VZCZCXRO2553
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0104/01 1690640
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180640Z JUN 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0384
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0403

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000104 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/18/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: MAJOR GENERAL LATIF MOTIVATED TO TACKLE BASRAH SECURITY 
PROBLEMS 
 
REF: BASRAH 93 
 
BASRAH 00000104  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a June 14 meeting with the Regional 
Coordinator (RC) and Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC), Major 
General Abdul Latif of the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army 
expressed support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's recent 
visit to Basrah and his efforts to enhance security in Basrah. 
Increased security measures have resulted in a recent decrease 
in murders, he said.  MG Latif agreed to coordinate with the 
British military to provide an Iraqi Army presence outside the 
main gate of the Regional Embassy Office in Basrah to deter 
attacks on local employees.  The Iraqi Army was qualified and 
capable of carrying out its duties, he said, and morale was high 
among the soldiers.  In his view, the assassinations were being 
carried out by criminal elements whose ultimate aim is to divide 
Basrah from the rest of Iraq and control its resources.  End 
Summary. 
 
Support for the Prime Minister's Visit 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2. (C) In a June 14 meeting with the RC and DRC, Major General 
(MG) Abdul Latif of the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army 
expressed support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's recent 
visit to Basrah.   Citing the political corruption and numerous 
assassinations that plague Basrah, MG Latif called the visit "a 
new beginning."  He said that the PM recognized the extent of 
the problem during his visit to Basrah and that the additional 
security measure that have been put into place since the visit 
resulted in a reduction in murders.  (Comment:  There were six 
murders reported to the Police Joint Operations Center- PJOC- in 
Basrah on June 13 and only one murder on June 14.  However, it 
is still too soon to tell if the murder rate has really dropped. 
 End Comment.)  Exuding confidence, he considered it an honor 
that the PM had requested him to take on a leadership role in 
Basrah and stated that the Iraqi Army (IA) had been accorded a 
large role in implementing the security plan.  He firmly stated 
that the IA's role was to support the central government. 
 
¶3.  (C) In accordance with the security plan, MG Latif said that 
he is in charge of four brigades, with one located in each of 
the four southern provinces.  One company from each from the 
provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan, has been brought in 
to buttress his forces in Basrah.  The increase in troops 
results allows him to increase IA presence in the city, MG Latif 
said, and these men would not be biased by political party 
affiliation or militias since they come from outside Basrah. 
The end result, he said, would be to frighten and control the 
criminal elements in Basrah responsible for most of the murders. 
 Even with the recent reduction in murders, he did not intend to 
let up on the security campaign. 
 
New Security Committee? 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) MG Latif alluded to a new security committee that had 
been formed in Baghdad without the knowledge of the political 
parties to address security in Basrah, and its members are 
scheduled to arrive in Basrah soon.  This new security committee 
is a very good thing, he said, because it shows that Baghdad was 
taking the situation in Basrah seriously and recognizing that 
the political parties were part of the security problem.  He was 
unsure of the names of the members of the new committee, but 
believed that there were seven people on the committee and that 
Minister Safa  al-Saafi heads the new committee. The committee 
will report directly to the Prime Minister and not to the 
governor.  (Comment: If this is true, we suspect that Minister 
al-Saafi is not unbiased and will act in support of Basrah 
Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli.  See reftel.  End Comment). 
 
Relations with CoP, Governor 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
¶5.  (C) In regards to Basrah Chief of Police (CoP) Hassan Sewady 
al-Saad and the Basrah Iraqi Police Services (IPS), MG Latif 
said he maintained good relations with the CoP and tried to help 
him when possible with security matters, but that he was aware 
that the CoP did not trust 80 percent of his own IPS.  The crux 
of the problem with the IPS in Basrah, he said, was that there 
was a lack of field supervision.  He said that while on patrols 
in Basrah, he would instruct IA soldiers to put on their body 
armor and helmets if they were not wearing them, but no real 
supervision of IPS exists.  Although there is a genuine problem 
with militia and political party infiltration into the IPS, he 
 
BASRAH 00000104  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
said that this problem could be addressed through professional 
supervision and direction. 
 
¶6.  (C) MG Latif described his relations with Governor Mohammed 
as starting off well at the beginning, but said that his efforts 
to maintain communications were not reciprocated by the governor 
and that the governor had not attended the funerals of his two 
sons.  He described taking a trip to Nassiriyah and observing 
the close cooperation between the governor of Dhi Qar and the IA 
commander.  He said that the lack of communication and 
cooperation between the IA and the Basrah governor only served 
to increase security problems. 
 
