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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANJUL 000396 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, AND VCI/FO; PRETORIA PLS 
PASS TO VCI PDAS FORD; DAKAR PLS PASS TO DAO, ODC, AND RAO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID MASS KMCA PTER PINS EINV ETRD
EAIR, GA, AU 
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: SCENE-SETTER FOR VCI PDAS FORD'S AND 
AF DAS THOMAS-GREENFIELD'S VISITS 
 
 
BANJUL 00000396  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) VCI PDAS Ford and AF DAS Thomas-Greenfield will visit 
The Gambia against the backdrop of the AU Summit -- for which 
the GOTG is feverishly preparing -- but also against the 
backdrop of markedly negative  human rights trend in this 
country, as highlighted by abuses following the coup plot 
thwarted March 21.  The GOTG has shown little regard for 
detainees held in connection with the failed plot, while also 
cracking down on private media institutions.  The negative 
repercussions of the GOTG's backsliding on human rights were 
evident in the June 16 suspension of The Gambia's eligibility 
for the MCA program.  Holding credible Presidential and 
National Assembly elections in 2006-7 will be crucial in GOTG 
efforts to reverse the negative human rights trend, which 
underscores rough-hewn President Jammeh's autocratic 
impulses. 
 
¶2. (C)  In the absence of MCA assistance, our Peace Corps 
program remains the centerpiece of USG development aid to The 
Gambia; annual bilateral assistance totals $1.5 million to $2 
million, and half of this amount goes to run the Peace Corps 
program.  The U.S. private sector's contribution to The 
Gambia's development in terms of investment remains modest, 
but is growing, and the inauguration of direct flights 
between Baltimore and Banjul by North American Airlines will 
promote commercial and other links.  Other key items in our 
bilateral agenda include pursuing the Global War on Terrorism 
and promoting regional peace and stability, but President 
Jammeh's erratic, autocratic behavior -- and his clumsy 
handling of relations with a far more powerful neighbor, 
Senegal -- complicates efforts to advance our agenda here. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
OVERVIEW: AU SUMMIT 
-------------------- 
 
3.(C) VCI PDAS Christopher Ford and AF DAS Linda 
Thomas-Greenfield, scheduled to visit The Gambia next week, 
will be the most senior State Department officials to travel 
here since the June 2003 visit by then-AF DAS Amb. 
Bridgewater.  Their visits will occur during the GOTG-hosted 
African Union Summit and preparatory meetings June 25-July 2, 
for which the GOTG is at present feverishly finalizing 
arrangements.  The AU Summit will be the largest 
international gathering ever hosted by the Gambians, and the 
tiny, severely resource-strapped GOTG is all-consumed with 
Summit preparations.  It remains unclear just how many 
African heads of state will be on hand, although GOTG and 
other sources estimate that perhaps half of the 53 leaders 
will personally attend.  Gambian President Yahya Jammeh's 
priority for the Summit is clear -- using it to cast himself 
as a respected, established African leader. 
 
NEGATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS TREND 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) But PDAS Ford's and DAS Thomas-Greenfield's visits 
will also occur against a backdrop detracting from Jammeh's 
image-building efforts: marked deterioration in the GOTG's 
record on human rights and respect for democratic norms.  The 
negative human rights trend has been most evident since 
November 2005, when authorities, likely acting at the 
President's direct instruction, detained three opposition 
politicians on trumped-up charges of sedition and unlawful 
possession of official documents.  The GOTG subsequently 
released the trio on bail, following a month's detention, and 
later dropped the charges altogether, but, since the coup 
attempt foiled March 21, the deterioration in the country's 
human rights situation has only intensified. 
 
THE FOILED COUP PLOT 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In response to the failed overthrow attempt, a 
vengeful Jammeh publicly vowed that those implicated would be 
treated "without mercy" so as to deter future would-be 
plotters.  In the ensuing months, authorities have detained 
over 50 persons -- including military officers, civilian 
officials, parliamentarians,  and private citizens -- 
suspected of having any connection with the plot. So far, 15 
detainees have been charged and are currently on trial, 
 
