VZCZCXRO7966
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0102/01 1650554
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140554Z JUN 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0380
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0399

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000102 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/14/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SOCI IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH GOVERNOR RENEWS EFFORTS TO REMOVE POLICE CHIEF, 
BACKTRACKS ON SECURITY PLAN 
 
REF: A) BASRAH 95, B) BASRAH 98, C) BASRAH 75, D) 05 BASRAH 49 
 
BASRAH 00000102  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Basrah Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli again 
renewed his efforts to replace Chief of Police (CoP) Hassan 
Sewady al-Saad by calling for a vote of no confidence on June 
¶11.  He said that the emergency security plan was not successful 
in halting violence in Basrah because the CoP was not qualified 
for his position and police efforts were less than robust.  The 
CoP does not believe the governor will be able to replace him 
unless he manages to bribe Minister of Interior officials.  The 
governor, he said, had been trying to remove him from his 
position for months because of his efforts to reform the police. 
 End Summary. 
 
Governor Says Basrah Police Are the Problem 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In a June 13 meeting, the Basrah Regional Coordinator 
(RC), Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC), and Poloff met with 
Basrah Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli to discuss the security 
situation in Basrah and the role of the Iraqi Police Service 
(IPS) and Iraqi Army (IA) two weeks after the declared State of 
Emergency (see Ref A).  The Governor said that the current 
security plan has many gaps and requires modifications.  The 
CoP, according to Wa'eli, is not qualified to lead the IPS and 
is not cooperating fully in implementing the security plan.  The 
Governor said he has not received any assistance from the 
central government to improve Basrah's security and claimed that 
he was responsible for devising and implementing the security 
plan. 
 
¶3.  (C) Governor Wa'eli repeatedly stressed that the plan was 
not working as well as it should because General Sewady and the 
IPS were not doing their jobs.  He said that he had observed 
firsthand in trips around the city that IPS did not carry out 
their duties.  Lack of cooperation from the CoP and IPS resulted 
in "gaps" in the security plan, the governor said.  He 
identified weak leadership, militia infiltration, lack of police 
discipline and high levels of corruption as the reasons behind 
the IPS's poor performance.  He said he had proposed a plan to 
the central government that would force approximately half of 
the IPS to retire to make room to hire more qualified officers. 
The Governor expressed frustration that his time was tied up 
with security issues and that he did not have time to focus on 
other issues, such as corruption.  If the IPS had strong 
leadership and did their jobs, he said, he would be able to 
shift his focus to other matters. 
 
¶4.  (C) In a complete turn-around from his June 5 statements 
regarding the role of the Iraqi Army in implementing the 
security plan, the governor told the RC and DRC that the plan 
would be more successful with increased IA participation (see 
Ref B), and he was working to incorporate more IA assistance and 
participation in the plan.  Governor Wa'eli also said that the 
security committee is coordinating with MND-SE forces on 
modifications to the plan and is working on a six-month security 
plan for Basrah.  Even with the problems inherent in the 
security plan, the Governor opined that there had been an 
improvement in the security situation in the past two weeks. 
 
CoP Presents Alternate View on Security Plan 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) In a June 12 meeting with the RC, CoP Sewady said that 
the security plan was good and that he was attempting to 
implement it in spite of interference from the governor.  As an 
example of the Governor's obstruction, he described an incident 
on June 8 when three men were arrested after launching a mortar 
attack near police headquarters.  Later that day, men wearing 
uniforms from the Serious Crimes Unit appeared at the police 
station, said that both they and the detainees were "governor's 
men," and pressured the police officers into releasing the 
detainees.  The detainees filed a court case against the police 
for imprisoning them without evidence, and they were able to do 
this because the governor was in control of the security 
committee.  (Comment:  When asked about the attack on the police 
station, Governor Wa'eli said he had heard something about the 
attack, but said that no one had been arrested in relation to 
it.  End Comment). 
 
