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RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0676
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C O N F I D E N T I A L YAOUNDE 000816 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C AND INR/AA 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA ACTION OFFICERS 
KINSHASA ALSO FOR BRAZZAVILLE 
DAKAR FOR B OSBORNE 
EUCOM FOR J5-A AFRICA DIVISION AND POLAD YATES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2016 
TAGS: PGOV ECON PHUM PINR CM
SUBJECT: CAMEROON: A TALE OF TWO PRESIDENCIES 
 
REF: A. YAOUNDE 556 
 
     ¶B. YAOUNDE 191 
     ¶C. YAOUNDE 404 
     ¶D. YAOUNDE 440 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C)  In its 46 years of independence, Cameroon has only 
known two presidents, Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960-1982) and Paul 
Biya (1982-present).  Ahidjo was a charismatic and decisive 
man who ruled a one-party state where citizens had no voice 
in their leadership.  Under Ahidjo, Cameroon's economy fared 
well; the country enjoyed some of the strongest economic and 
social indicators in Africa.  Since then, Biya has 
transformed Cameroon into a multi-party democracy with 
a growing focus on human rights and civil liberties.  His 
economic legacy, however, has been marred by massive 
indebtedness, corruption, a ten year economic downturn and 
falling social indicators.  Since his re-election in 2004, 
Biya seems to be thinking about his legacy and has engaged 
his government in a very serious approach to economic reform 
and restructuring, which is beginning to bear fruit.  The 
outstanding question is whether Biya is capable of 
engineering a turn-around of his negative legacy of 
corruption, stagnation and neglect in the five years 
remaining in his presidency.  End Summary. 
 
-------------- 
Biya's Dilemma 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (U) In the 46 years since independence, Cameroon has only 
known two presidents, Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960-1982) and Paul 
Biya (1982-present).  In November 2005, President Biya 
surpassed Ahidjo in years in power; he faces the 
constitutional end to his mandate in 2011, when he will be 
¶78.  This anniversary of sorts has led many in Cameroon to 
compare the two regimes.  Ahidjo, of course, gets the benefit 
of time and some nostalgia in this examination as many look 
back on his presidency through rose-colored glasses as a time 
of growth, development and no crime or corruption.  Biya's 
tenure has seen a currency devaluation, economic collapse, 
enormous corruption, and difficult social challenges such as 
AIDS -- but he also has brought a sort of democracy and 
undeniably increased civic freedoms to Cameroon.  On balance, 
each 
regime has its strong and weak points, and both combined 
reflect the path of many African nations from initial growth 
after independence, through subsequent stalling and financial 
crisis, to limited economic growth with increasing 
democracy and reform in recent years. 
 
-------------------------- 
The Men and their Politics 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Ahmadou Ahidjo was a Muslim from the North Province of 
Cameroon.  He put in place the regional and ethnic 
balance structure which still dominates Cameroonian politics 
today.  This structure includes carefully calculated awarding 
and balancing of ministerial positions and other high-level 
appointments, with some key positions "reserved" for natives 
of particular provinces.  Remembered as a charismatic and 
decisive man, Ahidjo traveled throughout 
the country and met with citizens regularly.  He centered 
power in his office and person, making all major decisions 
quickly based on his own knowledge of the issue.  He used 
force to repress rebellions in the southern and Anglophone 
provinces before and after independence.  Under his rule, 
Cameroon's human rights record was dismal.  This was a 
one-party state where citizens had no voice in their 
leadership.  On the other hand, he was known and respected 
for 
tolerating no corruption within his government. 
 
¶4. (U) Paul Biya took over when Ahidjo handed power to him by 
decree in 1982 (Biya had been Ahidjo's PM for seven  years). 
This was Ahidjo's attempt to appease increased donor pressure 
for a move toward democracy, with a nominal  change in 
regime, while continuing  to rule through Biya.  Biya turned 
out to have plans of his own and quickly 
took his own path.  Many say that in response Ahidjo was 
behind the failed coup in 1984.  Ahidjo denied such claims 
during a radio interview a day after the coup, but added that 
"if his partisans were behind it, it would be successful." 
Ahidjo left for a self-imposed exile in Senegal, where he 
died a few years later.  His body has never been returned to 
Cameroon for burial, a source of political tension here and a 
sign of just polarized the two presidents eventually became. 
 
