VZCZCXRO5673
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0110/01 1720649
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 210649Z JUN 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0395
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0414

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000110 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/21/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS KDEM KISL IZ
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL ELECTION IN BASRAH LIKELY TO BE WAR BETWEEN THE 
5'S 
 
REF: A) BASRAH 001 
 
BASRAH 00000110  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In meetings on June 15 and June 19, Hazim 
Joda, the branch manager for the Independent Electoral 
Commission of Iraq (IECI), and Osama Khalil, the Basrah IECI 
media manager, gave Basrah Regional Embassy Office (REO) Poloff 
an overview of issues in the pre-provincial election season in 
Basrah.  Both officials said that they expected the provincial 
election in Basrah to be particularly competitive and 
contentious, as the different political parties that make up the 
Unified Iraqi Coalition (UIC)- List 555- compete for power 
against each other.  Security in Basrah has degraded 
considerably since the December 15 election and is likely to be 
much more of an issue in the provincial election.  The issue of 
out-of-province voting for Iraqis displaced by sectarian 
violence was identified as a growing concern.  End Summary. 
 
List 555:  Each 5 For Himself 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In meetings on June 15 and June 19, Hazim Joda, the 
Basrah IECI branch manager, and Osama Khalil, the Basrah IECI 
media manager, gave an overview of issues leading up to the 
provincial election season in Basrah.  Neither Hazim nor Osama 
speculated about when they thought the provincial election would 
take place, but both said that they were aware the issue was 
currently under discussion in parliament.  Those parties 
currently in power were pushing for a later provincial election 
date, they said, while those parties that would likely gain 
seats were pushing for an early election. 
 
¶3.  (C) Osama and Hazim said they believed that Fadhila would 
separate from the rest of the Unified Iraqi Coalition (UIC) List 
555 for the provincial election.  Osama also said that it was 
possible that the two Da'awa parties and the Office of the 
Martyr Sadr (OMS) might separate from the UIC 555.  (Note:  In 
such a scenario, Da'awa and Da'awa Tanzim would remain allied. 
End Note.)  Both Osama and Hazim said, however, that other 
lists' parties, such as those in Iraqi National Accord (INA) 731 
List and Basrah Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) 618 List, were 
waiting to see what would happen to the UIC 555 before deciding 
whether or not to withdraw from their Lists.  If OMS withdrew 
from UIC 555, for example, then 731 parties would be more likely 
to remain on their list to improve their chances of winning more 
votes.  (Comment:  One REO contact said that in the provincial 
election, we would see the complete breakdown of the UIC 555 
List.  "It will be each 5 for himself."  End Comment.) 
 
¶4.  (C) Osama and Hazim both said that they maintained open 
communication with IIP party members.  The Sunni party had been 
disappointed with the outcome of the December 15 election, but 
they had also admitted to the IECI that they had not chosen 
their political candidates wisely and had therefore lost votes 
to the 731 List, which had included a former Ba'athist party on 
it (reftel).  Because the Sunni parties had lodged so many 
complaints after the December 15 election, Osama said that the 
IECI planned to welcome as many Sunni election observers as 
possible in the future provincial election. 
 
Security in Basrah a Major Concern 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Both Hazim and Osama voiced concern about the security 
situation in Basrah and how deteriorating conditions might 
adversely affect the provincial election.  Osama voiced private 
concern that the targeting of Sunnis in Basrah for 
assassinations, as well as the attack on the IIP headquarters in 
Basrah following the February 22 Golden Mosque attack, would 
adversely impact the elections.  Both Hazim and Osama expressed 
concern that the Sunni IIP headquarters was still closed in 
Basrah because it would affect the party's ability to organize 
and participate in the provincial election.  Hazim stated that, 
"2003 was better than 2004, and now 2005 is proving to be better 
than 2006." 
 
¶6.  (C) Both IECI officials remarked that the provincial 
election in Basrah would be especially competitive and 
contentious because the political parties comprising the UIC 555 
will compete against each other instead of cooperating with each 
other as they did in the December 15 parliamentarian election. 
The December 15 election had not been particularly divisive in 
Basrah, Hazim pointed out, and the UIC 555 won 13 out of 16 
national assembly seats.  Largely because of the lack of 
controversy, the December 15 election had taken place in an 
atmosphere of peace, with relatively few incidents of fraud or 
security issues.  This would not be the case during the 
provincial election, in his view, and he foresaw a greater risk 
 
BASRAH 00000110  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
for security incidents in the lead-up to the provincial election 
in Basrah, as well as more allegations of fraud and voting 
irregularities by the political parties. 
 
