VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1470/01 1220720
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 020720Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7670
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0578
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7290
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0656
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1204
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SEOUL 001470 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL PHUM MNUC EAID KN KS
SUBJECT: UNIFICATION MINISTER ON SIX PARTY TALKS, S/E 
LEFKOWITZ'S APR 28 WALL STREET JOURNAL OP-ED ON NORTH KOREA 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow.  Reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (S) In a May 1 meeting with the Ambassador, Minister of 
Unification Lee Jong-seok said he believed, from his meetings 
with North Korean counterparts at the April 21-24 
inter-Korean ministerial in Pyongyang, that the DPRK would 
return to the Six Party Talks if given a face-saving way to 
do so.  Lee strongly objected to Special Envoy Jay 
Lefkowitz's April 28 Wall Street Journal op-ed on North 
Korean human rights, asserting that the Special Envoy's 
remarks on South Korea's economic cooperation and 
humanitarian assistance were distorted, inaccurate, and 
unbefitting a high-ranking official of an allied country. 
Characterizing the op-ed as interfering in South Korea's 
domestic affairs, Lee called on U.S. officials to exercise 
restraint.  The Ambassador told Lee that the Special Envoy 
reflected the strong feeling among many Americans about the 
DPRK's human rights situation, and stressed the importance of 
transparency in the ROK's economic and humanitarian dealings 
with the North.  Lee said he expected former President Kim 
Dae-jung to visit North Korea sometime in late June, adding 
that Seoul hoped the former president could directly persuade 
Kim Jong-il that the DPRK should return to the Six Party 
Talks.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (U) The Ambassador met on May 1 with Minister of 
Unification Lee Jong-seok to discuss general North Korean 
issues prior to departing for the KEI Road Show and 
consultations in Washington.  Minister Lee was accompanied by 
Senior Advisor to the Minister Kim Sungbae and Policy Advisor 
Kim Hyun Jung. 
 
DPRK NEEDS FACE-SAVING WAY TO RETURN TO 6PT 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) Lee told the Ambassador that, during the April 21-24 
inter-Korean ministerial, he had strongly urged the DPRK to 
return to the Six Party Talks without preconditions.  He had 
the impression from his North Korean counterpart that the 
DPRK would return if given a "face-saving" way.  Lee assessed 
that, while North Korean officials responsible for foreign 
affairs, economic planning, and inter-Korean relations seemed 
to recognize the need for the DPRK to return to the 
negotiating table, the military was skeptical whether the 
Talks would benefit North Korea due to their belief that the 
United States would continually make new demands on the DPRK 
for nothing in return.  The North Korean military was gravely 
suspicious of Washington's intentions toward Pyongyang, which 
was why Washington's unrelenting focus on human rights and 
illicit activities reinforced the military's conviction that 
the United States sought regime change.  Lee said Washington, 
by focusing on these other issues rather than 
denuclearization, was making it difficult for the ROK to 
persuade the DPRK to return to the Six Party Talks. 
 
AMB: DELAY IN 6PT RAISES PROFILE OF OTHER ISSUES 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4.  (S) The Ambassador reminded Lee that human rights and 
other issues were bound to receive more attention in 
Washington and in the public debate as long as the Six Party 
Talks were stalled.  The United States and the other parties 
were not asking the DPRK for anything extra beyond the 
obligations stipulated in the September 19 Joint Statement. 
Stressing that President Bush, during his April 20 summit 
meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, had stated 
categorically that the United States remained committed to 
the Six Party process, the Ambassador asked what else the 
United States could do to help convince the DPRK of the U.S. 
commitment.  Lee said a high-level public statement of U.S. 
policy might be helpful in moving the DPRK. 
 
STRONG REACTION TO SENK LEFKOWITZ'S WSJ OP-ED 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Reading from prepared points, Minister Lee conveyed 
the ROKG's "serious concern" about Special Envoy for North 
Korean Human Rights (SENK) Jay Lefkowitz's April 28 op-ed in 
the Wall Street Journal.  Lee, noting that he did not believe 
Lefkowitz's article reflected the official position of the 
USG, said Seoul was concerned that a senior U.S. official had 
openly criticized the ROK's policies toward the DPRK, its 
human rights practices, and Seoul's strategy of North-South 
engagement including the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) in 
a widely-read publication.  Lee argued that: (1) Lefkowitz 
had seriously distorted the truth about the labor conditions 
at KIC and the wages paid to North Korean workers; (2) the 
Special Envoy based his criticism of the ROK's economic 
assistance policy toward the DPRK on his own subjective point 
of view without regard to Seoul's efforts to monitor all 
humanitarian assistance to North Korea (efforts that were 
improving steadily); and (3) the public criticism was 
unwarranted, especially between two allies, as it amounted to 
interfering in South Korean domestic affairs. 
 
LEE: CALL FOR EXERCISE IN RESTRAINT, TRUST ROK EXPERIENCE 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Reminding the Ambassador that the ROKG had never 
criticized the USG for its failure to accept North Korean 
refugees despite the strong desire among many North Koreans 
to seek asylum in the United States, Lee regretted that the 
Special Envoy continually made disparaging remarks about 
South Korea's policies on assistance to North Korea and North 
Korean human rights.  Seoul accepted 1,500 North Korean 
refugees annually, and it was hypocritical of the United 
States to criticize the ROK's policies when it had yet to 
receive even one.  Lee called for U.S. officials to exercise 
restraint in openly questioning the ROK's policies, urging 
the USG to have faith in the ROK's decades-long experience 
dealing with North Korea. 
 
SENK OP-ED REFLECTS FEELING AMONG MANY AMERICANS RE DPRK 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The Ambassador told Lee that he would convey his 
points to Washington, adding that the SENK reflected the 
strong feeling among many Americans (including President 
Bush) about the DPRK's human rights situation.  The Special 
Envoy's point was to try to find ways to improve the human 
rights situation in North Korea and he was not engaging in a 
rhetorical exercise.  The United States understood the ROK 
desire for providing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK, 
especially since Washington believed that humanitarian 
assistance should not be used as a political weapon. 
Monitoring where the assistance goes is important, however, 
and the ROK should share more information on its own 
monitoring efforts.  As KIC and other aspects of North-South 
economic cooperation raised questions, such as the issue of 
whether the North Korean workers received all their pay, it 
would be helpful if the ROK increased transparency on its 
economic and humanitarian dealings with the North, the 
Ambassador said. 
 
KDJ LIKELY TO VISIT DPRK LATE JUNE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Lee said he expected former President Kim Dae-jung to 
visit North Korea sometime in late June.  The ROK's biggest 
expectation for the visit, said Lee, was for the former 
president to meet Kim Jong-il and directly persuade him that 
the DPRK should return to the Six Party Talks.  The most 
effective way to overcome resistance to talks within the DPRK 
was by communicating directly with Kim Jong-il.  Seoul 
believed that Kim Dae-jung was in the best position to be 
able to convince the North Korean leader of the benefit of 
denuclearization, as well as to convey the concerns of the 
international community.  The ROKG believed that a successful 
meeting between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il could lead to a 
"significant momentum" in both North-South relations and the 
DPRK's interaction with the outside world, Lee said. 
VERSHBOW