¶7.  (C) When asked about the governor's push to have him removed 
from his position, the MG scoffed, saying the governor had no 
authority over the IA.  He acknowledged that the Basrah 
Provincial Council had convened on June 11 and voted on 
replacing the CoP as well, but said that they were not able to 
obtain the necessary number of votes.  The BPC, he said, was 
"uneducated" because it attempted to get rid of the people they 
found difficult to work with instead of seeking ways to maintain 
dialogue. 
 
Criminals and Mafia Types Carrying Out Murders 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) He acknowledged that Sunnis, academics, and Iraqis 
associated with the Coalition were being targeted for murder. 
The perpetrators are opportunist "mafia types" that attacked the 
only people they can get at.  Most of the militias, he said, are 
made up of criminals who had records for theft and murder. 
Jayish Al Mahdi (JAM) is the worst of the militias, he said, and 
is responsible for most of the IEDs and mortar attacks in the 
city.  These incidents are exacerbated by lack of interest on 
the part of the BPC-he described an incident during the PM's 
visit to Basrah where Vice President Hashimi specifically 
mentioned that Sunnis were being targeted in Basrah and leaving 
because of it.  BPC Chairman Sadoon al-Obadi had interjected 
that the Sunnis in Basrah were free to leave if they wanted, and 
no one was forcing them to go.  These remarks caused a strong 
reaction from the other people in the room. 
 
¶9. (C) The criminals were targeting teachers, religious leaders, 
and minorities in Basrah in order to ultimately divide Basrah 
from the rest of Iraq and control its resources, in MG Latif's 
view.  The Oil Protection Forces (OPF) is heavily infiltrated by 
these criminals, he said, because their positions give them easy 
access oil and profit from smuggling.  Every time the IA was 
close to capturing some of the smugglers, he said, these 
individuals were killed by other members of the OPF to protect 
the group as a whole.  Political parties, and Fadillah in 
particular, pressures members of the OPF and Facilities 
Protection Services (FPS) to join their party, he said. 
 
¶10.  (C) Despite the recent decrease in murders, MG Latif said 
that he suspected that many of the criminals were just laying 
low and waiting for the 30-day state of emergency to end before 
upping their activities again.  He said the best way to have a 
lasting effect on security in Basrah was to focus on "filtering" 
the IPS and removing those who were corrupt and engaged in 
criminal activity.  He expected this to be the main goal of the 
new security committee that was coming down from Baghdad and 
that it would take six to nine months to root out the criminals 
in the IPS. 
 
Iraqi Army Up to the Challenge 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) MG Latif was optimistic about the ability of the IA to 
carry out its role in the security plan.  Gaps in resources 
existed, he admitted, but there were enough soldiers to get the 
job done.  The IA launched a public education campaign in Basrah 
to direct people to call a hotline to report killings and 
kidnappings and to respect IA convoys and give them the right of 
way so they can do their job.  He described his soldiers as 
well-trained and morale as good, because the soldiers believed 
that they were working to protect people. 
 
Increased Protection for REO Employees 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶12. (C) The RC asked the MG to consider increasing IA presence 
outside the main gate of the Regional Embassy Office to deter 
the monitoring of the movements of local employees and attacks 
on them.  The MG replied that this should be possible and that 
he would coordinate with the British military to do so.  He 
concurred with the RC that an increase in IPS outside the main 
gate would simply frighten local employees even more, because 
IPS have become associated in the minds of most Iraqis with 
murder campaigns. 
 
BASRAH 00000104  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶13.  (C) Comment:  MG Latif was careful and diplomatic in his 
descriptions of the governor, the CoP, and other political 
figures, and it was clear that he valued the ability to maintain 
dialogue and professional relations with all the players on the 
field.  He was dismissive of the BPC's approach of boycotting 
and voting out people they did not agree with, and he believed 
that the provincial elections would result in many of the 
current political players in Basrah losing their seats.  He also 
clearly does not believe that only 30 days of emergency security 
measures will result in a complete cure to the security 
situation in Basrah.  However, he was obviously determined to 
carry out his role in keeping Basrah from falling into the hands 
of separatists that wish to monopolize the province's resources 
by forcing a national division.  End Comment. 
GROSS