised 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶4.  (C) In a June 4 meeting, Majed al-Sari, Ministry of Defense 
Advisor for the Southern Region, told the Deputy Regional 
Coordinator (DRC) that the emergency security committee had no 
hope of stabilizing the situation in Basrah with the Governor at 
its head, comparing the situation to "a thief minding the 
store."  He described Dr. Safa as a close personal friend of 
Governor Wa'hili.  Former Transportation Minister Salam 
al-Maliki used to be the Deputy Governor of Basrah in 2004, 
Majed said, and has too many personal interests in Basrah to be 
able to deal with the security crisis neutrally.  Amiri, a 
well-known Badr Organization member, went to the same school as 
Governor Wa'hili and was also a close friend of his.  Majed was 
unable to name the Sunni Arab representative on the committee, 
although he said he thought there was one.  (Comment: We have 
heard three different names for the Sunni representative: 
Samara'ee (no further information), Amer (no further 
information), and Khalaf al-Issa, head of the Sunni Iraqi 
Islamic Party and parliamentarian.  We have been unable to 
confirm any of these names.  End Comment.) 
 
¶5.  (C) When asked why he thought the PM had appointed these 
people to be on the committee, Majed answered that he believed 
it was out of desire to avoid bringing in "outsiders" who would 
be viewed with distrust by the provincial government.  He said 
this was fine, but the mistake was in not balancing out the 
"insiders" with technocrats and other political independents. 
He noted that all of the members on the committee were political 
figures who would look at the Basrah problem through the 
perspective of their parties' interests, not in terms of how to 
solve the problem.  He suggested that representatives from the 
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Human Rights should have 
been included on the council.  He expressed disbelief that the 
emergency committee included no representatives from the Iraqi 
Army or police. 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment:  The issue of British-held detainees and 
forcing their release has been Governor Mohammed's favorite 
theme for months.  That Dr. Safa took this issue on in the 
security committee meeting, even though it is not directly 
related to Basrah's security situation, concerns us.  The 
committee appears to be more concerned with laying the blame for 
Basrah's poor security on coalition forces than actually doing 
anything to address the problem.  Vehicle checkpoints alone will 
do little to improve matters in Basrah, especially if they are 
under the control of the Basrah police.  Even this part of the 
plan has not been fully implemented yet in the city. 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment continued: We concur with the British and with 
Majed al Sari that the emergency security committee, as it now 
 
BASRAH 00000093  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
stands, will fail because the emergency plan is unworkable and 
inadequate, and because the security committee is not committed 
to finding solutions to the security crisis in Basrah.  The 
Governor has been implicated repeatedly in militia-related 
attacks and assassinations, as well as oil smuggling and other 
corrupt activities.  It is inconceivable that he will be able to 
positively impact Basrah's security.  Central government 
involvement is crucial in order to remove the Governor from the 
head of the emergency committee; if he cannot be physically 
removed, his influence on the committee must be reduced.  We 
also believe that making the emergency committee more 
representative by including non-political members of the 
Ministries of Defense and Human Rights, for example, would be a 
step in the right direction.  End comment. 
MARRANO