VZCZCXRO7489
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2148/01 1731452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221452Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5258
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002148 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PDEM KCRM MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: REACTIONS TO THE BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 02135 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for 
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C//REL MNFI) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. The Baghdad Security 
Plan commenced operation June 14.  The June 20 MCNS review of 
the plan assessed the operation positively, noting room for 
improvement (reftel).  On June 24, the plan will be formally 
reviewed to determine what modifications are needed to 
maximize progress.  While some of the measures implemented by 
the plan, like additional checkpoints set up across the city, 
have inconvenienced the citizens of Baghdad, they have proven 
effective in controlling crime and decreasing violence. 
 
¶2. (C//REL MNFI) The below comments reflect reactions from a 
variety of political contacts.  The majority of our contacts 
agreed that improving the security situation in Baghdad would 
send a strong message to terrorists all over Iraq.  They 
supported measures to stem the violence that has continued 
across Baghdad for the past several months.  However, both 
Sunni and Shia contacts reported that they have not seen 
Baghdad Security Plan measures implemented in Shia 
neighborhoods, which has heightened Sunni concerns that the 
plan targets their communities.  We interpret the following 
comments as partially representing the actual situation, but 
also biased by personal views.  END COMMENT AND SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------- 
No Change in Shia Neighborhoods 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C//REL MNFI) Sadr City DAC member Ali Suadi told PolFSN 
in a June 22 conversation that the Baghdad Security Plan has 
had a negligible effect on security in Sadr City.  According 
to Suadi, the only checkpoints in Sadr City are JAM 
checkpoints.  There is no sign that JAM is concerned that ISF 
will interfere with their activities. 
 
¶4. (C//REL MNFI) In June 18 meetings with PolOff, Ahmed 
Hassan, Hassan Shama, Ahmed Rahim, and Talib Hussein of the 
Sadr City District Advisory Council (DAC) said the Baghdad 
Security Plan has not affected security in Sadr City.  Ahmed 
Hassan said the Sadrist-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) still 
controls Sadr City.  The extra security measures taken under 
the Baghdad Security Plan did not prevent the June 16 bombing 
of the Buratha Mosque in Baghdad.  Hassan recommended that 
MNF-I and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) completely seal off 
Sadr City for several days, search every house, and arrest 
militia members.  He added that the lack of security in Sadr 
City has caused some residents - Sunni Arab, Shia, and Kurd 
alike - to say they wish for Saddam's return, although he 
admitted that most people do not actually want this and say 
so only in anger. 
 
¶5. (C//REL MNFI) On June 18, SCIRI CoR member Ijra Faisal Oda 
told PolOff that there is some evidence that the Baghdad 
Security plan had been implemented in Sunni areas but that 
there was no activity in Sadr City and many Shia 
neighborhoods.  She pointed out that her parents live in the 
very dangerous neighborhood of Hatema (located next to 
Ameriyah district) and claimed that the Iraqi Security forces 
have not set up any checkpoints. 
 
¶6. (C//REL MNFI) On June 16, Iraqiyya COR member Hachem 
al-Hassani claimed that the plan had not been implemented in 
the Shia neighborhoods, which contributed to its 
politicization.  He acknowledged that many Sunni areas will 
be targeted for terrorists, but that the PM needs to show on 
television that the plan is being executed in all areas of 
Baghdad, otherwise he should expect a violent backlash that 
could harm him politically. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Sunnis Okay with Plan, Anxious About Implementation 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶7. (C//REL MNFI) Sunni Arab leaders continued to view the 
Baghdad Security Plan with skepticism and believed that it 
has targeted their communities.  Iraqi Islamic Party leader 
(IIP) Ala'a Makki told Poloff June 17 that there is great 
anxiety about the plan.  He said people were afraid that the 
plan was meant to attack and disarm the Sunni people.   He 
said that there was nothing wrong with the plan itself, just 
the manner of its implementation and asked for USG support to 
ensure that the security measures apply to all the sects, not 
just the Sunnis. 
¶8. (C//REL MNFI) The IIP affiliated Dar As-Salam paper 
published a front page editorial on June 18 where it said it 
could not be optimistic if the new plan was like the previous 
ones - "we can expect more random arrests and killings."  The 
editorial concluded that since the security forces were 
 
