VZCZCXRO6817
PP RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0101/01 1641016
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 131016Z JUN 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0378
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0397

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000101 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/13/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI CLERIC PESSIMISTIC ON BASRAH SECURITY SITUATION 
 
REF: A) BASRAH 78; B) BASRAH 89; C) BASRAH 96 
 
BASRAH 00000101  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b) 
 
¶1.  Summary:  On June 12, the Regional Coordinator (RC) and 
Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC) met with Sheikh Khalid al 
Mullah, a moderate Sunni Imam.  During the meeting, Sheikh 
Khalid said that the security situation remains dismal and 
Sunnis in Basrah are continuing to flee because of intimidation 
and assassinations.  He expressed frustration with the lack of 
help from the local government that remain inert due to 
infighting.  According to Sheikh Khalid, the security situation 
in Basrah has deteriorated since the Prime Minister's May 31 
"State of Emergency" declaration.  He said that unless something 
is done soon to help the Sunni community, the threat of 
assassination would continue to force them to leave Basrah.  End 
summary. 
 
DISPLACEMENT AND ASSASSINATIONS 
 
¶2.  On June 12, the RC and DRC met with Sheikh Khalid al Mullah, 
a moderate Sunni imam and close REO contact, to discuss the 
security situation in Basrah.  He pointed out that there were 
two factors affecting Sunnis in Basrah, displacement and 
assassinations.  Sheikh Khalid estimated that over the last two 
months, approximately 500 Sunni families had fled Basrah for 
other Iraqi cities (Mosul, Bayji and Anbar) and Jordan and 
Syria.  He estimated that the numbers would increase over the 
next month and that approximately 50 percent of Sunni families 
in Basrah had already left or were planning to leave, with 40 
Sunni families leaving Basrah daily.  Sheikh Khalid said that 
the number of Sunnis assassinated over the past two months also 
increased. 
 
¶3.  Sheikh Khalid stated that the local government was doing 
nothing to help the Sunnis of Basrah and that he had met with 
the Governor, Mohammed al Wa'eli, various political parties and 
security forces.  When asked what he was told by Governor 
Wa'eli, Sheikh Khalid responded that the Governor did what he 
always did which is to blame other political parties for 
Basrah's security problems.  He said that many of the other 
political parties, in turn, blamed the Governor for all of the 
security problems.  Sheikh Khalid said all the political parties 
- and their militias - are the root of the problems facing 
Basrah and share in the responsibility for the violence. 
 
STATE OF EMERGENCY 
 
¶4.  According to Sheikh Khalid, the security situation in Basrah 
has worsened since the announcement of a State of Emergency by 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.  He cited increased 
assassinations and the bombing of the marketplace as examples 
(Ref C).  He said that he has not seen an increased Iraqi Army 
(IA) presence in Basrah, but affirmed that it would be very 
welcome.  Sheikh Khalid suggested that an increase in the number 
of IA in Basrah and weeding out bad and corrupt officers in the 
Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is the only viable way to control or 
decrease the level of violence in Basrah.  He opined that people 
did not trust the IPS and that increased presence of the IA 
would make people feel safer.  Sheikh Khalid said that when 
citizens see Coalition Forces on patrol it makes them feel safe, 
unlike when they see a heavy IPS presence. 
 
DISAFFECTED SUNNI YOUTH 
 
¶5.  Sheikh Khalid reiterated comments he has made previously 
that the Sunnis in Basrah are different from Sunnis in the rest 
of Iraq.  He stated that the Sunnis in Basrah were not violent 
and have never opposed Coalition Forces.  He expressed 
frustration that the Sunnis in Basrah were paying for the 
mistakes of Sunnis elsewhere in Iraq.  According to Sheikh 
Khalid, approximately 70 percent of young Sunnis in Basrah have 
fled for other regions in Iraq.  He is deeply concerned that 
these young people would go to more volatile cities and 
participate in violent activities and then return to Basrah and 
pursue the same activities they learned in the north.  He was 
afraid that the youth that had left would import the violence 
from other parts of Iraq. 
 
PERSONAL TRAGEDY 
 
¶6.  When asked if Sunni intimidation was still taking place, 
Sheikh Khalid replied in the affirmative.  He stressed that the 
intimidation took on three forms; direct personal threats, 
threatening letters or notes and the assassination of a family 
member that would prompt the rest of the family to flee.  Sheikh 
Khalid then said that his 13-year-old son had been kidnapped 10 
days ago.  He said that his son was beaten and had his 
fingernails removed.  After being held captive for four days he 
was released when Sheikh Khalid paid the kidnappers US$12,000. 
 
BASRAH 00000101  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
The kidnappers told him that this time it was merely a 
kidnapping but if he and his family did not leave Basrah, the 
next time his son would be killed.  Sheikh Khalid has since 
moved his family to Damascus, Syria.  He did not know who was 
responsible for the kidnapping. 
 
¶7.  Sheikh Khalid said that he had no intention of leaving 
Basrah.  He has minimal security in the form of a few bodyguards 
and said that he only leaves his home when absolutely necessary. 
 He wanted to stay in Basrah with the hope that he could help 
make a difference.  Sheikh Khalid said that Sunni extremists who 
previously criticized and would not speak to him because of his 
relationship with Coalition Forces are now beginning to 
understand that engagement with all parties is important.  Some 
Sunni extremists now are coming to speak with him on a regular 
basis. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶8.  Comment:  Sheikh Khalid is always willing to meet with 
Coalition Forces and publicly denounce militia and sectarian 
violence.  He genuinely wants to help end the violence in any 
way that he can, even if it means risking his own life by 
staying in Basrah.  The security situation in Basrah is bad for 
the average citizen of Basrah, but for the Sunnis it is even 
more perilous. The Prime Minister's declaration of a "State of 
Emergency" on May 31 gave the Sunnis in Basrah hope that 
violence against them would diminish.  However, two weeks later, 
there still is no improvement in their particular situation. 
End comment. 
GROSS