VZCZCXRO5511
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2114/01 1720231
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 210231Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5211
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0043
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002114 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016 
TAGS: PGOV CIA IZ MASS MCAP MOPS NATO PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: MCNS - MUTHANNA, BASRAH, AND BAGHDAD 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2046 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, A.I. DANIEL SPECKHARD FOR REASONS 1.4 
 (A), (B), (D) 
 
¶1. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) SUMMARY: On June 18, the 
Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS) met to 
discuss security issues in Muthanna, Basrah, and Baghdad.  It 
was decided to announce the transfer of security 
responsibility for Muthanna from the Coalition to the GOI on 
June 19.  The Basrah security plan was evaluated, with 
modifications to be made to the Iraqi command structure.  The 
MCNS also evaluated the Baghdad security plan, the 
implementation of which will be reviewed to improve 
effectiveness and counter rising insurgent violence.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki 
chaired the MCNS on the evening of June 18.  Present for the 
Iraqis were Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zawbai; Minster of 
Interior Jawad al-Bulani; Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir; 
Minister of State for National Security Shirwan al-Wa'ili; 
Minister of Finance (and former Minister of Interior) Bayan 
Jabr; National Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie; and 
Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Babikir Shawkt.  The Coalition was 
represented by Charge d'Affaires Speckhard, UK Ambassador 
Patey, and MNF-I Deputy Commanding General LTG Fry.  Topics 
for discussion were security issues in Muthanna, Basrah and 
Baghdad. 
 
------------------------ 
ANNOUNCEMENT OF TRANSFER 
OF SECURITY IN MUTHANNA 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) Transfer of security responsibility 
for Muthanna (reftel) from the Coalition to the GOI is 
pending.  The MCNS decided to make modifications to the way 
that local security is handled in Muthanna because of 
problems that had previously arisen with the Basrah 
Governor's management of security in his province.  The MCNS 
implemented restrictions on the Muthanna Governor's authority 
to raise his own militia forces, recruit new police personnel 
who are more loyal to the Governor than to the GOI, direct 
control of police forces, and affect MNF-I movement.  Maliki 
will decide who would be the lead for handling any crisis in 
Muthanna, and -- depending on the circumstances -- the Iraqi 
Police (IP) Commander or Iraqi Army (IA) Commander are the 
preferred leads. 
 
------------------------------------ 
MUTHANNA READY FOR SECURITY TRANSFER 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) Maliki decided that the 
announcement to transfer provincial security would be made on 
June 19.  A decision for the date of a formal transfer 
ceremony is pending but likely to be July 14.  The MCNS 
agreed to delay the public announcement of the actual 
ceremony date for security reasons.  It also was agreed that 
the proposed general Implementing Arrangements and the PM's 
Security Authorization (which would allow the PM to designate 
specific individuals to assume lead roles) would be reviewed 
by Maliki, who agreed to decide this week on their specifics. 
 
------------------ 
PROBLEMS IN BASRAH 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) The MCNS then reviewed the Basrah 
security plan.  There was consensus that Basrah is a critical 
province and that success there could have a ripple effect 
across Iraq.  As such, solid groundwork needs to be laid to 
permit the eventual transfer of security and to allow 
provincial elections.  There would be leadership changes; 
Iraqi forces would become more disciplined and effective; and 
a political/national dialogue would be conducted. 
 
¶6. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) Current weaknesses in the IP and IA 
in Basrah are challenges that have to be overcome now, Maliki 
stated.  In order to instill discipline in the ranks, Maliki 
ordered reform of the IP to remove corrupt elements by 
prosecuting them.  Weak leaders in the IP and IA, he 
directed, would be replaced by those with strong, proven 
records.  Increased security operations would heighten ISF 
visibility, deter rogue IP and JAM/militia elements, and 
reassure the local populace.  The MCNS also assigned specific 
 
BAGHDAD 00002114  002 OF 002 
 
 
missions: the ISF would lead "deter and reassure" operations 
(checkpoints, joint patrols, outreach to local Sunnis, and 
increase in surge operations); MNF-I would lead "attrition" 
operations (arrest, search, and detention operations). 
Command and control arrangements would be revised, minimizing 
the Basrah Governor's role and authority in security, with 
the GOI selecting a trusted person from the Iraqi army as the 
chair of the Provincial Security Committee (formerly the 
Governor was the cha 
ir). 
 
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BAGHDAD 
------- 
 
¶7. (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) The Baghdad Security plan commenced 
on June 14.  Maliki requested a review of progress so far and 
what changes needed to be made.  Although attacks initially 
decreased, there was a follow-on spike of violent attacks on 
June 17.  The MCNS agreed that this spike was an attempt to 
discredit the GOI's high-profile security initiative.  Also, 
due to certain areas being cordoned off, there is concern 
that some neighborhoods are short of food and water.  Maliki 
urged for the momentum to continue and requested that the 
security Ministers review what modifications needed to be 
made to counter the insurgents and protect the people. 
Maliki strongly emphasized that setbacks would not be 
accepted and that if more forces are necessary or additional 
supplies needed, then they would be brought in from other 
areas.  It was agreed that a formal review will be conducted 
on June 24. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (S//REL GBR AUS JAPAN) COMMENT: Maliki allowed 
free-wheeling discussions by all those present.  Rubaie was 
extremely vocal in the deliberations, demonstrating his 
growing influence as NSA.  Maliki, however, ultimately called 
the shots, concluding the meeting with a crisp summation of 
the decisions taken and the actions pending -- typical of his 
decisive, business-like performance thus far.  END COMMENT. 
SPECKHARD