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INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000606 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV MASS IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE:  ACOTA COORDINATOR VISIT SUMMARY 
 
Classified By: ECON OFFICER ERFANA DAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  ACOTA Program and Policy Coordinator, Chip 
Beck (Coordinator), visited Abidjan 13-14 May 2006 for a 
visit to, and an exchange of information with, the United 
Nations peacekeeping mission in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) 
Headquarters Staff.  He received a general briefing from the 
Senior Officer in Charge of Staffing, Colonel Aziz 
(Bangladesh) and Chief Operations Officer Colonel Wecker 
(France) on the status of their operations in Cote d'Ivoire 
and their assessment of the performance of ACOTA trained 
troops under their command.  Coordinator was assisted and 
accompanied by Econoff, Deputy DATT, and the TDY Air Attache. 
 He was afforded a post-brief by the DCM after the UNOCI site 
visit.  The coordinator had an excellent opportunity to 
obtain firsthand insights into the field performance of ACOTA 
partners and assess potential needs for future peace support 
operations (PSO) training.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) UNOCI Briefing:  Bangladeshi Colonel Aziz provided a 
standard Power Point briefing on the UNOCI operations, but 
the most informative part of the meetings came in the 
informal exchange of views during and following the official 
briefing.  Neither Colonel Aziz nor French Colonel Wecker was 
familiar with ACOTA, so the Coordinator provided them with a 
thumbnail overview of the US PSO training program and a 
rundown of ACOTA partner countries.  Surprisingly, Colonel 
Wecker was not particularly familiar with the French RECAMP 
program either, or the British BPST, so both force commanders 
were interested to learn more about who is training African 
forces, why, and how.  The ACOTA partners with significant 
troops present are Senegal, Nigeria, Benin, and Ghana, all of 
whom are performing well in general, but with the below-noted 
problems that occur during times of calm.  With regard to 
non-ACOTA countries serving the UNOCI, the UN commanders 
noted that the forces from Niger are "good soldiers" and they 
are happy with them.  (ACOTA Coordinator Comment:  Niger is 
interested in joining ACOTA, and is under consideration as an 
ACOTA partner in FY 2007.  End Comment.) 
 
¶3.  (U) Recommendations:  The ACOTA Coordinator believes that 
ACOTA Program Office might consult with the UN DPKO offices 
in New York to insure that future UN force commanders receive 
at least a standard backgrounder on ACOTA, RECAMP, and BPST, 
prior to deployment, along with specific details on which of 
their African forces have received training in one or more of 
the PSO training programs.  The reason for this briefing 
would be to open additional doors and communications channels 
with the force commanders so that ACOTA might in the future 
receive periodic and UN-sanctioned input from PSO commanders 
on the performance levels and training needs as they perceive 
them in the field. 
 
¶4.  (C) UN Observations From the Field:  When questioned as 
to the performance levels of the ACOTA and non-ACOTA African 
units, the UN commanders initially attempted to be general in 
their comments, rather than too specific, to avoid the 
appearance of being critical toward any one country. 
However, in the course of offering examples, they eventually 
did get into specifics.  Most of the examples were either 
positive or correctable with training.  One interesting sound 
bite from Colonel Wecker was his assessment that "Africans 
make the best peacekeepers in Africa" because of their 
knowledge of the languages, cultural factors, and societal 
nuances.  More often than not, they also "infiltrate" the 
communities they serve, in ways that, perhaps unintentionally 
at times, assists in acquiring information and intelligence 
that forewarn their unit commanders of impending trouble. 
Colonel Aziz concurred with that assessment, noting that the 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi troops were hampered not only by 
their lack of knowledge of French and local languages, but as 
with the Europeans, also by their ethnicity.  Simply put, the 
Africans fit in, whereas non-Africans stand out and are 
isolated.  It is an obvious observation, but one that 
supports the policy goal of training more, and more 
competent, African peace-keeping operations (PKO) forces for 
the Regional Brigades and African Standby Force (ASF). 
Colonel Wecker also commented that the African PKO forces 
performed exceptionally well in times of crisis, not only due 
to their foreknowledge of problems, but due to what he 
described as their cultural acceptance of doing what needed 
to be done in difficult situations.  "A Senegalese is not 
afraid to wade into the crowd and crack a few heads to 
disperse them," he noted, "whereas a Pakistani may be unsure 
of himself in a situation with foreigners."  As an example, 
the two commanders noted that in recent civil demonstrations 
and rioting, the Senegalese quelled a disturbance, while 
Bangladeshi elements were routed by the crowds. 
 