BAGHDAD 00002148  002 OF 003 
 
 
infiltrated by militias that participate in the raids, the 
coming days will show if the plan succeeds or fails. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Senior Sunni and Kurdish Leaders Not Consulted 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶9. (C//REL MNFI) Vice President Tarik al-Hashimi on June 11 
said that he had several concerns about the security plan 
including that he and other Sunni leaders in government, had 
not been consulted when it was drawn up.  The plan continued 
to refer to "terrorists" in Baghdad, a term previously used 
by the MOI to justify attacks on Sunni Arab neighborhoods, he 
said.  In addition, MOI forces continue to control 
checkpoints in Sunni areas under the plan. 
¶10. (C//REL MNFI) Senior Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
Council of Representatives (CoR) member and former Deputy 
Prime Minister Rowsch Shaways told PolOff on June 19 that he 
personally had not been shown a copy of the Baghdad Security 
Plan.  However, he agreed that it was crucial to secure 
Baghdad ) if the capitol was safe, Shaways reasoned, it 
would send a positive message to the rest of the country. 
The key thing was to incorporate both Ministry of Defense and 
Ministry of Interior forces into the plan, and ensure that 
they were supervised by Coalition Forces.  The Coalition's 
oversight would reassure citizens of Baghdad that they would 
not be unfairly scrutinized for sectarian reasons, and would 
act as "quality control" over the minimally trained Iraqi 
soldiers and police. 
 
-------------------------- 
Checkpoints Not the Answer 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C//REL MNFI) Sadr City DAC members Talib Hussein, Ahmed 
Rahim, and Hassan Shama characterized the additional 
checkpoints that have been set up under the Baghdad Security 
Plan as "useless."  They said that ISF has neither the 
equipment nor the training to effectively search cars for 
weapons, including bombs.  As a result, the checkpoints serve 
only to create more traffic jams, they argued. 
 
¶12. (C//REL MNFI) Baghdad provincial governor Hussain 
al-Tahan (SCIRI) told PolFSN June 19 that there is no 
organized security plan, just an increase in checkpoints and 
traffic problems.  The additional troops were doing nothing 
more than duplicating the work of the traffic police.  Al- 
Tahan called the plan "tribal," claiming that it had not been 
developed by experts.  He said that he had called Minister of 
Interior Jawad al-Bulani to complain about the plan, and its 
focus on quantity not quality.  To truly secure Baghdad, he 
argued, more checkpoints need to be set up at the entrances 
to the city, not within the city itself. 
 
¶13. (C//REL MNFI) In a June 17 meeting, UNAMI Human Rights 
Officer Bushra Jamil told PolOff that the Baghdad Security 
Plan would not solve the security problems in Baghdad.  She 
said that more checkpoints would do nothing but snarl 
traffic, however she also cautioned that more raids on 
private homes could increase public resentment towards the 
Iraqi security forces.  Jamil insisted that the only way the 
security situation would improve would be for coalition and 
Iraqi forces to finally act on the information they already 
know, and start arresting and punishing the criminals 
committing the violence. 
 
¶14. (C//REL MNFI) One Embassy FSN from Baghdad's 
Shia-dominated Qadimiyah district commented on June 18 that 
locals were hopeful for the new security plan, but cautious. 
She noted that the plan had resulted in more checkpoints and 
waiting lines, and that this aspect of the plan made 
residents nervous.  "We are afraid that a terrorist will 
target and try to attack these queues". 
 
¶15. (C//REL MNFI) In a June 19 conversation with PolFSN, 
Baghdad City Council Chairman Basem Al-Yacoubi (Fadhila) said 
that it was too early to see results from the Baghdad 
Security Plan.  He cautioned against rushing to judgment, 
noting that "maybe after one month we can evaluate the 
results."  He also advocated for a greater focus on arms 
control, rather than movement control (checkpoints).  If 
everyone turned in their weapons, perhaps in an amnesty 
effort, then violence would end he reasoned. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (C//REL MNFI) While many political contacts were critical 
of the Baghdad Security Plan, their criticism was generally 
aimed at implementation issues rather than at the plan 
itself.  We report these comments knowing they may reflect 
 
BAGHDAD 00002148  003 OF 003 
 
 
individual views.  Many consider new procedures cumbersome 
and inconvenient.  For example, while the addition of 
checkpoints across the city creates traffic jams at times, 
the increased scrutiny both deters and prevents attacks. 
 
¶17. (C//REL MNFI) Baghdad residents are strongly in favor of 
initiatives to increase security.  Unfortunately the deep 
divide that has developed between Sunni and Shia, as well as 
between citizens and the security forces, makes consensus on 
security matters difficult to achieve.  MNF-I and GOI 
officials are well aware of existing sensitivities, and will 
continue to assess the effectiveness of the plan and adjust 
strategies and procedures as appropriate. 
SPECKHARD