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FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
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INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 7867
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 1950
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 2477
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2378
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1451
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0471

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 000882 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2016 
TAGS: EAID ECON IN PGOV PREL PTER UZ ZK
SUBJECT: WE AGREE TO AGREE: KARIMOV RECEIVES INDIAN PM 
 
REF: TASHKENT 799 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY DCM BRAD HANSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: After years of GOU pressure, the Indian PM 
finally visited Tashkent on April 25-26.  The timing was 
convenient, as President Karimov departed one week later to 
Pakistan.  The PM's visit resulted in numerous agreements, 
but most lacked substance, according to the Indian DCM. 
Seven memoranda of understanding (MOU) were signed, spanning 
gas exploration to education, but working groups must be 
formed to work out details on most of these.  Some real 
progress was made with expanding information technology (IT) 
programs and educational/cultural exchanges.  The Indians 
raised concerns about democracy and stability in Afghanistan, 
to which the Uzbeks replied that they would consider the 
GOI's suggestions.  No progress was made on visa 
liberalization for Indian businessmen.  For Karimov, the 
importance of the visit is the simple fact that the Indian PM 
came, bolstering Karimov's strategy to show the world and his 
domestic audience that Uzbekistan is not isolated and does 
not need the West.  Karimov reportedly railed against the 
U.S. "betrayal" in the two leader's private meeting.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The Indian DCM, Dr. B.M. Vinod Kumar, believes Karimov 
had two aims in asking the Indian PM to visit at this time. 
First, Karimov wanted to show that after distancing 
Uzbekistan from the West and cozying up to Russia and China, 
he still has bilateral relationships with non-Western 
countries unassociated with communism.  Second, Karimov 
wanted the visit to occur before his trip to Pakistan in 
order to play the Indian cooperation card and pressure 
Pakistan into following through on previous promises, 
including information sharing on counter-terrorism. 
 
LOTS OF SMALL POTATOES, BUT NO MEAT 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) As Post's previous report anticipated (reftel), the 
signed agreements amount to very little.  Three MOUs were 
signed for cooperation in mineral exploration and extraction. 
 The Indian DCM said no details were worked out on these 
MOUs.  Instead, there are tentative plans to form working 
groups to decide on the details.  According to the Indian 
DCM, the Indian Ministry of Coal and Mines did not agree to 
sign the MOU with the State Committee for Geology and Mineral 
Resources until the eve of the visit.  The Ministry was 
skeptical of any tangible results from the MOU, he said, but 
decided signing it would lock India into future benefits if 
the two sides eventually do cooperate. 
 
¶4. (C) The Indian DCM said India's energy policy towards 
Uzbekistan is a small part a broader policy of reaching out 
to China, Russia, South Korea, Malaysia, and other Southeast 
Asian countries to secure energy sources via joint 
exploration deals.  If the MOUs on energy come to fruition, 
transporting the gas south through Afghanistan poses a large 
problem.  The MOU between India's Ministry of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas and Uzbekneftegaz lacks details of any kind.  The 
Indian DCM said his PM was able to avoid responding directly 
to Indian journalists' questions for MOU details at a joint 
press conference, as there were none.  However, Karimov 
stepped in to announce, to the surprise of his Indian 
counterpart, that the two sides had agreed to a 50/50 split 
(Note: Press reports of what will be split range from 
"extracts" to "energy supplies" and infrastructure.  End 
note.)  The press took the statement and ran with it.  The 
Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) almost did not sign the 
MOU with Uzbekneftegaz due to lack of information from the 
Uzbeks.  According to the Indian DCM, GAIL, thinking 
Uzbekneftegaz was a private company, was reluctant to sign 
the MOU and requested annual reports to gauge investment 
risk.  Uzbekneftegaz said they do not write such reports, but 
in the end the MOU was signed.  (Note: It appears that, at 
the GOI political level, some last-minute pressuring occurred 
to convince GAIL to sign.  End note.) 
 
¶5. (C) India is keen on aiding Uzbekistan in education and 
signed three MOUs to expand its programs.  The Indian DCM 
said the agreement to expand IT education follows an earlier 
2004 agreement.  India plans to invest one-half to one 
million USD to supply eight faculty members and advanced 
computer equipment to a yet-to-be-determined local 
university.  It will also increase the number of Uzbek 
 
TASHKENT 00000882  002 OF 003 
 
 
student spots at India's premier IT institute, the Center for 
Development of Advanced Computers (CDAC).  (Note: CDAC 
developed India's first super computer, according to the 
Indian DCM.  End note.)  The Indian DCM said the MOU between 
Delhi University and the Tashkent State Institute of Oriental 
Studies will expand existing cooperation to include Hindi 
classes, Indian faculty members, courses on Indian history, 
guest lecturers and books on India.  Also, the Indian side 
agreed to assist on entrepreneurial education, but all 
details remain to be worked out. 
 