BANJUL 00000396  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
around 28 have been cleared of involvement in the plot and 
released without charge, and five or so remain in custody, 
but have yet to be charged.  A GOTG  statement claimed that 
five detainees, including former National Intelligence Agency 
head Daba Marena, escaped from custody in late March, but 
authorities have said nothing since about efforts to 
recapture them, amidst persistent rumors that they were 
secretly executed. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶6. (C) Our sense is that authorities have shown little regard 
for detainees' rights;  we have picked up credible reports of 
torture. (A senior official, detained but later released, 
claimed to us that both he and his children were beaten by 
security officials determined to obtain incriminating 
information.)   We believe that all detainees, including 
those released and cleared of suspicion, were held without 
charge beyond the maximum 72-hour period stipulated by law. 
Jammeh has stated that the accused will receive a fair 
trial, but it is hard to imagine those tortured being allowed 
to testify to the abuse.  As for those detainees who have yet 
to be charged, among them  is Mariam Denton, lawyer of 
prominent defendant and dual U.S.-Gambian national Tamsir 
Jasseh.   A reliable source tells us that authorities have no 
evidence of Denton's involvement in the failed plot, but are 
keeping her in custody because of her refusal so far to 
divulge information that Jasseh may have shared with her 
about the plot. 
 
CRACKDOWN ON THE MEDIA 
---------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The country's private media institutions have also 
figured prominently in the negative human rights trend.  In 
October 2005, authorities closed the Sengalese-run radio 
station, SUD FM, citing broadcasts that could undermine 
Gambian/Senegalese relations.  In late March, in the 
aftermath of the foiled coup plot, authorities closed a 
journal, the "Independent," and detained its General Manager 
and Chief Editor -- both later released -- as well as a 
journalist, who has been charged with "printing false 
information" and is currently on trial.  The GOTG has given 
no explanation for the continued closure of the 
"Independent,"  but our sources believe that, because of the 
paper's well-known anti-government outlook, the GOTG is 
unwilling to permit it to resume publication, lest its 
anti-Jammeh pieces tarnish his image prior to the AU Summit. 
Most recently, the manager of the foreign-based  online 
"Freedom Newspaper,"  also known for its anti-Jammeh views, 
claimed that pro-GOTG hackers had been responsible for the 
disruption of his website and public disclosure of the names 
of subscribers; authorities reacted by calling in locally 
resident subscribers for questioning.   Meanwhile, the 
December 2004 murder of prominent journalist Deyda Hydara, 
associated with the independent journal, "The Point," remains 
unsolved, amidst ongoing allegations of GOTG involvement. 
 
FALLOUT ON BILATERAL TIES: SUSPENSION OF MCA ELIGIBILITY 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶8. (C) The top U.S. objective in The Gambia is promoting 
respect for human rights and democratization, and the GOTG's 
backsliding in this area is at present overshadowing all 
other aspects of our bilateral relationship.  Indicative of 
the fallout, on June 16 the Millenium Challenge Corporation's 
(MCC) Board of Directors voted to suspend The Gambia's 
eligibility for the Millenium Challenge Account (MCA) 
program. The MCC's decision was based, inter alia, on the 
GOTG's declining performance on MCA eligibility criteria in 
the "ruling justly" category; slippage in performance on 
various criteria in the "promoting economic freedom" category 
was also cited.  With the GOTG currently all-consumed with AU 
Summit preparations, its reaction to the suspension has so 
far been muted; Foreign Minister Lamin Kaba Bajo indicated to 
the Ambassador the GOTG's desire to work closely with us on 
behalf of reinstatement, but it is hard to imagine the GOTG 
achieving sufficient improvement on relevant eligibility 
criteria within the minimum six-month "waiting period" for 
submission of a successful reinstatement request. 
 
THE 2006-7 ELECTIONS 
-------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Holding credible Presidential and National Assembly 
elections, scheduled for September 2006 and January 2007, 
respectively, will be crucial in any GOTG effort to reverse 
 
BANJUL 00000396  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
the current negative trend in the human rights and political 
arenas.  Prospects for good elections, though, are uncertain. 
To be sure, opposition parties have been allowed in recent 
months to conduct public gatherings and other activities to 
build popular support.  A recent by-election for a National 
Assembly seat featured active campaigning by opposition as 
well as ruling party candidates, and the opposition accepted 
the ruling party's victory as legitimate.   Opposition 
leaders have assured us that they will participate in the 
Presidential  and National Assembly contests, asserting their 
belief that they will have an adequate opportunity to compete 
for votes. (NOTE: The 2002 National Assembly contest, 
although judged credible by the international community, 
nonetheless featured a boycott by the country's leading 
opposition party, the United Democratic Party, UDP. UDP 
leaders have repeatedly told us that they will refrain from a 
boycott in the upcoming contests. END NOTE) 
 
