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RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0694/01 1811129
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301129Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1516
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000694 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO EFIN IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: PRIME MINISTER,S PEACE TRAIN STUCK 
AT DISARMAMENT 
 
REF: A. ABIDJAN 647 
     ¶B. ABIDJAN 658 
     ¶C. ABIDJAN 686 
     ¶D. ABIDJAN 688 
 
Classified By: Poloff PGwyn for reasons 1.4 b&d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Prime Minister Banny's peace train is stuck 
for the moment at the disarmament station.  The Armed Forces 
of Cote d'Ivoire (FANCI) say they have completed the initial, 
pre-regroupment phase of the disarmament, where combatants 
are assembled at designated sites under their own command 
structure.  However, it appears that the rebel New Forces 
(FN) have barely started pre-regroupment, and the pro-Gbagbo 
militias refuse to start it at all.  Those FANCI and FN 
forces which have been pre-regrouped are badly in need of 
food, medicine and other basic supplies -- otherwise their 
leaders tell us they will not be able to keep them at the 
sites.  The inability of the FN and FANCI even to agree on 
what should be the central issue in their ongoing talks 
highlights how deeply the two sides still mistrust each 
other.  The issue of financing is also becoming increasingly 
important.  It is critical for the Ivoirian government's 
current bond issuance to succeed so that it can clear its 
World Bank arrears, and for the government's own 2006 budget 
not to get caught up in the ongoing wrangle over the powers 
of the National Assembly in the transition to elections. 
Without money to fuel it, the train may have trouble 
departing this station.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Prime Minister Banny has taken to using the image of a 
peace train, on which he urges all parties to stay aboard as 
it carries the nation toward elections.  However, for the 
moment at least, the train appears stuck at the disarmament 
station.  After some movement over the last month, the three 
sides involved in the process appear to be once again at an 
impasse. 
 
¶3. (C) The first phase of the disarmament process is supposed 
to be pre-regroupment, where former combatants from the FN, 
the FANCI, and the pro-Gbagbo militias in the West are 
assembled at designated locations under their own command 
structure.  In the second phase, regroupment, ex-combatants 
are to be assembled in larger numbers at fewer locations 
under the control of international peacekeeping forces. 
Eventually they are to surrender their weapons and be either 
demobilized or integrated into new, combined armed forces. 
 
¶4. (C) After many delays, the pre-regroupment phase finally 
started May 18, timed to coincide with the beginning of a 
pilot identification program, in keeping with the 
painstakingly achieved political agreement to move forward 
with disarmament and identification simultaneously.  It was 
to be completed within 45 days. 
 
FANCI 
 
¶5. (C) For FANCI, pre-regroupment was relatively 
straightforward, a matter of withdrawing troops to FANCI 
barracks.  FANCI has announced that they have completed their 
pre-regroupment, having assembled a total of 12,547 troops at 
35 sites throughout the government zone.  However, FANCI 
Chief of Staff General Philippe Mangou has presented the 
PNDDR (the National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration), which is overseeing the whole DDR 
process, with a list of urgent needs such as medicine and 
tents to keep the FANCI soldiers in the pre-regroupment 
camps. 
 
MILITIAS 
 
¶6. (C) The pre-regroupment of pro-Gbagbo militias in the West 
was supposed to start June 8.  The militia leaders postponed 
the date three times (refs A and B), citing concerns about 
security for their men and delays in FN pre-regroupment.   On 
June 20 the militia leaders met in Abidjan with FANCI Chief 
of Staf Mangou and PNDDR Chairman Ouassenan Kone to air 
their concerns.  Denis Maho Glofiei, the chief leaer of the 
western militias, told the Defense Attche June 26 that the 
militias were upset that the Prime Minister had refused to 
meet with them.  He said the meeting with Mangou and Kone had 
not adequately addressed their concerns and the militias were 
not planning to start pre-regroupment any time soon.   Maho 
said security was their primary concern -- they do not trust 
ONUCI to protect their men at the pre-regroupment sites after 
ONUCI troops were so easily chased out of Guiglo in January. 
(Note: It was the militias who routed them.)  PNDDR contacts 
told us that although the militia leaders said they were 
concerned about the security of their men, in reality they 
appeared to be more focused on receiving enough bodyguards 
and 4X4 vehicles for themselves.  Maho said the militia 
leaders would meet among themselves July 6 in Guiglo, without 
 
ABIDJAN 00000694  002 OF 003 
 
 
FANCI or PNDDR.  Maho did invite the Defense Attache to 
attend. 
 
¶7. (U)  However, On June 28, Pastor Gammi, one of the other 
western militia leaders, announced publicly that he was 
satisfied with the results of the June 20 meeting and urged 
his men to begin moving to the pre-regroupment sites. 
 
