VZCZCXRO7637
PP RUEHCHI
DE RUEHVN #0443/01 1371007
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171007Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9914
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 6571
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 2643
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2105
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 1759
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0872
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0113
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1191
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0031
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0084
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0083
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0655
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0373
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0547
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0088

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENTIANE 000443 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL/IRF, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL KIRF TH LA
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR A JOINT DEMARCHE ON MISSING HMONG 
CHILDREN 
 
REF: VIENTIANE 396 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. (C) The "like-minded" Embassies in Vientiane have agreed 
that a joint demarche to the Lao government on the missing 
Hmong children should be the next step in ongoing efforts to 
secure the release of the group.  The decision whether to 
deliver the demarche will depend on the outcome of ongoing 
discussions between the Lao and Thai governments: it will be 
called for if the Thai provide information on the children's 
deportation as expected and the Lao do not respond 
positively.  Getting non-Vientiane embassies on board the 
joint demarche will add weight to the message.  The 
Bangkok-based Canadians have signed on, and other missions in 
Bangkok, including the EU, Norwegians and New Zealanders, may 
also participate. End summary. 
 
Some progress -- maybe 
---------------------- 
¶2. (C) The Australian Ambassador convened the meeting of the 
like-minded group May 16 to discuss next steps on the missing 
Hmong children. In addition to the U.S. and Australian 
Ambassadors, the French Ambassador, UNDP ResRep, and German 
and Swedish Charges attended. The EU Charge, who has been a 
regular at these meetings, did not attend.  The group 
reviewed the latest developments on the missing children, and 
concluded that recent discussions between the Lao and Thai 
governments offered some signs of progress, although the 
process had been excruciatingly slow. At least it appeared 
the Thai NSC had handed over to Thai MFA the information it 
had collected pertaining to the children's deportation, and 
MFA should be turning this information over to the Lao 
government very soon, perhaps as early as this week. 
 
¶3. (C) Moreover, there were several other initiatives afoot 
to keep the Lao reminded of the continued importance of this 
issue. The Australian Foreign Ministry had given clearance 
for its Ambassador to participate in a joint demarche, and 
the Minister was prepared to send a letter to his Lao 
counterpart urging a resolution of the matter if the demarche 
failed. The UN had drafted a similar letter from the 
Secretary-General to the Lao President urging ("gently," as 
 
SIPDIS 
the UNDP ResRep qualified) both the Lao and the Thai to find 
a solution to the matter. The Ambassador noted that A/S Hill 
or DAS John would likely also raise the issue during their 
upcoming visit to Thailand. The German Charge said the 
children would likely be discussed (along with the recent 
massacre of Hmong civilians in Vientiane province) at the 
upcoming Council Working Group ("COASI") meeting of the EU. 
The Australians also passed on that the Lao FM had reportedly 
written instructions to the provinces to "resolve the issue" 
at the local level, perhaps paving the way for the children's 
quiet release in coming weeks. (In another development, 
following the meeting the Australian Ambassador informed us 
he had been granted a long-postponed meeting with the Lao FM 
late today, specifically to discuss the children.) 
 
Joint demarche as the next step 
------------------------------- 
¶4. (C) Although there was some debate about timing and 
message, the like-minded group agreed that a joint demarche 
was the most reasonable next step. For the moment, the 
discussions between the Lao and Thai should be given time to 
move ahead; if the Thai delivered information on the 
deportation to the Lao this week or next, as expected, the 
Lao would need some time to respond.  Their response would 
determine the need for the joint demarche.  They could either 
release the children -- or at least give some sign they had 
"found them" -- or they could stall further. If the latter, 
the group concluded the joint demarche should be delivered. 
The most likely date for the demarche would be early June, 
 
VIENTIANE 00000443  002 OF 002 
 
 
following the UN SecGen's visit to Bangkok May 26. 
 
Getting others on board 
----------------------- 
¶5. (C) The group felt that the greater the participation in 
the demarche, the deeper its likely impact on the Lao.  The 
Australians and U.S. were committed, and the Canadian 
Ambassador in Bangkok had agreed to participate. During a 
visit to Vientiane last week, the EU Ambassador had expressed 
reluctance to participate in a demarche, but in subsequent 
conversations appeared more amenable.  The French, Germans 
and Swedes generally supported the idea, but could not join 
without clearance from their home ministries.  The group 
believed the UN ResRep should lead the demarche, but the 
ResRep was not convinced New York would approve.  All felt 
the message of the demarche should not be antagonistic. What 
mattered was not so much tone as optics: the presence of 
Bangkok-based Ambassadors would remind the Lao that this was 
not a "Vientiane" issue but one of concern to many countries. 
 
¶6. (C) To expand participation in the demarche, the group saw 
the need to approach other missions in Bangkok.  The 
Australians felt the New Zealanders would go along, and 
agreed to try to enlist them. Likewise the Swedes believed 
the Norwegians and perhaps the Swiss would be willing to go 
along. Of more importance was the EU Ambassador: the presence 
of the EU would carry great weight, as the EU mission 
represented a number of countries with close relations to 
Laos and the EU was a major donor here. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶7. (C) The idea of a joint demarche was born from the visit 
of UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner Wendy Chamberlin in late 
March. That visit resuscitated activity on the children: 
Ambassador Chamberlin's well-crafted strategy succeeded in 
bringing the Lao and Thai together to talk about the missing 
children, although at nothing like the speed we would have 
hoped for.  We understand from numerous sources, including 
Embassy Bangkok, that the Thai government has finally come up 
with the information the Lao have been requesting for months, 
and with the handover of this info (hopefully this week or 
next) the ball will be firmly back in the Lao court. 
 
¶8. (C) Whether the Lao intend to use the Thai information as 
a fig leaf to disguise their needless detention of the 
children for nearly six months, or whether it is an excuse to 
drag out the process until the world forgets the issue, will 
become evident after they receive the information.  If the 
former, the joint demarche won't be needed, as the Lao will 
have what cover they need to "find" the children and then 
return them to Thailand. If the latter, though, the demarche 
will be absolutely called for to convince the GoL that its 
detention of the kids is not being forgotten. End comment. 
HASLACH