¶6. (C) The Indians will establish a new IT institute in 
Tashkent, the Jawaharlal Nehru Uzbekistan India Center for 
IT.  This will release about 50 IT slots to non-IT slots for 
study in India.  Currently, 25-30 disciplines are represented 
in the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation study 
program, from rural development to banking, which will expand 
from 100 to 120 opportunities a year.  Most of the programs 
are three to six months, though some students participate in 
year-long post-graduate programs. 
 
¶7. (C) The sixth and seventh MOUs are even more nebulous. 
The MOU on agricultural research simply states that the two 
sides are working on its annual work plan for 2007.  The 
Indian DCM said this plan is worked at on the director 
general level, but was included among the MOUs to give the 
visit more substance.  The last MOU is meant to revive 
specific industries on a reported Uzbek "sick" industry list. 
 Up to now, said the Indian DCM, the GOU has not named 
specific units among the "sick" industries, but believes 
textile units (silk and cotton) will be among them.  India is 
waiting for the GOU to specify the industries and units in 
order to suggest strategies. 
 
 
"WE WILL CONSIDER IT" 
----------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Indian side raised democracy at the delegation 
meeting, according to the Indian DCM.  (Note: Kumar clearly 
had not been debriefed on the private meeting between Karimov 
and the PM.  The Indian DCM's comments appear to be based on 
the delegation meeting.  He was heavily involved on the 
preparations for the visit.  End note.)  The PM acknowledged 
the importance of stability in Uzbekistan, but pointed out 
that popular participation in institutions and 
decision-making bodies was essential in promoting stability. 
He told the GOU that the GOI stands ready to continue its 
assistance to help build such institutions.  The Uzbeks 
responded with "we will consider it."  The Indian DCM noted 
to the DCM that India has facilitated visits of leaders of 
Uzbek institutions, such as the Parliament Speaker and 
Central Elections Commission Chairman to see for themselves 
Indian democratic institutions. 
 
¶9. (C) Also discussed during the visit was the Uzbek-Indian 
counter-terrorism working group, which has met only twice. 
According to the Indian DCM, the information sharing 
relationship is one-way.  To date, the Uzbeks have not shared 
any intel with the Indians.  In contrast, the Indians shared 
intel in 2005 about two Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
members arrested in India and possible IMU activities in the 
Pakistani portion of Kashmir.  Further, it appears the 
Indians are dissatisfied with the existing arrangement to 
share information thru the MFA.  At the last working group 
meeting, the Indians asked the Uzbeks to appoint a 
coordinator for the information-sharing process.  So far 
there has been no response from the Uzbeks. 
 
¶10. (C) India raised its concern for stability in Afghanistan 
with the Uzbeks and encouraged the GOU to increase efforts to 
promote stability and development in Afghanistan.  The Indian 
DCM noted to the DCM that in recent years Uzbek 
activity/interest in Afghanistan has dropped substantially. 
Kumar also remarked on the lack of Uzbek involvement in 
regional counterterrorism efforts.  (Note: Karimov, at the 
joint press event, indirectly criticized the U.S. and 
coalition for alleged lack of progress in dealing with 
narcotics in Afghanistan.  End note.)  The Uzbeks responded 
to the Indian delegation with "we will consider it." 
 
¶11. (C) The Indian DCM also noted that no progress was made 
on the Indian request to liberalize Uzbek visas for Indian 
businessmen, diplomats and others.  Kumar noted the Uzbek 
response was exactly the same as in 1993, when PM Rao visited 
 
TASHKENT 00000882  003 OF 003 
 
 
Uzbekistan: "we'll examine it." 
 
¶12. (C) U.S. relations with Uzbekistan also came up in the 
PM's private meeting with Karimov.  The Indian Ambassador 
told our Ambassador that Karimov railed against the U.S. at 
some length for "betraying" Uzbekistan's efforts to be a good 
partner on counterterrorism by supporting a "colored 
revolution" in Uzbekistan. 
 
¶13. (C) Comment: With the incessant GOU pressure on the GOI 
for this visit (reftel), one might have expected the Uzbeks 
to place more importance on specific outcomes.  However, for 
Karimov, it was largely to show the world that Uzbekistan is 
not isolated.  The GOU has been courting states throughout 
Asia*-South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, India and 
Pakistan--to secure agreements on gas exploration, business 
investment and education exchanges.  Most of these agreements 
lack much substance and are meant only to demonstrate that 
Uzbekistan has non-Western, democratic "friends" and does not 
need the West.  Uzbekistan is carving its territory up for 
foreign mineral exploration, with the Russians receiving the 
prime lots and countries less important to Uzbekistan, like 
India, receiving only agreements to agree on exploration. 
PURNELL