VZCZCXYZ0007
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DE RUEHUL #1472/01 1220744
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 020744Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7673
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0580
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7292
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0658
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1206
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001472 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KS
SUBJECT: ROK QUESTIONS PERCEIVED USG POLICY SHIFTS ON DPRK 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun.  Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In a May 1 meeting with the POL M/C, Cho Tae-yong, 
Director-General of MOFAT's North American Affairs Bureau, 
asked whether USG policy had changed toward the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex (KIC) and on granting asylum to North 
Koreans who had already been resettled in South Korea.  Cho 
protested SENK Lefkowitz's April 28 op-ed in the Wall Street 
Journal, characterizing it as inaccurate and unbalanced.  He 
said the commentary contrasted with previous USG statements 
of support for the KIC.  Cho also sought clarification on the 
case of North Korean defector Seo Jae-sok, who, according to 
press accounts, was granted asylum status by the Los Angeles 
Immigration Court.  Cho requested further information about 
how this case might represent or influence the USG view of 
North Korean defectors.  See action request in para 11.  END 
SUMMARY. 
. 
PROTESTING SENK'S WSJ OP-ED 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) North American Affairs Bureau Director-General Cho 
Tae-yong requested a meeting with POL M/C on May 1 to seek 
clarification on whether USG policy toward North Korea had 
changed recently.  Cho pointed to the April 28 Wall Street 
Journal op-ed submitted by the Special Envoy on Human Rights 
in North Korea, Jay Lefkowitz, to express Seoul's 
disappointment over what Cho described as a negative and 
misleading portrayal of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). 
 ROKG officials had thought that Washington generally 
supported the KIC, but this op-ed made them wonder if that 
had changed. 
 
¶3.  (C) Cho said he wanted to deliver several points.  First, 
the ROKG and most Korean people viewed the KIC as a positive 
development that deserved more credit from the international 
community.  Second, ROKG officials, most recently in a visit 
to Washington, have made efforts to explain the KIC in a 
straightforward and clear manner.  Third, when senior USG 
officials made criticisms, people would assume that this was 
the USG view.  Fourth, the WSJ article was factually 
incorrect or at best failed to give an accurate description. 
 
¶4.  (C) The facts were, Cho stated, that 13 ROK firms were in 
operation in the KIC, employing 4,918 North Korean workers. 
Since the project began, the ROK has paid a total of USD 2.7 
million in wages plus an additional USD 300,000 in taxes, 
resulting in USD 3 million for employment.  The ROK spent an 
additional USD 12 million for use of the land.  The equipment 
and facilities in the KIC were owned by the ROK.  In other 
words, the ROK had spent at most tens of millions of dollars, 
rather than having had "pumped hundreds of millions of 
dollars" into the North. 
 
¶5.  (C) POL M/C replied that Hyundai Asan's own briefings 
sometimes blurred the line between its projects in Kaesong 
and Mount Kumgang.  In addition, press accounts from 
time-to-time had mentioned ROK transfers of some USD 500 
million in the North to facilitate some of the South Korean 
projects.  Seconding the suggestion from the WSJ article, he 
suggested Seoul consider allowing the International Labor 
Organization to visit the KIC.  MOFAT had helpfully 
facilitated the visits of two congressional staff delegations 
to KIC, along with accompanying Emboffs, who valued the 
opportunity to see conditions for themselves, POL M/C said. 
 
¶6.  (C) On North Korean refugees, Cho said the WSJ article 
mentioned that the USG would welcome resettlement to the 
United States, but the article did not mention that the ROKG 
had settled virtually all of the North Korean refugees to 
date.  ROKG policy has been to accept any and all North 
Korean refugees who wish to live in South Korea, and so far 
the ROKG had taken around 7,000 defectors.  Cho characterized 
this as an error of omission that contributed to the negative 
view of the enormous efforts the ROKG had expended toward 
humanitarian assistance for North Koreans. 
. 
LA ASYLUM CASE 
-------------- 
¶7.  (C) DG Cho also sought clarification on the case of a 
North Korean defector, Seo Jae-sok, who, according to press 
accounts, was granted asylum status by the Los Angeles 
Immigration Court.  Again, Cho asked if this represented a 
change in USG policy.  It was his understanding that the USG 
was working with the ROKG on ways to resettle North Korean 
refugees who had not already received asylum in South Korea. 
Cho said that Mr. Seo was a South Korean citizen.  Therefore, 
granting him political asylum could be viewed as South Korea 
lacking in political freedom, and that the applicant was 
politically repressed in South Korea.  This was just not 
true. 
 
¶8.  (C) Specifically, Cho asked whether this case would 
affect the USG view of and policy toward North Korean 
defectors who had received ROK citizenship.  Was the North 
Korean Human Rights Act the basis for this decision?  If so, 
did this case contradict Section 302 of the NKHRA that said 
it was not intended "to apply to former North Korean 
nationals who have availed themselves of those rights" to 
citizenship under the ROKG Constitution? 
 
¶9.  (C) Lastly, Cho regretted that the USG had not informed 
the ROKG about this case.  Seoul did not know if this case 
was over or if it would be appealed.  While privacy concerns 
were to be expected, a lack of information placed ROK 
officials in the unenviable position of not being able to 
respond to questions from senior policymakers or the press. 
 
¶10.  (C) For example, Cho said, according to some press 
reports the individual may have had an earlier asylum request 
rejected by the Department of Homeland Security.  Was this a 
case of the Judiciary Branch acting independently from the 
Executive Branch?  According to another press account, the 
individual claimed that his resident registration in South 
Korea was canceled, and to some this might incorrectly 
suggest that the ROK had revoked his citizenship.  Cho 
explained that when a person was no longer living at a 
particular address in Korea, his local residency was 
suspended, as would be one's drivers license in the United 
States if one moved to another state.  Fuller consultations 
would have been able to remedy some of these misperceptions. 
Cho requested that the Embassy ask for information that could 
be conveyed to the ROKG. 
 
¶11. (C) Action Request: We would appreciate Department's 
guidance on the following questions raised by DG Cho: (1) Has 
the USG view changed in regard to the KIC? (2) Is it the USG 
policy to accept for resettlement North Korean refugees who 
now have South Korean citizenship? 
VERSHBOW