¶5. (U) Biya is a Christian from the South Province.  He is 
more reclusive, rarely traveling either within Cameroon or 
the African region.  Aside from R&R trips to Switzerland, 
France, and sometimes Germany, he also rarely goes abroad, 
and is almost never seen in public.  He has continued the 
political traditions of ethnic and regional balance in most 
government positions and of concentrating power in his own 
hands.  His decision-making style, however, is very  slow and 
deliberative, making decisions  only after extensive personal 
consideration and input from multiple trusted advisors over 
longer periods of time than most observers would expect. 
(For example, we have been awaiting a government reshuffle 
here for months.)  Therefore his government's decision-making 
process is cumbersome and often  ineffective.  The first 
decade of Biya's rule perpetuated Cameroon's one-party rule 
and poor human rights record, particularly as coup rumors 
swirled in the late 80s.  Since 1992, however, Biya has stood 
for election three times, with each election being 
progressively more free and fair, although still flawed. 
Since 1992 Cameroon has also had opposition parties - several 
hundred, in fact -- and an increasingly free press. 
Moreover, Cameroon's previously poor human rights record has 
shown steady improvement over the last six years. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Another interesting difference between the two men 
is that during Biya's regime the military leadership has 
taken on a distinct tribal slant.  While there is some amount 
of ethnic balance in the Armed Forces at large, the 
entire presidential guard and most of the senior generals are 
Beti, members of Biya's own ethnic group.  Many believe that 
part of Biya's reaction to the 1984 coup attempt has been to 
only advance Betis -- the only ones he really trusts -- into 
positions of senior military leadership.  Others feel that it 
reflects efforts by members of the President's region to hold 
on to power by creating a military which will prohibit any 
non-southerner from ascending to the presidency. 
 
¶7. (U) In 1996 a new constitution enshrined some of Biya's 
democratic advancements and laid out a road map for the 
devolution of power out from the capital to the provinces. 
As noted in Ref B, however, this constitution is only half 
implemented, with many issues still being governed by the 
1972 Constitution.  Biya's 2004 election was his second, and 
last, under the 1996 Constitution.  In 2011 Cameroonians 
should, for the first time, elect a completely new president. 
 
--------------------- 
The Economic Legacies 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Under Ahidjo, Cameroon had some of the strongest 
economic and social indicators for Africa.  GDP growth rates, 
life expectancy and civil service wages were all high and 
unemployment was low.  Cameroon depended on a diverse 
agricultural sector for its income and benefited greatly from 
the spike in world commodity prices in the late seventies. 
Ahidjo used the revenue in a concerted program of five-year 
infrastructure development plans.  Commodities were regulated 
and sold under national parastatals in order to ensure 
maximum revenue to both the state and the producers 
(peasants).  Most of modern Cameroon was built and paved 
under Ahidjo's reign.  While Cameroon also developed a 
service and industrial sector, the firms were all 
parastatals, leaving little room for the development of a 
private sector.  Ahidjo's regime also produced one of 
Cameroon's most valuable commodities, its well educated work 
force.  Benefitting from the colonial legacy of education 
structures and traditions, Cameroon boasted a large number of 
literate and well educated workers. 
 
¶9. (U) Biya's economic legacy is much more mixed.  After 
Cameroon discovered oil in 1977, oil revenue was sufficient 
for Cameroon to feel it could borrow against it to cover the 
loss of income from the collapse of agricultural commodity 
prices.  Trying to support the large weight of the 
heavily-subsidized parastatal structure built up by Ahidjo, 
Cameroon began to incur a huge debt load.  This was 
aggravated by the deteriorating effects of the overvalued CFA 
(fixed to the French franc at the same rate since 1958).  The 
late 1980s were a time of severe economic 
contraction from which Cameroon is only now beginning to 
emerge. 
 
