VZCZCXRO4268
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #1844/01 1520946
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 010946Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4825
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001844 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016 
TAGS: PINS MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: MCNS DISCUSSES NEW PLAN FOR BAGHDAD SECURITY 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (A), (B), (D 
) 
 
¶1.  (S//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki 
convened a meeting of the Ministerial Committee for National 
Security (MCNS) on May 29 to discuss the Baghdad Security 
Plan.  National Security Advisor (NSA) Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie 
provided a briefing on the political and outreach aspects of 
the plan, while Fourth U.S. Infantry Division (4ID) 
Commanding General J.D. Thurman explained the military 
components. For several of the Iraqis present, this was their 
first exposure to the MCNS process, and they expressed 
uncertainty about approving the plan if they could not be 
assured of its success.  It was agreed that a "Red Team" 
would examine the plan one more time to assure all that it is 
workable and stands a good chance of success.  The PM also 
directed the Iraqi Army to formulate a plan to deal with 
reportedly rising levels of violence in Diyala province.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (S//REL GBR AUS) PM Maliki convened the MCNS at his office 
the morning of May 29.  Present for the Iraqis were DPM for 
Security and Acting MinDef Salam al-Zawba'i, DPM Barham 
Salih, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoshyar Zebari, NSA 
Rubaie, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Babikir Shawkt, and the 
PM's Assistant Dr. al-Tamimi.  Also present were Ambassador, 
British Ambassador Patey, MNF-I Commanding General Casey, and 
4ID Commanding General Thurman. 
 
--------------------- 
BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S//REL GBR AUS) The purpose of the meeting was to 
continue discussions from May 25 on the Baghdad Security 
Plan.  Rubaie explained that in addition to its military 
aspects, it is important that the Plan be put into political 
context and that Iraqis be informed of it through a media 
outreach campaign.  Such a campaign would include a public 
announcement of the government's plan for security that puts 
it in the context of national unity.  Religious leaders would 
be called upon to speak in its favor, and the leaders of 
militias and armed groups would be engaged in advance.  The 
people, Rubaie argued, must be told what the Ministries of 
Interior (MOI) and Defense (MOD) are doing to protect them, 
primarily from Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ). 
 
¶4.  (S//REL GBR AUS) Non-military aspects of the plan include: 
 
-- Improved border security 
-- Strict regulation of personal security details 
-- Increased police presence 
-- Funding to replace worn out or destroyed police equipment 
and vehicles 
-- Additional professionalization of the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF), including new, unique uniforms to make it more 
difficult for unauthorized armed groups to masquerade as 
police 
 
¶5. (S//REL GBR AUS) Rubaie confirmed that clear statements 
would be made to the public to: 
 
-- Call for national unity 
-- Explain that licenses will be required for weapons and 
that the number of guns permitted to be stored inside mosques 
and husayniyas will be strictly controlled 
-- State that an amnesty for members of the "honorable 
resistance" is being considered; the government will work to 
develop a more effective judicial system; organized crime 
will be targeted; new jobs will be created, support will be 
sought from neighboring countries; and a system will be put 
in place to more effectively register and track vehicle 
ownership. 
 
¶6. (S//GBR AUS) MG Thurman then briefed the military aspects 
of the security plan, which call for a focus on four areas of 
Baghdad where sectarian violence, murders, and assassinations 
continue to be a problem.  These problems are caused by AQIZ 
(which is attempting to foment sectarian strife), militias, 
organized criminal gangs, and illegal Sharia courts, Thurman 
said.  Different combinations of forces will be sent to these 
areas; permanent checkpoints will be augmented by temporary 
and constantly moving traffic control points; and targeted 
operations against terrorist cells operating on Baghdad's 
fringes will continue 24 hours a day to interdict their 
ability to carry out attacks in the city center.  Areas of 
Baghdad with minimal problems will be turned over to 
competent Iraqi police forces to further build confidence in 
the government's ability to maintain peace without the Iraqi 
 
BAGHDAD 00001844  002 OF 003 
 
 
Army or CF.  In addition, funds will be spent to beautify 
parts of Baghdad by cleaning up unauthorized checkpoints and 
makeshift street barricades.  It is anticipated that ISF will 
take the lead and that Coalition Forces (CF) will play a 
supporting role.  Iraq will also look to the Coalition and to 
other neighbors and international partners for funding to 
help reintegrate members of armed groups into society. 
 