¶5.  (C) On a more critical note, Colonel Wecker noted that 
while the Africans perform well under pressure and in times 
of crisis, their military discipline tends to deteriorate 
 
ABIDJAN 00000606  002 OF 002 
 
 
significantly during periods of calm, during which times they 
may turn to drinking, socializing, and carousing with the 
locals, or just "slacking off."  This has also caused some 
unintended long-term problems, such as local pregnancies 
fathered by African peacekeepers.  (ACOTA Coordinator 
Comment:  This example of disciplinary problems was later 
discussed with Burkina Faso Army trainers at the 
Non-Commissioned Officers Training Academy in Ouagadougou, 
where they noted they place a high premium on discipline and 
force structure.  As ACOTA seeks to assist the African Union 
and Regional Brigades build the most solid PSO forces 
possible, the issue of image, discipline, and role-modeling 
needs to be continually stressed, perhaps even more than it 
already is.  End Comment.) 
 
¶6.  (C) Challenges Faced by the UN:  Problems noted by the UN 
Commanders were: the difficulty in maintaining vehicles; 
difficulty in collecting short-term, time-critical 
intelligence; insufficient number of PKO forces to blanket 
all the areas they need to control, leading to deployment of 
smaller elements that can be isolated or cut-off; and 
effective communications discipline during crisis.  In terms 
of the limitations of the UNOCI, the commanders noted that 
their force strength was generally insufficient to deal with 
the thousands of hostile civilians that could be mobilized by 
the Young Patriots or warring factions on short notice, and 
who can descend very rapidly in large numbers on UNOCI units 
that are then outnumbered and overwhelmed.  Both Colonel Aziz 
and Wecker maintained that creating general stability and 
implementing the DDR processes are the general and preferred 
answer to correcting this situation.  It was noted that there 
needs to be a change in the mandate for UNOCI to implement 
DDRQand they estimate UNOCI needs at least three more 
reinforced battalions over a period of six months to maintain 
security during the DDR process.  Both commanders indicated 
that the general population is growing weary of the 
disturbances and the interruption they cause to civilian 
lives and jobs.  They hope this frustration will eventually 
(soon) act as a deterrent to continued large-scale 
disturbances. 
 
¶7.  (U) Training recommendations:  With regards to the type 
of training that is needed by the PSO forces, the UN 
commanders indicated that crowd control, reaction to 
demonstrations, and riot training were high on their list. 
Given the disturbances manifested by the Young Patriots as 
well as looters, unemployed persons, students, and mobs in 
general, the commanders indicated that not only did they need 
more forces trained in crowd control and as Quick Reaction 
Forces (QFR), but that those units also needed more 
specialized gear, such as shields, riot helmets, batons, and 
non-lethal weapons.  (ACOTA Coordinator Comment:  In the 
past, ACOTA has provided both training and equipment in riot 
control to military gendarmes.  ACOTA will re-examine the 
need for more such training, particularly if the field 
missions PSO troops are entering can be identified as either 
urban situations, or even involve large refugee centers where 
demonstrations are not uncommon.  As part of the "trainee 
packages," ACOTA is able to provide limited quantities of 
riot control equipment.  End Comment.) 
 
¶8.  (C) ACOTA Coordinator Comment:  The visit to the UNOCI 
was the first such mission area site visit by ACOTA in the 
past year.  During the February 2006 African Union (AU) 
Training and Evaluation conference in Luanda, the Deputy AU 
Peace Support Operations Director (PSOD), Nigerian Major 
General Ishaya Hassan urged program directors from ACOTA, 
RECAMP, and BPST to conduct more such evaluations of 
PSO-trained troops "on location" in the mission areas.  ACOTA 
plans to conduct additional mission area evaluations in the 
near term, including Darfur.  This particular visit to Cote 
d'Ivoire was definitely useful for its tactical and 
operational insights, and afforded discussion points that 
were employed in the subsequent visit to Burkina Faso. 
Hooks