NEW FORCES 
 
¶8. (C) Pre-regroupment was not as straightforward for the FN 
as it was for the FANCI because they had no barracks to 
withdraw to, having destroyed all the FANCI barracks in their 
areas during the 2002 rebellion.  Initially they were to 
assemble at 100 locations throughout the areas they control, 
but they eventually reduced that number to 50.  The New 
Forces announced in a press conference on June 23 that they 
had pre-regrouped 12,885 soldiers in 31 sites.   However, the 
commanders of the UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI) and 
the French Licorne peacekeeping force told the International 
Working Group (IWG) the same day that the FN had thus far 
only occupied 7 of the planned 50 sites.  On a more positive 
note, FN leader Guillaume Soro confirmed at the same IWG 
meeting that the FN would allow UN and French peacekeepers to 
enter their sites to verify that pre-regroupment was actually 
taking place. 
 
¶9. (C) Sidiki Konate, Director of Cabinet for Guillaume Soro, 
told us June 21 that the FN continued to hope to complete 
pre-regroupment by the end of the month.  However, he said 
the FN were very concerned by delays in the pre-regroupment 
of pro-Gbagbo militias in the West, because assembling FN 
soldiers at pre-regroupment sites made them vulnerable to 
surprise attack. 
 
¶10. (C) The FN pre-regroupment sites are basic encampments 
throughout the countryside in rebel-held areas, with no real 
support structures for the men.  Poloff visited one of these 
sites at Botro, near the rebel capital of Bouake, on June 26. 
 The site was a former prefecture building in a regrettable 
state of disrepair.  There was no running water and the 
bathrooms were unusable.  Cherif Ousmane, Boauke Zone 
Commander for the FN, told us that the UN was supposed to 
deliver water regularly but had not done so in ten days.  The 
ceilings of the building had either collapsed or were 
crumbling, though the roof was intact.  A chalkboard 
indicated that the total number of troops at the site was 79. 
 Ousmane said that food, water, medicine, electricity and 
better housing conditions are urgently needed to keep the men 
inside the camps. 
 
POST-DISARMAMENT 
 
¶11. (C) Another disarmament-related issue on which progress 
is stalled is the restructuring of the armed forces.  The 
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement stipulated that, in the context of 
disarmament, the government would restructure the armed 
forces to provide for the reintegration of some of the FN 
with the FANCI, but it didn't say how or when this would 
happen.  Questions about this restructuring/reintegration are 
at the top of the list of FN priorities in the ongoing talks 
between the FN and FANCI chiefs of staff.  The FN want 
agreement now on the formation of a combined FN/FANCI joint 
staff, in part to assure no retribution against FN soldiers 
who rejoin the FANCI after disarmament, and in part to assure 
a role for the FN in providing security for the upcoming 
elections.  The FN also want former FANCI soldiers who joined 
the rebellion but will now be reintegrated with FANCI to 
retain their current ranks (many have been promoted to much 
higher ranks in the FN), and they want such FN soldiers to be 
paid their salaries retroactively to the beginning of the 
rebellion.  FANCI refuses even to discuss any of these 
demands, arguing that such issues only distract from the task 
at hand of going forward with disarmament without delay.  The 
latest round of FN/FANCI talks, scheduled for June 29-30 in 
Bouake, broke up a day early over these three restructuring 
issues, though the two sides did agree to meet again July 6. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶12. (C)  We should have a better sense of how badly 
pre-regroupment may be stalled after the next round of 
FN/FANCI talks and the upcoming conclave of western militia 
leaders, both on July 6.  The inability of the FN and FANCI 
even to agree on what should be the central issue in their 
ongoing talks highlights how deeply the two sides still 
mistrust each other.  The issue of financing is also becoming 
increasingly critical for the success of disarmament.  In 
turn, this makes it all the more important for the Ivoirian 
government's bond issuance to clear the country's arrears 
with the World Bank, which closes at the end of this month, 
to succeed.  It also casts a spotlight on the government's 
 
ABIDJAN 00000694  003 OF 003 
 
 
own 2006 budget, which could well become caught up in the 
ongoing political wrangle over the powers of the National 
Assembly after its mandate expired December 15.  Prime 
Minister Banny told the IWG that he had no intention of 
submitting the budget to the Assembly for approval (ref C), 
and the agreement which representatives of the President, 
Prime Minister, President of the National Assembly and all 
the parliamentary groups signed on June 23 contained implied 
assurances that the Assembly would not take up peace 
process-related legislation (ref D).  However, President 
Gbagbo, who has the right to submit legislation to the 
Assembly, and his FPI (Ivoirian Popular Front) party, which 
controls the Assembly, could well assert that the budget is 
not peace-process related.  Without money to fuel it, the 
peace train may well remain stopped for now at the 
disarmament station.  End Comment. 
Hooks