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P 071426Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8209
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0090
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 5898
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1145
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4580
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1318
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0179
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0197
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0997
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0307
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0505

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASMARA 000490 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC ETTC ER SU
SUBJECT: GSE ASKS FOR USG ROLE IN EF NEGOTIATIONS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: AMB Scott H. DeLisi, for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with PFDJ Political 
Advisor Yemane Ghebreab on June 6, 2006, Ambassador 
was told that the Government of the State of Eritrea 
(GSE) continues to move ahead with planning for 
preparatory talks on June 13 with the Eastern Front 
and Government of National Unity (GNU).  Ghebreab 
explained that he has not received as much input from 
the parties as expected, but believes most issues 
should be resolved during the discussions next week. 
He noted that the parties had decided not to invite 
observers for the preparatory talks but he was 
confident there would be a role for international 
partners once the formal negotiations got underway. 
However, he said he would nonetheless welcome USG 
assistance and advice on how to structure both the 
talks and an agreement for eastern Sudan, suggesting 
possible meetings with USG experts in advance of the 
start of the negotiations.  "Fresh" ideas on how to 
achieve a lasting agreement, especially in light of 
the problems affecting the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), would be 
helpful, he said.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On June 6, 2006, Ambassador met with PFDJ 
Political Advisor Yemane Ghebreab to discuss recent 
developments on the Eastern Front and GNU 
negotiations.  Ghebreab explained that the GSE would 
be ready for the June 13 preparatory talks, but was 
frustrated that the GSE had yet to receive agenda 
items from the parties or even the names of the 
representatives for the GNU.  That said, he believes 
that both parties are committed to the process and to 
sorting out the outstanding issues for the launch of 
negotiations during the preparatory session. 
 
¶3. (C) When asked about whether observers would be 
present for the preparatory talks, he explained that 
both parties had agreed that observers would not/not 
be present at those sessions.  The preparatory talks 
would instead be used to resolve between the parties 
their differing views on observers for the formal 
negotiations themselves.  Yemane noted that the GNU 
has been resistant to the idea of observers and the 
Eastern Front would like to invite most of the 
international community.  He stated that the GSE has 
no preference other than to find a compromise that 
both sides can live with and it will work with the 
parties to reach some agreement.  He added that the 
GSE would need technical advice from the 
international community, especially from those 
governments who have been involved in Naivasha and 
Abuja.  Ghebreab also admitted that the GSE will need 
the assistance of countries who have leverage with 
the GNU and can put pressure on them if need be, and 
made it clear that the U.S. would be an instrumental 
partner. 
 
¶4. (C) Ghebreab continued by noting he had little 
doubt that there would be a role for international 
actors during the formal negotiations, and more or 
less assumed the U.S. would be asked to play a role 
once the parties reached agreement at the pre-talks. 
Surprisingly, he queried if it would be possible for 
a USG expert on Sudan to come to Asmara either before 
or, perhaps better, after the preparatory talks to 
meet with him and the GSE team and discuss what an 
agreement in the East should look like.  He wanted to 
draw on our prior experience with Khartoum and would 
welcome, he said, our input into what a realistic and 
achievable agreement that could meet both political 
imperatives and the needs of the people in the east 
might look like.  In particular, he asked us for 
assistance in coming up with "fresh" ideas in how we 
should approach such an agreement, looking beyond the 
CPA.  Ghebreab discussed as well other areas where 
our help could be important as the eastern 
negotiations move forward and seemed eager to work 
with us. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment:  The meeting with Ghebreab on Sudan 
signaled a considerable step for the GSE in terms of 
asking directly for the USG to provide technical 
assistance and policy input on the negotiations and 
agreement.  We know that Norwegian colleagues who 
have also been providing input to the Eritreans have 
urged them to reach out to the USG but even they were 
surprised that Ghebreab, who they considered 
previously to be skeptical about doing so, had been 
so forthcoming.  They suggested that this decision 
might reflect a policy shift agreed upon at the 
highest levels in the GSE.  Whatever the reasons, we 
believe that the GSE request gives us a unique 
opportunity to influence the course of developments 
in eastern Sudan and also to engage the GSE more 
directly on support for the Darfur peace agreement as 
well - especially important given the recent arrival 
here of both the SLM and JEM non-signatories to the 
agreement.  While no decisions on observers or timing 
for negotiations have been set, post would like 
Department's input at the earliest on the possibility 
of providing technical assistance to the GSE, 
guidance on engaging the parties prior to 
negotiations and the role, if any, of observers. 
End Comment. 
 
DELISI