VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0893/01 1211742
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011742Z MAY 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8876

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000893 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KUNR PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: UN: OIOS ISSUES REPORT ON THE COMPREHENSIVE 
MANAGEMENT AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS 
 
¶1. Summary.  Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 59/296 
in which the Assembly requested the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services (OIOS) to conduct a comprehensive 
management audit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO), OIOS issued a summary report (A/60/717) of its seven 
separate audit reports of the department. The audit covered 
the areas of procurement, financial management and budgeting, 
human resources management, information and communication 
technology, mission planning, substantive operations, and 
best practices.  In general, the OIOS concluded that while 
efforts have been made to improve the management of 
peacekeeping operations in recent years, the changes have 
been outpaced by the challenges the UN faces in its field 
operations.  DPKO needs to strengthen its internal controls 
and enforce accountability.  It also needs to bolster the 
standards of ethical behavior to reverse the current 
prevailing culture of impunity in the department. OIOS 
highlighted a number of actions that could be taken to 
strengthen the management of peacekeeping, including: 
reorganization of the budget process to reduce duplication; 
adequate monitoring by headquarters of recruitment authority 
delegated to the field; strengthened mission planning and 
strategic guidance; improved coordination between DPKO and 
other relevant UN actors; greater implementation of best 
practices and lessons learned.  OIOS made a total of 158 
recommendations, of which 105 were considered to be critical. 
 The Department of Management (DM), Department of Safety and 
Security (DSS) and DPKO accepted 133 of the recommendations, 
most of which were being implemented.  The Fifth Committee is 
expected to consider and to take note of the report during 
its second resumed session this spring. A summary of key 
findings is outlined below. End summary. 
 
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Procurement 
----------- 
 
¶2. OIOS highlighted the lack of adequate internal controls 
and enforcement of existing controls as a an underlying cause 
of an environment ripe for fraud and abuse in procurement. 
OIOS found substantial evidence that senior management was 
negligent in applying existing controls and in calling for 
greater controls where necessary.  This resulted in, among 
other things, a pattern of violations of the Financial Rules 
and Regulations of the UN. 
 
¶3.  In many cases, OIOS found that budgeting for mission 
requirements was not based on realistic assumptions and, as a 
result, in some cases there were significant financial losses 
to the UN. A handful of case studies were highlighted, 
pointing to overestimation of commodity requirements in two 
missions, at a cost of $53 million and $31 million 
respectively. OIOS also determined that greater efforts 
should be made to rationalize the holdings of spare parts, 
and that the use of air transport for contingents and 
equipment (which is seven times the cost of sea transport) 
should only be used when no other means of timely transport 
is available. 
 
¶4. Among other things, the audit highlighted the general lack 
of basic procurement concepts by some field-based procurement 
staff, and OIOS noted that due to incomplete records 
management, the auditors were unable to determine whether 
staff had the prerequisite qualifications prior to being 
hired.  OIOS pointed to the imbalance between the number of 
procurement staff at headquarters and in the field vis-a-vis 
the percentage of procurement activities for which they were 
responsible.  While headquarters is responsible for handling 
more than half of all procurement, the number of procurement 
staff at Headquarters is only a fraction of the total 
procurement staff employed in the field. 
 
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Financial management and budgeting 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. OIOS' review of the budget process found that it was 
lengthy, cumbersome, and with field missions, DPKO and DM 
each reviewing peacekeeping budgets, it was often 
duplicative.  As a result, there was little flexibility 
within the current budget process to provide a flexible 
approach in response to changing mandates.  OIOS also found 
that there was a general disconnect between the cost centers 
to which funds were allocated and managers who were delegated 
authority to implement the budget.  As a result, there was 
little practical accountability for budget management and 
implementation.  OIOS further found a general disconnect 
between strategic mission planning and the use of the 
results-based-budgeting framework. 
 
