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DE RUEHC #3673/01 1432224
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 232218Z MAY 06
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY 7614

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 083673 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN, SIPDIS, FOR DCMS AND ALL CABLE DRAFTERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2031 
TAGS: AMGT AOMS PINR ACOA KCCP
SUBJECT: ALLIED SHARING AND SIPRNET 
 
Classified By: RM A/S Brad Higgins, For Reasons 1.4 (d) and 
(g). 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action message.  As a part of the 
continuing war on terrorism and in response to 
recommendations of the 9/11 and the WMD Commissions, the 
Congress and the President have mandated a number of 
changes in the way information is to be shared, within the 
federal government, between the federal government and 
state, local and tribal officials (including in some cases 
the private sector), and with certain of our allies.  These 
changes are making obsolete certain assumptions that have 
governed the way that we in the State Department write, 
classify and mark telegrams and other communications. 
Chief among these are the assumptions that classified State 
Department telegrams and other communications will not be 
further disseminated by recipient agencies without the 
authorization of the originating agency, and that they will 
similarly not be shared with foreign countries without 
specific originating agency authorization.  This does not 
mean that agencies originating classified information will 
not restrict its further dissemination, but this will 
increasingly require an affirmative action to mark 
documents to be restricted.  The ground rules for 
additional sharing (and for restricting dissemination) are 
rapidly being developed within the USG, and posts will be 
informed as the new rules and procedures are adopted.  This 
telegram deals with sharing information with certain 
allies. 
 
¶2. (S//NF) The President has instructed that the DOD- 
controlled SIPRNet be a primary mechanism by which certain 
information is to be shared with our closest allies in the 
war on terror: the UK, Australia, and Canada (direct 
contact is still a primary mechanism also).  In carrying 
out this directive DOD intends to provide UK, Australian, 
and Canadian users access to all of SIPRNet except for 
those documents, email, data repositories and services 
explicitly protected as US-only.  DOD will prohibit allied 
access to documents marked NOFORN, as well as telegrams 
containing various categories of information such as Arms 
Export Control Act, NATO information, and Restricted Data. 
Moreover, DOD's official implementation guidance lists 
"diplomatic communications" and "foreign policy 
information" as categories of information generally 
prohibited from release to these UK/Australia/Canada 
personnel. 
 
¶3. (S//NF) For exempting these categories from sharing, the 
DOD solution relies on a variety of network mechanisms, 
software tools, "dirty-word" filters, and network 
monitoring systems to prevent UK/Australia/Canada user 
access to non-releasable content on SIPRNet.  The State 
Department remains engaged in discussions related to this 
DOD decision.  In March 2006 State provided DOD with a 
comprehensive list of keywords, phrases, markings and other 
unique identifiers for DOD to use within filters to 
identify and prevent disclosure of non-releasable, US-only 
diplomatic reporting information on SIPRNet.  A variety 
of State-specific channels and captions were included among 
this list of prohibited reporting, e.g., NODIS, LIMDIS, 
ROGER, EXDIS, SIPDIS, STADIS, OIG, DISSENT, MED, and DS 
Channel.  State at that time also instructed DOD to 
blacklist all of State's US-only SIPRNet websites to 
prevent allied user access, meaning that all URLs that 
begin with "ses.state.sgov.gov","source.ds.state.sgov.go v", 
"state.sgov.gov", and "ncd.state.sgov.gov" among others are 
blocked. 
 
¶4. (S//NF) The Department remains actively engaged with the 
DOD and Director of National Intelligence to ensure that 
appropriate technical controls are implemented to protect 
State US-only reporting on SIPRNet.  At this stage, 
however, the filters may not protect all State Department 
information that should not be shared.  Therefore, any 
State Department reporting that should not be directly 
accessed by UK/Australia/Canada officials must be marked 
"NOFORN".  This will include, for instance, much 
information obtained from or about other countries in 
normal diplomatic intercourse.  In many cases this will be 
a more stringent restriction than desirable because some 
information not appropriate for sharing with the UK, 
Australia and Canada will need to be shared with other 
countries, and in other cases State officials may determine 
that the information should at some point be released to 
appropriate allies with access to SIPRNet.  However, 
pending the development of a more refined filtering system 
or the adoption of additional marking categories, all State 
 
STATE 00083673  002 OF 002 
 
 
Department classified material not intended to be shared 
with the UK/Australia/Canada, as well as material 
explicitly intended for a US-only audience, including 
memorandums, briefings, cables, emails, and other 
electronically disseminated information, must be marked 
NOFORN. 
 
¶5. (S//NF) As information is increasingly disseminated 
electronically within the USG, drafters should adopt 
insofar as possible common interagency classification and 
dissemination markings.  Diplomatic reporting that is 
authorized for release to a specific country, or countries, 
should insofar as possible be marked as "REL TO X", where X 
is the ISO country code for the country specified for 
release.  Such marking should include the USA country 
code in addition to the foreign country code.  For example, 
a USG CONFIDENTIAL document approved for release to the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada must be marked, 
"C//REL TO USA, GBR, AUS, CAN".   Cables marked releasable 
to our UK, Australian, and Canadian partners will not be 
released to other foreign governments unless specifically 
included within the REL TO field using the appropriate ISO 
country code.  If necessary, additional sharing 
instructions should be included in the first paragraph of 
the text.  Again, however, it is recognized that it is 
often not possible to determine when drafting a document 
to which countries it may be appropriate to release some or 
all of the information at which point in time. Accordingly, 
a NOFORN marking or the absence of a "REL TO" marking does 
not constitute a prohibition on further dissemination of 
Department of State information when an authorized 
Department of State official decides that dissemination is 
appropriate.  Other agency information, however, should not 
be disseminated except in accordance with markings or with 
the subsequent authorization of the agency in question. 
 
¶6. (U) The A bureau is currently preparing related document 
classification and dissemination marking instructions for 
inclusion within the FAM, and it is likely that additional 
guidance will be provided via telegram in the coming 
months.  For directives relating to the collaborative 
sharing with the UK, Australia, and Canada mandated by the 
President, see: http://www.ismc.sgov.gov/Collaboration/gbr- 
aus-proxy-info/.  For a current listing on of ISO country 
codes,visit:http://capco.dssc.sgov.gov/security_info/iso3 16 
6-countrycodes.html. 
 
¶7.      (U) Minimize considered. 
RICE