¶6.  (C) The CoP acknowledged that corruption was a major problem 
in the police force and said that this was why it was necessary 
to incorporate Iraqi Army and coalition forces into the plan. 
As long as there were militias in Basrah, the CoP said, there 
would be security problems.  The plan itself, he said, consisted 
 
BASRAH 00000102  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
mostly of increasing vehicle checkpoints and patrols in the "hot 
spots" in Basrah.  He said he believed a committee from Baghdad 
from either the PM's office or the MoI would arrive in Basrah in 
the near future to work on implementing the security plan. 
(Note:  The governor, when asked about a possible visit of a 
committee from Baghdad, said he knew of no such committee but 
that the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior may 
visit Basrah in the next few days to discuss the security 
situation.  End Note.) 
 
Voting Out the Chief of Police 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The Governor acknowledged that the Basrah Provincial 
Council (BPC) had met on June 11 and voted on the removal of the 
Basrah CoP, but that only 24 members voted in favor of the 
removal.  Only 31 of the 41 BPC members attended the session, 
and some members abstained from voting.  The Governor said that 
if all 41 members were present they might have gotten the 28 
votes necessary to remove the Chief of Police.  Even though the 
necessary 28 votes were not made, the Governor confirmed that 
eight names had been forwarded to the Ministry of Interior as 
possible replacements for the CoP, but said that all eight 
candidates were unqualified. 
 
¶8.  (C) The governor publicly announced his disapproval of the 
CoP in a press conference on May 13 (see Ref C).  CoP Sewady 
expressed doubt that the governor would be able to get rid of 
him, noting that he had been attempting to remove him either 
through assassination attempts or through the political process 
for over a year and had thus far been unsuccessful.  He said 
that he had strong support from the MoI, as well as from members 
of the Basrah Islamic List on the BPC.  He expressed disdain for 
most BPC members, who constantly request that he supply them 
with cars, weapons, ammunition, and bodyguards. 
 
¶9.  (C) CoP Sewady said that he had been informed by his 
contacts in the MoI that names had been forwarded to the MoI as 
candidates to replace him as CoP.  He identified one of the 
candidates as General Mohammed Kadhem Ali, a former CoP that CoP 
Sewady said "corrupted the police in the first place" by hiring 
politically affiliated police (see Ref D).  If he does get 
replaced, the CoP said, it would be because MoI officials were 
bribed into getting rid of him. 
 
Chief of Police Says Basrah Governor Is the Problem 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
---------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The CoP said that the increase in violence in Basrah 
since the May 31 declaration of the State of Emergency was, in 
his opinion, due to Governor Wa'eli, the Fadillah party, and 
their militia reacting to the strong criticism of Sunni Vice 
President Hashimi.  The marketplace bombing on June 3 with the 
subsequent attack on the Sunni mosques was a show of strength to 
retaliate against the perceived "meddling" of the central 
government in Basrah's affairs.  When asked why the governor was 
appointed head of the security committee, the CoP replied that 
this decision had been made after seeing the negative reaction 
of the local government to the PM's visit in order to avoid an 
escalation in tension and violence. 
 
¶11.  (C) Comment:  The governor was clearly opposed to the PM's 
declaration of a State of Emergency in Basrah, while the CoP 
expressed support for it - because it resulted in a loss of face 
for the Basrah governor.  Now that the IA has been accorded a 
greater role in implementing the plan, the governor is 
supporting the move for the same reasons - because it makes the 
CoP look like he is incapable of doing his job.  Governor 
Wa'eli's proposed police reformation plan sounds very similar to 
the reformations that CoP Sewady has been trying to implement 
since he assumed his position - reduce the number of unqualified 
police in the force and fight corruption.  However, the 
governor's increasingly desperate attempts to remove CoP Sewady 
from his position suggest that his true interests lie in 
protecting his militia members on the police force and 
maintaining his influence in security matters.  The CoP has 
always opposed militia infiltration and the influence of the 
Islamic political parties on the police force.  CoP Sewady was 
instrumental in disbanding the Division of Internal Affairs in 
December 2005, which functioned as an extrajudicial force under 
the personal control of Governor al-Wa'eli that was involved in 
criminal activities.  End Comment. 
GROSS