This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 002567 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/ARP, EUR/RPM; 
PM - HILLEN, LOFTUS 
OSD FOR ASD RODMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016 
TAGS: MARR PREL IZ AE NATO GE
SUBJECT: NATO DELEGATION REPORTS ON STATUS OF DISCUSSIONS 
WITH UAE ON ICI 
 
REF: 05 ABU DHABI 1376 
 
Classified By: DCM Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  On June 12, a Turkish admiral heading NATO 
delegation visiting the UAE briefed diplomats of NATO 
countries on progress in ICI discussions with the UAEG.  UAE 
interlocutors were described as well-prepped and "very 
forward-leaning and positive," but are also perceived as 
having "misperceptions and incorrect knowledge" about NATO's 
overall goals.  Delegation conveyed UAE MFA concerns about 
Iranian "poor management" of nuclear facilities as well as 
its apparent preference for bilateral rather than collective 
military relationships.  NATO delegation also relayed UAEG's 
familiar position that the islands dispute with Iran would 
not be resolved by force.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Rear Admiral Deniz Kutluk (Turkish Navy), Assistant 
Director of International Military Staff, Cooperation and 
Regional Security Head of NATO delegation, briefed 
Ambassadors, Defense Attaches, and other diplomats of NATO 
countries at the German Embassy on June 12 concerning 
progress on Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) discussions 
with the UAEG.  Admiral Kutluk described his Emirati 
interlocutors (MG Ali Al-Kaabi, BG Al Salah) as "very 
forward-leaning and positive," noting that they came forward 
with new ideas, expressing interest in the menu of NATO 
programs and in force standardization.  He said that the UAE, 
like NATO, recognizes the primary security threats as 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.  He further 
described the Emiratis as having come well-prepped for their 
meetings, asking relevant and specific questions. 
 
¶3. (C) In this regard Kutluk says they discussed intel 
exchange and info sharing within a framework security 
agreement.  Genevieve Labelle (Canadian Member of NATO Office 
of Security) noted that there was no military contact at the 
UAE Embassy in Brussels, a situation the UAEG may seek to 
remedy as it seeks to comprehend the complexity of NATO's 
organizational structure. 
 
¶4. (C) However, the conclusion of the NATO delegation is that 
the UAE may eventually be ready to cooperate even beyond the 
limits of the program, but for the time being has "some 
misperceptions and incorrect knowledge" of NATO's overall 
goals and intentions in the Middle East region as well as how 
it operates as a coalition of sovereign states.  Kutluk noted 
a discrepancy between the ability of NATO and that of the GCC 
in terms of "fast reactive" capability. 
 
¶5. (C) With regard to Iran and its nuclear ambitions, Kutluk 
said the UAEG expressed primary concern about the "poor 
management" of Iranian nuclear power generators and the 
likelihood of nuclear fallout following accidents.  The UAEG 
made it clear that the Abu Musa and Tunb islands dispute with 
Iran will not be resolved by force. 
 
¶6. (C) Kutluk said that the MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid al-Nuaimi 
described to him the effects of regional 
turbulence on UAE's development, indicating that it had not 
been easy for a 35-year-old nation to cope with security 
challenges.  According to Kutluk, al-Nuaimi posed questions 
about the relative advantages of a collective (NATO) versus a 
bilateral (US-UAE, US-UK) military relationship. 
 
¶7. (C) During discussion period, UK military attach opined 
that owing to the tribal habit and structure of the UAE it 
would take 50-60 years to develop a credible military 
capacity, noting fundamental mistrust of anything other than 
a bilateral relationship and inherent difficulty grasping the 
NATO concept.  He noted that the UAE had approached the UK 
about deploying an additional 600 UAE soldiers to Helman in 
Afghanistan and also the U.S. about deploying as many as 
¶1000. 
 
¶8. (C) The Turkish military representative confirmed that 
despite earlier indications to the contrary, the UAE did not 
send observers to the Anatolian Sun exercise in Turkey.  The 
consensus was that the UAE, while selecting nineteen (19) 
activities from the menu of NATO possibilities, would 
probably prefer a quieter, less high profile form of 
cooperation for the immediate future. 
 
¶9. (C) Admiral Kutluk also expressed interest in hearing 
ideas on how Saudi Arabia and Oman would likely respond to 
ICI.  The admiral indicated that he personally had no future 
plans to return to the UAE in order to continue ICI 
discussions on behalf of NATO. 
SISON