Getting out the Vote 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Osama said that he was focusing on launching an 
effective public education campaign in Basrah in order to 
improve voter turnout.  He said that he was worried that too 
many people were becoming apathetic about voting.  As media 
manager, he saw it as his specific duty to "get out the vote," 
and was working closely with the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI) and other non-governmental organizations to do so.  He 
specifically identified women voters as a target audience, 
saying that women made up over half the population but were 
historically underrepresented in voter turnout.  He said he was 
trying to brainstorm possibilities to encourage women to educate 
themselves about voting so that they would be less susceptible 
to pressure from family members and religious leaders on how to 
vote. 
 
Where and How Do IDPs Vote? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶8.  (C) Osama identified voting for internally displaced people 
(IDPs) in Basrah as an issue of concern.  Many Shia families 
have moved into the Basrah area from other provinces in Iraq, 
and these individuals will face difficulty in being able to vote 
in the provincial election.  These families are too frightened 
to return to their home provinces to vote.  (Comment:  During 
the June 19 meeting, Hazim downplayed the issue, saying that he 
believed the IDP problem in Basrah was blown out of proportion 
by the media.  Hazim was not present at the June 15 meeting. 
End Comment.) 
 
¶9.  (C) When asked if the IECI could coordinate with the 
Ministry of Displacement and Migration to facilitate voting for 
displaced families, Osama replied that this would be possible. 
He suggested that displaced families be allowed to pre-register 
in the 40 days leading up to the provincial election in their 
new province of residence with the "Number 91 Form."  He 
admitted that this might tax IECI logistical capabilities 
because, from past experience, he knew that most people waited 
until the last few days before the election to pre-register.  He 
said the IECI had no plans at the moment to allow for absentee 
or out-of-province voting.  (Comment:  Allowing IDPs to vote in 
their new places of residence would solve the issue of them 
voting.  However, it would not enable them to vote for the local 
government in their places of habitual residence, which would 
pose other problems.  In addition, the influx of Shia into 
Basrah and the flows of Sunnis out of Basrah may skew the 
results of the provincial election if IDPs are not able to 
affect the vote in their places of habitual residence.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶9.  (C) Comment:  The outcome of the December 15 election in 
Basrah was largely a foregone conclusion, as the political scene 
in Basrah was, and continues to be, dominated by the Fadhila, 
Da'awa, SCIRI, and Basrah Islamic List parties.  This will not 
be the case in the provincial election, because each of these 
Islamic political parties will attempt to gain as much control 
on the provincial council as possible.  The likelihood of 
intense political battles, coupled with the unstable security 
environment in Basrah, indicates that the provincial election in 
Basrah has the potential to take place in a significantly 
different atmosphere than the December 15 election and give rise 
to increased violence. 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment continued:  Despite Hazim's efforts to minimize 
of the problem of IDPs in Basrah, it has the potential to 
explode in the polling stations during the run-up to the 
election because the issue concerns sectarianism between Sunnis 
and Shia.  In any case, the issue of out-of-province voting must 
be resolved on a general level so that Iraqis who are 
temporarily displaced from their provinces of habitual residence 
have the opportunity to affect political change in their home 
provinces.  End comment. 
 
¶11.  (C) BIONOTE:  Hazim Hammed Joda al-Rubaee was born in 1954 
in Basrah.  He became the manager of the Basrah branch of the 
IECI in December 2005.  Prior to that, he was the deputy IECI 
manager from October to December 2005.  He is not affiliated 
with any of the political parties.  He obtained a B.S. in 
mechanical engineering from the University of Basrah in 1978 and 
spent the following sixteen years working in the Ministry of 
Transportation as an engineer.  In 1994, he fled to Jordan, 
where he worked in a transport company.  In 1996, he moved to 
the United Arab Emirates where he worked in the Muften Company 
until he returned to Basrah in 1998.  He speaks fluent English. 
 
BASRAH 00000110  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
He is married and has three children. 
 
12 (C) BIONOTE:  Osama Khalil Ibrahim was born in 1965 in 
Basrah.  He obtained a B.S. in political science from the Shatt 
Al Arab University in Basrah and is currently working on his 
M.S. in political science at the same university.  He does not 
speak English.  He is married. 
GROSS