---------------- 
QUESTIONS RAISED 
---------------- 
 
¶7. (S//REL GBR AUS) Following the presentations by Rubaie and 
MG Thurman, DPM Zawba'i protested that although he is the DPM 
in charge of security and the Acting MinDef, this was the 
first time he was hearing about all of this.  To achieve 
security, Zawba'i said, it is necessary for the CF to gain 
the Iraqi people's trust, which cannot be done while 
thousands of detainees remain in custody.  Zawba'i then 
criticized the state of detention facilities managed by the 
MOI and MOD and insisted that the Coalition assist in 
obtaining the release of detainees, or at least their 
transfer to facilities managed by the Ministry of Justice. 
He recommended that checkpoints in Baghdad be manned jointly 
by MOD and MOI forces because the people have more trust in 
the Iraqi Army than they do in the police.  Zawba'i objected 
to Rubaie's earlier reference to an "honorable resistance" 
and said that he is going to meet with clerics and militia 
leaders to emphasize that, with the formation of a National 
Unity government, the age of 
the gun is over and the age of reconstruction has begun. 
 
¶8. (S//REL GBR AUS) Rubaie sought to address Zawba'i's 
concerns, pointing out that steps are being taken to address 
the detainee problem, that the security plan had been put 
together with MNF-I prior to the seating of the new 
government, and that the previous government had also 
formulated a five-point plan to deal with militias.  Rubaie 
then repeated the political and public outreach steps that 
will be taken in conjunction with the security plan. 
 
¶9. (S//REL GBR AUS) Ambassador pointed out that achieving 
security in Baghdad is critical, as all of Iraq and the 
outside world look to what is happening in Baghdad as an 
indicator of how things are going in the country as a whole. 
Because the enactment of this plan will be the first major 
security decision taken by the new government, Ambassador 
added, it is important that all involved have confidence that 
the plan is well conceived and that we have the resources to 
make it a success.  The government must not over-promise or 
under-deliver, Ambassador warned, nor must it set 
expectations that cannot be met.  GEN Casey assured 
Ambassador and the others that sufficient forces exist to 
make the plan a success, noting five main points to emphasize 
the critical interplay between policy, action, and 
communications.  In GEN Casey's view: 
 
-- The government must make an announcement about the 
security plan that places it in the context of national unity; 
 
-- A public affairs outreach program must be designed that 
will get the Iraqi people involved (e.g., by encouraging them 
to use tip lines more to address the problems in their 
neighborhoods); 
 
-- There must be a policy and action on weapons possession 
and illegal checkpoints; 
 
-- Anti-terrorism measures (such as curfews, vehicle bans, 
etc.) must be used to help ISF get the population involved; 
 
-- There must be a broad statement on militia policy. 
 
¶10.  (S//REL GBR AUS) Both Maliki and DPM Salih continued to 
have questions concerning the plan, such as how it differs 
from what is already being done and whether the size of the 
force and the nature of the actions to be taken are 
sufficient to achieve the goals set.  Army Chief of Staff 
Babikir opined that the plan as presented is comprehensive 
and supported by the Army.  Ambassador suggested that the 
plan be subjected to a review by a "Red Team" to identify and 
fill any gaps that may exist.  The Prime Minister directed 
Rubaie to coordinate a final review of the plan. 
 
------ 
DIYALA 
------ 
 
¶11. (S//REL GBR AUS) Maliki reported he had received a letter 
 
BAGHDAD 00001844  003 OF 003 
 
 
from the Governor of Diyala Province stating that reported 
levels of violence are increasing beyond the ability of local 
authorities to control.  The Governor is requesting central 
government assistance to address these problems.  Maliki 
directed Babikir to formulate a plan on how the Army can be 
used to help assist local forces quell the violence. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (S//REL GBR AUS) COMMENT: This was the first MCNS meeting 
for nearly all of the Iraqi participants, and it was clear 
that they have yet to define their own roles on the 
committee.  Likewise, it was the first time that they have 
dealt with the highest levels of Coalition military and 
diplomatic leadership concerning the serious security matters 
facing the country. 
KHALILZAD