¶10. (U) In 1988 Cameroon began its first efforts to address 
its financial crisis by submitting to its first IMF 
program.  The 50 percent devaluation of the CFA helped 
stimulate some growth in the economy, but the underlying 
structural problems caused by the bloated civil service, the 
number of parastatals and the large debt load required 
serious belt tightening.  In response to the IMF's initial 
requirements that the overall civil service wage bill be 
cut in half, the Biya government kept all the positions, but 
cut salaries in half.  Suddenly, in the period of two 
years a large segment of Cameroon's work force lost over 75 
percent of its purchasing power.  Many point to this event 
as the start of Cameroon's current problems with pervasive 
corruption, as many Cameroonians, out of economic need, 
exploit the rent-seeking opportunities their positions afford 
(Ref C).  The job uncertainty that has resulted from 
the multiple IMF programs (which have strongly pushed for the 
privatization or liquidation of the majority of the 
inefficiently run parastatals) has also created deep 
uncertainty and instability on the job front. 
 
¶11. (U) After many false starts and detours, Cameroon finally 
achieved HIPC completion point on April 28.  This will lead 
to the forgiveness of almost 2/3 of its foreign debt.  Biya's 
current plans are to use the benefits of this 
debt forgiveness, combined with a strong anti-corruption 
campaign, to bring about positive economic change.  The 
objectives are to invest heavily in health and education to 
help the country address the problems posed by AIDS and 
malaria and to bring education levels and standards back up 
to the Ahidjo era levels.  Infrastructure, especially in 
Douala and certain intercity roads, needs to be upgraded as 
well. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Biya -- concerned about his legacy? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) In a 1991 interview on French television, Biya said 
that he would love to be remembered as the "man who  brought 
democracy to Cameroon."  But since his re-election in 2004, 
Biya seems to be re-thinking his legacy and its 
scope.  While politically he leaves a fairly positive record, 
economically, Cameroon presents at best a more mixed 
picture and is certainly not the same country Biya inherited. 
 Indeed, Biya recently asked the Ambassador rhetorically, 
"What pride would I feel in leaving Cameroon as it is today?" 
 Since 2004 Biya has engaged his government in a very serious 
approach to economic reform and restructuring, which led to 
HIPC completion point.  It is not yet certain, however, 
whether these changes will be deep enough to achieve clear 
economic advancements by the 2011 presidential election. 
Despite his strides to combat corruption, which will improve 
the economy and other social 
indicators, if overall economic results do not meet Biya's 
objectives, some wonder whether Biya will feel his 
political legacy is sufficient to leave office at the end of 
his constitutional mandate, or if he will try to stay on for 
an additional (currently unconstitutional) term to leave a 
strong double legacy. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (C) Complicating Biya's own calculations about his legacy 
is the question about who will be the presidential 
candidates.  Particularly with Cameroon's opposition in 
disarray (Ref A), the President's CPDM party is the only one 
likely to produce a viable candidate.  There is currently 
much quiet jockeying for power within the CPDM, mostly (but 
not only) by Southerners trying to ensure that the presidency 
remains in their hands. (Cameroon's albeit limited tradition 
suggests that it should go back to the north - as any 
Northerner will tell you.)  But if the fractures become 
serious, Biya might conclude that the country is unready for 
a transition, and seek to change the constitution to permit 
yet another term. 
 
¶14. (C) However, our feeling today is that any predictions 
about Biya trying to stay on for an additional term are off 
the mark.  Indeed, with his young wife and family, his 
"retirement" house under construction next door to the 
embassy, and his sense of urgency about ongoing reforms, he 
seems to us a person who already has decided to live out his 
final days outside of public office.  Legacy aspirations 
aside, his age and his health (Ref D) will be important 
factors  that could even prevent him from completing his 
current constitutional mandate, let alone seeking another 
one.  Our sense is that Biya is focused on his legacy and is 
working to ensure that he will have accomplished his stated 
goals by 2011.  The measures taken to reach the HIPC 
completion point, to combat corruption, and to lead Cameroon 
toward Millennium Challenge eligibility increasingly 
represent fundamental changes to Cameroon's political, 
economic and social infrastructure.  All of this augers well 
for Cameroonians having the opportunity to elect a new leader 
in 2011.  End Comment. 
MARQUARDT