VZCZCXRO2221
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0451/01 1320600
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 120600Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4643
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2037
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SKOPJE 000451 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: ETHNIC ALBANIAN LEADERS ON ELECTIONS 
AND KOSOVO STATUS 
 
REF: A. SKOPJE 373 
 
     ¶B. SKOPJE 420 
 
SUMMARY and COMMENT 
 
¶1. (C) During separate meetings May 4, the Ambassador told 
DUI and DPA leaders Ali Ahmeti and Arben Xhaferi, 
respectively, to refrain from importing K-Albanian "muscle" 
to assist them during upcoming parliamentary elections.  She 
reiterated the USG position on Macedonia-Kosovo border 
demarcation and asked both leaders to refrain from further 
public comment on the matter.  She reminded both men that the 
2001 Skopje-Belgrade agreement delimiting the border was not 
subject to renegotiation. 
 
¶2. (C) Both leaders denied they intended to rely on 
K-Albanian "muscle" to assist them during the election, and 
pledged to adhere to democratic norms during the political 
campaign.  DPA Vice President Thaci admitted there were 
eAlbanian "extremists" amidst the DPA ranks, but argued it 
was easier to control them if they remained inside the party. 
 On border demarcation, both Ahmeti and Xhaferi said they 
agreed the matter should remain a technical matter, rather 
than becoming a political issue in the election campaign. 
 
¶3. (C) Anecdotal evidence indicates that DUI and DPA, despite 
their protestations to the contrary, have imported K-Albanian 
"muscle" to assist them in the elections.  Such K-Albanian 
involvement could lead to electoral fraud and violence, 
damaging Macedonia's democratic system and near-term 
prospects for NATO membership.  It would be useful if local 
authorities in Tirana and Pristina strongly urged K-Albanian 
political parties to avoid providing such "reinforcements" to 
their eAlbanian counterparts in Macedonia, and to recall 
those already here.   End Summary and Comment. 
 
MEETING WITH eALBANIAN LEADERS IN TETOVO 
 
¶4. (U) Ambassador met separately with DUI (ethnic Albanian 
governing coalition junior partner) President Ali Ahmeti and 
DPA (main ethnic Albanian opposition party) President Arben 
Xhaferi on May 4 in Tetovo.  Ahmeti was accompanied by DUI 
Vice President Agron Buxhaku.  Xhaferi was joined by DPA Vice 
President Menduh Thaci.  DCM and P/E Chief (notetaker) 
accompanied the Ambassador. 
 
GETTING THE WORD OUT ON FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ahmeti told the Ambassador that DUI's grassroots 
organization for the electoral campaign was taking shape. 
Party staffers covering areas where DUI would contend for 
parliamentary seats would spread the message regarding the 
need to conduct "proper elections" and to ensure high 
turnout.  He was confident there would be few problems on 
election day. 
 
DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES THE ONLY WAY FORWARD 
 
¶6. (SBU) Xhaferi, asserting that DPA had "accepted democratic 
procedures as the only way forward" in the elections, said 
the party viewed free and fair elections as the sole way to 
validate the political legitimacy of the state.  Commenting 
that DUI's "unrealistically high percentage of votes" 
received in last year's local elections had undermined the 
legitimacy of the democratic process, Xhaferi complained that 
the international community's reaction to DPA's subsequent 
complaints had been too "soft." 
 
DPA CAMPAIGN -- NO "NEURALGIC" THEMES 
 
¶7. (C) Xhaferi said DPA would not campaign with themes that 
are "neuralgic" to eMacedonians (e.g., the name dispute with 
Greece and other identity issues).  The party would question 
Ali Ahmeti's moral authority, and would attack DUI's alleged 
failure to ensure implementation of the Framework Agreement. 
It also would focus on economic equality for eAlbanians by 
tackling "systemic obstacles" to eAlbanian investment. 
 
 
SKOPJE 00000451  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶8. (C) Thaci added that DPA would not directly attack ruling 
SDSM during the campaign, since "that would raise its poll 
ratings."  The party would seek to show through its 
professional cadres that it was ready to enter government and 
to work effectively as a coalition partner.  He blamed DUI's 
lack of professional staff for its alleged failure to 
implement the FWA. 
 
KOSOVAR "MUSCLE" TO INFLUENCE ELECTIONS? 
 
¶9. (C) The Ambassador raised with Ahmeti rumors circulating 
in international community circles that DUI had imported 
Kosovar Albanian "muscle" to help the party during the 
campaign, and said she hoped the rumors were unfounded.  If 
true, she said, the USG would expect DUI to send such forces 
back to Kosovo immediately.  She repeated that message to 
Xhaferi and Thaci, adding that the elections should be viewed 
as a political, not a physical, contest.  Kosovar Albanian 
involvement in Macedonia's political process would reflect 
poorly on all eAlbanians, including those in Kosovo. 
 
NO NEED FOR K-ALBANIAN HELP? 
 
¶10. (C) Ahmeti denied that DUI had employed K-Albanians to 
interfere in the elections.  He added that the party had 
never used such forces in the past; it did not need them now. 
 Ahmeti admitted there were some Kosovar associates of DUI 
living in Macedonia, such as Emrush Suma, but he would soon 
return to Kosovo.  At any rate, he had forbidden Suma from 
interfering in the electoral campaign.  Ahmeti noted that DUI 
enjoyed good relations with eAlbanian parties in both 
Pristina and Tirana, and that the party had declined recent 
offers of assistance from several of them. 
 