¶10. (C)  At the same time, the GOTG's backsliding on human 
rights in past months has pointed up President Jammeh's 
autocratic impulses. While opposition party leaders have not 
been targetted in the aftermath of the failed coup plot, 
Jammeh's public statements deriding the opposition are not 
encouraging. In February, Nigerian President Obasanjo's 
mediation brought about improved dialog between Jammeh and 
his  ruling APRC party, on the one hand, and the opposition 
parties, on the other; in Obasanjo's presence, the two sides 
signed a MOU setting forth a "code of good conduct" for the 
elections.   The extent to which Jammeh and his APRC respect 
the MOU in the run-up to the elections will likely serve as a 
good indicator regarding the credibility of the electoral 
process.  Meanwhile, our sources express hope that Obasanjo, 
perhaps joined by other African leaders, will use the AU 
Summit to impress on Jammeh the imperative of reining in his 
autocratic tendencies and permitting credible elections.   We 
will also continue to stress to the GOTG the crucial 
importance of good elections for the country's democratic 
evolution. 
 
THE GAMBIA'S DEVELOPMENT AND U.S.SUPPORT 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Gambia's now-suspended MCA eligibility held out 
the prospect of a substantial expansion of U.S. assistance 
for the country's efforts at development and poverty 
alleviation.  Among the world's poorest countries, with per 
capita income less than $400, The Gambia relies heavily on 
foreign donor assistance.   In the absence of MCA assistance, 
our Peace Corps program remains the centerpiece of our 
development aid.  Overall bilateral U.S. aid to The Gambia 
currently runs at $1.5 million to $2 million annually, and 
about half of this amount represents the cost of the Peace 
Corps program.  A noteworthy development is the growing 
involvement in The Gambia of the U.S. Trade and Development 
Agency (USTDA), which is currently supporting two feasibility 
studies for investment projects here. 
 
¶12. (SBU)  The U.S. private sector's contribution to The 
Gambia's development in terms of investment remains modest; 
current investments total an estimated several million 
dollars.  At the same time, American firms are showing 
increasing interest in The Gambian market, and the recent 
inauguration of a weekly direct flight between Baltimore and 
Banjul by North American Airlines will facilitate the 
strengthening  of commercial and other links.  True, the 
current volume of bilateral trade is minimal, and The Gambia 
has yet to take much advantage of its AGOA eligibility,  with 
AGOA-qualified exports to the U.S. less than $100,000 
annually. The Gambia's AGOA-related textile visa is expected 
to be finalized soon, but the country's prospects for 
significant textile  exports to the U.S. are limited. 
 
OTHER U.S. INTERESTS 
-------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Other noteworthy bilateral interests include the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and regional peace and 
stability.  Regarding the GWOT, in recent years, Jammeh and 
his government have proven to be useful partners, providing 
concrete support for several joint counterterrorism 
operations.  The GOTG's efforts on behalf of regional peace 
and stability are manifested in its participation in 
peacekeeping operations, most recently the African Union 
Mission in Darfur, where the Gambian contingent includes a 
company of troops, around 100 police officers, and various 
 
BANJUL 00000396  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
military observers.  Also noteworthy is the generally 
pro-U.S. feeling in this moderate Muslim country, making it 
fertile ground for our public diplomacy efforts. 
 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
---------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Following his re-election in 2001, Jammeh undertook 
various initiatives to improve ties with the U.S., e.g., 
concluding an Article 98 Agreement, sharply reducing links 
with a key patron, Libya, adopting a more moderate foreign 
policy generally, and improving the GOTG's human rights 
record. The U.S., in turn, responded with such gestures as 
lifting the "508 Sanctions" imposed following his 1994 coup 
and granting AGOA eligibility; the culmination was the 
granting of MCA eligibility. Past months, however, have 
served to reaffirm the rough-hewn Gambian leader's penchant 
for erratic, autocratic behavior and called into question his 
reliability and effectiveness as a partner.  His clumsy 
handling of ties with his far more powerful neighbor, Senegal 
(e.g., the two countries' August/October 2005 dispute over 
transport and border issues, provoked by the GOTG, Jammeh's 
poor management of bilateral strains resulting from the 
failed coup plot) also raises questions as to The Gambia's 
status as a force for stability in West Africa.  In sum, 
Jammeh's pattern of behavior in recent months requires that 
we keep up the pressure for a reversal of the negative trends 
that led to the suspension of MCA eligibility while working 
to maintain cooperation on other key U.S.  interests such as 
the GWOT. 
STAFFORD