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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1018/01 1382108
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 182108Z MAY 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0927
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6164
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0042
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0574
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9082

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001018 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: AMBASSADOR BOLTON'S MEETING WITH 
PETER VAN WALSUM, SRSG BASTAGLI 
 
Classified By: Amb. John Bolton. E.O. 12958. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In a May 8 joint call with SRSG for Western 
Sahara Francesco Bastagli, Personal Envoy for Western Sahara 
Peter van Walsum, noted the Security Council's April rollover 
of the MINURSO mandate and its failure to take action on the 
Secretary General's recommendation of direct talks between 
 
SIPDIS 
the key parties. He implied that there was so little for him 
to do now except submit his resignation. He inquired as to 
the current U.S. position on the Western Sahara, whether and 
when it might take a strong position and what U.S. views were 
on the future role of the Personal Envoy.  Ambassador Bolton 
replied that the Security Council's "culture of inaction" on 
Western Sahara and the comfort the parties have regarding the 
status quo suggest that change would come only if forced by 
something like the possible termination of MINURSO. 
Ambassador Bolton said that given other priorities in the 
Middle East at this time, the U.S. is unprepared to take a 
diferent position on Western Sahara.  Ambassador Bolton said 
we would wait to see what Morocco might offer by way of an 
autonomy proposal in six to nine months and, suggested that 
van Walsum travel to Paris, London and Madrid to urge those 
capitals to take decisive positions on the future of MINURSO. 
 End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The Secretary General's Personal Envoy (PE) for 
Western Sahara Peter van Walsum and the Secretary-General's 
Special Representative for Western Sahara (SRSG) Francesco 
Bastagli made a May 8 joint call on Ambassador Bolton.  Van 
Walsum noted that in its April rollover of the MINURSO 
mandate, the Security Council had not acted on the 
Secretary-General's call for negotiations between the 
 
SIPDIS 
parties, and that important members of the Security Council 
had indicated in their explanations of vote (EOVs) that this 
would be the last such technical rollover. 
 
¶3. (C) But, Van Walsum wondered, if political influence has 
enabled Morocco to obstruct progress on the issue, could the 
Security Council force Morocco to do anything they do not 
want to do?  Moreover, van Walsum added, the difficulties of 
forcing the Moroccans to come up with a reasonable proposal 
aside, whenever he has raised the issue with Algeria and the 
Polisario, he has been told that UNGA resolution 1514 (which 
asserted the right of self-determination for colonial 
peoples) and the 1975 International Court of Justice Advisory 
Opinion (ICJ AO) on Western Sahara (which supported 
applicability of UNGA 1514) are the basis of the 
international legality governing the Western Sahara. 
Expanding on the SYG's recommendation for direct negotiations 
grounded on "realpolitik," van Walsum noted that both UNGA 
1514 and the ICJ AO are more than thirty years old and that 
the Security Council,s requirement for a chapter six 
(consensual) solution to the problem of Western Sahara in 
place since 2002, must now be considered a part of the 
international legal framework as well. 
 
Security Council Inaction, Politics, the Rollover 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador Bolton said that heavy lobbying by Morocco, 
which does not want any constraints imposed on it, was a key 
factor in the rollover decision.  Moreover, Ambassador Bolton 
added, given what Paul Volker has referred to as the "culture 
of inaction" at the Security Council, it is unlikely that 
anything will be seriously addressed until we are at a 
precipice.  Such inaction, Ambassador Bolton recalled, was 
the reason he had suggested that MINURSO should be 
terminated.  Ambassador Bolton said that having failed to 
start sufficiently in advance of the past rollover to force 
anything to happen, we will have to go through another 
six-month cycle.  In the future, we need to establish some 
kind of structure that lays out consequences, in particular 
the termination of MINURSO, should Morocco not do something. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Bolton said that politics as well as 
international legality are at work in Western Sahara and 
change will occur only if we are willing to shake things up. 
In 1991 we established MINURSO and thought we could finish 
everything by the end of that year, but the Moroccans shot it 
down.  In 1997 we established a referendum, and Moroccans 
shot that down.  And in 2004, Baker developed the Baker Plan 
and the Moroccans shot that down.  Thus, Ambassador Bolton 
said, the way to get to a decision might be to suggest that 
MINURSO will be terminated.  You know something should be 
terminated when everyone claims to want it, but no one uses 
it to achieve a solution.  MINURSO has become merely a 
security blanket for the parties. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Bolton said that Morocco had indicated it 
would have a substantial autonomy plan by March, but now 
asserts it will require an additional six to nine months 
because it needs to hold domestic political consultations and 
to pass a constitutional amendment to authorize such a plan. 
And in six months, the Moroccans might well say they are 
still not quite ready.  Should this happen, Ambassador Bolton 
said, he would prefer to say to the U.S. taxpayer that we are 
not going to continue to pay for MINURSO and that it would be 
best to terminate MINURSO.  At that point, we could tell the 
Western Saharans that they can return to Western Sahara, or 
they can return to war.  Ambassador Bolton said his guess 
would be that the Sahrawi would remain in the camps in 
Algeria until the Algerians tired of contributing money to 
preserve the fiction. 
 
Removing the Security Blanket 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Commenting on Ambassador Bolton's argument that the 
termination of MINURSO might be the only way to spur action 
on the Western Sahara, SRSG Bastagli noted that if the U.S. 
were serious about terminating MINURSO, it should make its 
position known as soon as possible.  Van Walsum said that the 
U.S. has cried wolf too often about termination.  Ambassador 
Bolton replied that he has been the only one even to suggest 
closure and only after fifteen years of inaction.  Now, 
unless you do something dramatic, you won't get any action. 
He noted that in English law, possession is nine points of 
the law, Morocco controls the territory, and the Moroccans 
have no incentive to change.  In fact, Ambassador Bolton 
said, the Moroccans have been upset every time the prospect 
of MINURSO termination is raised.  MINURSO is their security 
blanket.  But if there is no incentive for Morocco to change 
and no pressure on them to change, then it is difficult to 
understand why the UN should continue to participate, 
Ambassador Bolton said. 
 
¶8. (C) Van Walsum asked whether Ambassador Bolton agreed with 
Algeria and the Polisario, who say that there will be a new 
political reality after Chirac departs, offering the 
possibility of pressure on Morocco.  Ambassador Bolton said 
that there is always the possibility that a key actor might 
change its position. The Spanish have been calling for a 
combined Spanish, French, U.S. initiative. 
 
¶9. (C) In response to van Walsum's query regarding when the 
U.S. might take a strong position on Western Sahara and, 
specifically, whether the U.S. might pressure Morocco to 
accept a referendum, Ambassador Bolton noted a number of 
factors at play, including democratization in the Middle East 
and Congressional unhappiness with yet another rollover. 
Things to Do 
------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Asked by van Walsum how the U.S. thought his efforts 
might be best directed, Ambassador Bolton said that the key 
goal should be that we avoid doing in six months what we did 
a few weeks ago and that the major players should not be 
allowed to wait until the last moment before discussing the 
way forward.  Ambassador Bolton suggested that the Personal 
Envoy travel to Paris, London and Madrid to say that these 
capitals need to decide soon what should be done. 
 
¶11. (C) SRSG Bastagli volunteered that MINURSO could 
contribute to "shaking things up" and therefore moving the 
process forward by providing human rights and political 
reporting that it has not done in the past.  He said that 
such reporting could be accomplished without any increase in 
staffing.  Moreover, he said, increasing the confidence 
building measures, and supplementing them with seminars might 
be additional activities that might energize dialogue between 
the two sides. 
BOLTON