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Human Resources Management 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. Although the GA has in recent years reiterated the central 
authority of the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM) 
in the monitoring and approval of the recruitment and 
placement of staff, OIOS found that the delegation of 
authority to DPKO for recruitment of mission personnel had 
resulted in OHRM relinquishing authority for its oversight 
function.  In addition, rather than recruiting from missions 
-- which are closest to the work required to be performed -- 
recruitment by DPKO has been conducted largely from 
headquarters.  This practice runs contrary to the intent of 
delegation of authority, which was to provide greater 
opportunity for missions to recruit the necessary personnel 
for operations.  As such, OIOS believes that a review of the 
delegation of authority should be reviewed to assess whether 
the delegation should remain with DPKO. 
 
¶7.  Concerning recruitment and placement, OIOS noted that 
despite an average vacancy rate of 23 per cent in field 
missions (as at 31 May 2005), no mechanism was in place to 
address the problem of vacancies and to reduce the overall 
level.  OIOS also found that the recruitment process suffered 
from a general lack of transparency and pointed to a number 
of cases in which recommended candidates were appointed 
without a vacancy announcement process.  Such lack of 
competition meant that there was no assurance that the best 
candidates were selected.  OIOS further pointed to the need 
for increased training and staff development of personnel. 
 
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Information and communication technology 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. OIOS' audit of the ICT function in DPKO concluded that its 
present placement -- as a subset of the Office of Mission 
Support -- was an impediment to its role in advocating the 
ICT agenda at the highest level.  Furthermore, without a more 
central organizational placement within DPKO, the 
Communications and Information Technology Service (CITS) 
could not effectively ensure the unification of effort and 
effectively delivery of service throughout DPKO. 
 
¶9.  OIOS found that although there was a draft information 
management strategy within DPKO (due to be finalized by June 
2006), it did not specify specific and measurable outcomes, 
responsible parties, and indicators of achievement.  OIOS 
also commented on the proliferation of information systems 
and their general lack of integration.  There are at least 5 
different systems used by DPKO, none of which are linked by 
common interfaces and/or databases. There was also no 
function within CITS to provide for IT security or backup in 
the event of disruption to the system.  Finally, OIOS 
commented that the maintenance IT assets in missions should 
be more rigorously managed to ensure that new IT assets were 
utilized upon their procurement and not left unused. 
 
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Mission planning 
---------------- 
 
¶10. OIOS noted that although DPKO had developed a mission 
planning process handbook, there was minimal consultation 
with key UN partners in its preparation and, in general, DPKO 
leadership appeared to be reluctant to consult and/or 
collaborate with key partners on an integrated approach to 
peacekeeping.  Both OIOS and DPKO acknowledged that the 
absence of dedicated mission planning cells and involvement 
of senior leadership at the planning stage had a negative 
effect on the overall ability of the department to develop 
coherent strategies for mandate implementation, resource 
identification and budget formulation. 
 
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Substantive operations 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. OIOS' audit covered the substantive areas of electoral 
assistance; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR); demining operations; and human rights, the rule of law 
and protection of civilians.  In electoral assistance, OIOS 
found that greater collaboration with and directive from the 
Department of Political Affairs' Electoral Assistance 
Division was required, as were greater security measures for 
electoral assistance personnel in the field.  With respect to 
DDR, OIOS concluded that under the current staffing 
complement there is limited capacity for DPKO to effectively 
monitor the implementation of DDR activities in missions. 
 
¶12.  OIOS found that DPKO had not made any provisions with 
troop contributing countries (TCCs) to ensure that 
contingents charged with demining were doing so in compliance 
 
 
 
with the International Mine Action Standards, and that 
efforts should be made to formalize this arrangement in 
memoranda of understanding with TCCs.  Finally, OIOS 
concluded that oversight and accountability for human rights 
and rule of law programs was generally weak and substantive 
guidance from headquarters on these issues was lacking. 
 
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Best practices 
-------------- 
 
¶13. OIOS concluded from its review that best practices were 
not regularly categorized and disseminated based on lessons 
learned, and that more effort was required to ensure that 
positive and negative lessons learned are comprehensively 
shared with field missions so that they may benefit in a 
timely manner.  OIOS also highlighted overlap in the area of 
knowledge management between the Best Practices Section and 
DPKO's office of Change Management, and recommended that 
their respective roles be clarified. 
 
BOLTON