¶11. (C) DPA's Thaci said that the party was working with 
counterparts in Tirana and Pristina to urge them to press 
eAlbanians in Macedonia to work for free and fair elections. 
DPA had told authorities in Pristina that Kosovar Albanians 
in Macedonia who might interfere in the electoral process 
would "not be allowed to remain here."  The expulsion of 
Kosovar Albanian political groups from Macedonia would, Thaci 
contended, "reduce by 50 percent" the number of election 
fraud incidents on election day. (Note: Thaci later provided 
us with a list -- forwarded to the Department -- of the 
K-Albanians DPA claims will be employed by DUI during the 
elections. End Note.) 
 
DPA's HOMEGROWN "MUSCLE" 
 
¶12. (C) Thaci admitted that some local DPA members, such as 
former UCK member Daut Rexhepi-Leka and criminal gang leader 
Agim Krasniqi, had "extremist backgrounds," but he tried to 
assure the Ambassador that he could control them.  It was 
better for such persons to be "inside the DPA tent than to 
operate outside of it," he said. 
 
¶13. (C) Thaci pledged that DPA would "take responsibility for 
the behavior of our troops," claiming that the party's strict 
hierarchy would make that possible.  At the same time, he 
said, "DPA followers are courageous and will clash with DUI's 
Kosovars if problems arise."  If the Kosovars left before the 
elections, that "balance of power" would not be necessary. 
 
KOSOVO STATUS AND BORDER DEMARCATION 
 
¶14. (C) Referring to recent statements by DUI and especially 
by DPA leaders that had muddied the waters on demarcation of 
the Macedonia-Kosovo border, the Ambassador restated the US 
position on the matter, underscoring that it should be 
resolved as part of a final status solution for Kosovo.  In 
the meantime, it would be prudent for all parties to avoid 
making public statements about the matter.  It was especially 
important to keep border demarcation from becoming an issue 
in the upcoming electoral campaign. 
 
¶15. (C) Ahmeti noted that he had recently discussed the 
demarcation issue with Kosovar authorities, and conceded that 
Kosovar PM Ceku had made some "extreme" statements on the 
 
SKOPJE 00000451  003 OF 004 
 
 
matter, perhaps under pressure from hardliners.  The main 
concern, in his view, was to ensure that Kosovo maintained 
and improved its relations with Macedonia throughout the 
final status process.  As the status talks process 
progressed, it was important not to allow demarcation, which 
"could be completed at the appropriate time," to become a 
major political distraction. 
 
¶16. (C) Ahmeti slammed DPA leader Xhaferi's visit to Kosovo 
the previous week as "unfruitful" for having stirred Kosovar 
emotions over the demarcation issue.  He noted that actual 
demarcation could lead to violent reactions on the part of 
eAlbanian citizens living in the border region who did not 
want to live on Macedonian soil.  The Ambassador made it 
clear that the 2001 Skopje-Belgrade border delimitation 
agreement was not subject to renegotiation.  What needed to 
be done was a technical demarcation of the existing border. 
It was important, therefore, to keep the issue off the status 
process agenda for now.  Ahmeti agreed, adding that a 
"technical MOU" on demarcation might help resolve the matter. 
 
 
¶17. (C) Xhaferi argued that press reports about his 
statements on the border issue during a recent visit to 
Pristina had inaccurately characterized his position.  In 
fact, he had said that Pristina could not resolve the 
demarcation issue at the present time because Kosovo still 
had no international legal standing to do so. 
 
KONDOVO AND KRASNIQI CANDIDACY 
 
¶18. (C) Thaci said that the early March police raid on 
Kondovo, which left one eAlbanian dead and one seriously 
wounded, had sorely tested DPA's crisis management skills, 
but that the party had managed to control the eAlbanian 
reaction and to prevent further violence.  He said he had 
chastised Krasniqi for having harbored the three criminals 
involved, and said the notorious Kondovo gang leader would 
not, contrary to earlier reports, be included on DPA's list 
of candidates for parliament. 
 
CONTROVERSIAL MONUMENT CONSTRUCTION 
 
¶19. (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether the DUI-led Struga 
municipality would obey a recent local court order 
prohibiting construction of a controversial monument to a 
deceased former NLA and DUI member, the plan for which 
already had raised inter-ethnic tensions there.  Ahmeti 
blamed the inter-ethnic fracas over the monument on the 
Struga mayor's inexperience.  He said he had persuaded 
backers of the monument project to temporarily suspend work 
on it, and pledged that the issue would be resolved after the 
parliamentary elections.  The Ambassador noted the importance 
to Struga's economic prospects, particularly its touristic 
appeal, of resolving the issue peacefully. 
 
COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST 
 
¶20. (C) Although both DUI and DPA deny that they plan to use 
Kosovar Albanians to "assist" them during the elections, 
anecdotal evidence, including from OSCE field observers, 
indicates that both parties already have Kosovar 
"reinforcements" on the ground here.  K-Albanian involvement 
in the Macedonian electoral process would likely result in 
isolated electoral fraud and violent clashes, given the 
heated campaign climate and DPA's "do or die" approach to 
winning.  Such an outcome would damage the democratic process 
here and would jeopardize Macedonia's chances for NATO 
membership in the next two years.  It also could have 
negative regional repercussions, with political leaders in 
Belgrade using such involvement to charge that K-Albanians 
are destabilizing the neighborhood. 
 
¶21. (C) Embassy is raising this issue at IC Principals' 
meetings to ensure the IC here uses similar language and 
arguments in admonishing DUI and DPA.  It would be 
particularly useful, therefore, if local authorities in 
Tirana and Pristina would strongly urge K-Albanian political 
 
SKOPJE 00000451  004 OF 004 
 
 
parties to avoid providing such "reinforcements" to their 
eAlbanian counterparts in Macedonia, and to recall those 
already here. 
WOHLERS