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FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000966 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR D (SMITH), P (BAME), EUR (DICARLO), EUR/SCE 
(ENGLISH, SAINZ, FOOKS), NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER, 
GREGORIAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA:  WHY THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM VOTE FAILED 
AND WHAT IT MEANS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS L. MCELHANEY.  REASON:  1.4 (B) AND ( 
D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  In a late-night vote April 26, the 
constitutional reform package agreed on by the leaders of 
Bosnia's major political parties failed to obtain the 2/3 
majority it needed in the House of Representatives, falling 
short by only two votes.  Of the 42 delegates, a majority -- 
26 -- voted in favor, with 16 voting against (no abstentions 
or absences).  The package and its backers -- Bosniak SDA, 
Serb SDS, SNSD, PDP, Croat HDZ and multi-ethnic SDP -- were 
the victims of an alliance of convenience between (Bosniak) 
Haris Silajdzic's Party for BiH (SBiH) and the new right-wing 
Croat party "HDZ 1990."  The rejection of the package means 
Bosnia will, for now, retain its inefficient governmental 
structure, although we continue to probe for the possibility 
of finding the necessary votes -- if not at this moment, then 
in a more conducive post-election environment.  The 
parliament's failure to pass the package leaves the Bosniak 
SDA party and its party president, Sulejman Tihic, as the 
biggest losers, with the public defection of one of the 
party's own parliamentarians driving the nail in the reform 
package's coffin and exposing deep rifts in the party's 
infrastructure.  The political forces unleashed by the 
constitutional reform debate will continue to whirl in the 
pre-election period, and we will need to contain the 
destructive finger-pointing even as we work to lay out plans 
for the future of constitutional reform in Bosnia -- a 
process that must and will go on.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE ALLIANCE:  SBIH, HDZ 1990 -- PLUS TWO 
 
¶2.  (C)  After a 16 hour session on April 26 and nine hours 
of debate and caucusing the following day, the BiH House of 
Representatiaves voted down the U.S. and EU-backed 
constitutional reform package close to midnight April 27. 
The U.S. brokered package -- negotiated by the leaders of 
BiH's eight largest political parties (representing all 
ethnicities) over approximately 12 months of discussion -- 
was ultimately done in by a highly orchestrated and vicious 
joint campaign by the breakaway Croat party, "HDZ 1990" and 
the (ostensibly multiethnic but largely Bosniak) Party for 
BiH (SBiH).  Behind the alliance:  the electoral ambitions of 
their party leaders to de-throne SDA President Tihic and HDZ 
President Covic in the October national elections.  As 
reported in previous cables, HDZ 1990 was founded largely to 
oppose the current HDZ leader, Dragan Covic, who participated 
in the constitutional reform negotiations; HDZ 1990 defined 
opposition to Covic as opposition to the constitutional 
reform.  Five of six HDZ House of Reps parliamentarians 
ultimately aligned themselves with HDZ 1990, and cast their 
votes accordingly. 
 
¶3.  (C)  SBiH, under the leadership of the mercurial and 
power-hungry Haris Silajdzic, proved an even more destructive 
force.  A participant in the constitutional reform 
negotiations for the past year, it ceased to participate in 
the end-game ostensibly over a single issue -- retention of 
the existing complex voting procedure in the House of 
Representatives (the so-called practice of "entity voting"). 
But that was just their cover.  The real reason was the 
Presidential ambitions of Silajdzic, who has spent most of 
his time in recent years outside the country but now seeks to 
seize the political moment by preying on fissures within the 
leading Bosniak SDA party.  Though Silajdzic was not 
physically present in the Parliament, observers quickly 
identified his proxy:  Zlatko Hadzidedic, an aide to SBiH 
Minister of Civil Affairs Halilovic, who orchestrated efforts 
by SBiH, HDZ 1990 and various radical independents to sow 
dissent.  Hadzidedic focused his efforts (and money) on 
getting the two additional "no" votes against the package 
needed for the HDZ 1990 and SBiH alliance to prevail. 
 
¶4.  (C)  He found those votes not among rejectionist Serb 
fringe parties but among the Bosniak ranks.  Many here 
believe that at least one of two crucial Bosniak "no" votes 
was literally bought and paid for by SBiH.  Over the 48 hours 
prior to and during the debate, Mehmed Zilic, the SDA 
defector, appeared to be a man who had promised his vote to 
someone else for a price.  He was alternately intractable, 
unreachable and deliberately ambiguous despite a wave of 
successive entreaties by long-time friends, political allies 
and even religious leaders including the Reis (in response to 
a plea from the Ambassador).  Zilic's position hardened 
perceptibly in the last day before the Parliament session; 
 
SARAJEVO 00000966  002 OF 003 
 
 
ham-handed intimidation by SDA President Tihic's close ally, 
Minister for Human Rights Mirsad Kebo, provided the pretext 
for Zilic to break SDA ranks, but it was clear from his 
frequent caucusing with SBiH handlers, among other things, 
that he had promised his vote elsewhere. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The second critical "no" vote was cast by Sead 
Avdic, an elderly "independent" MP -- independent due largely 
to his history of quarrelling with all his previous party 
allies.  Avdic and Zilic are close; both left the SDP some 
years ago for different parties but have maintained ties. 
Throughout the debate, Avdic tried to portray himself as the 
broker of a grand compromise, only to find his proposal (a 
non-starter for all sides) rejected even by those who for 
days pretended to encourage him:  SBiH and HDZ 1990.  Avdic's 
petulance and intractability gained as he seemed to realize 
that his efforts at dealmaking had no takers, and Zilic's 
"no" vote gave him the protection he sought to vote likewise, 
having told us only an hour earlier that "he would not be the 
man to block the package." 
 
END-GAME NEGOTIATIONS CONSTRUCTIVE BUT UNSUCCESSFUL 
 
¶6.  (C)  SDP leader Lagumdzija, joined by other political 
party leaders, offered HDZ 1990 a significant compromise at 
the start of the afternoon.  The offer:  a "super veto" in 
the upper House of Peoples, whereby any law deemed 
destructive to vital national interests by all seven members 
of a given ethnic caucus would automatically be rejected, 
without recourse to the constitutional court.  Substantively, 
this should have met the HDZ 1990 concerns that the 
constitutional reform package had gone too far in reducing 
the role of the ethnic-based House of Peoples (indeed, the 
suggested compromise -- agreed among the pro-reform parties 
without our input -- violated our principle of avoiding 
ethnic-based formulations).  But HDZ 1990 leader Martin Raguz 
and his group rejected any compromise, nor would they agree 
to abstain on the vote (thus permitting the required 2/3 of 
the assembly to pass the package through).  The fact that 
literally NO compromise proved acceptable to the nay-sayers 
shocked the EC and EU ambassadors present during these 
consultations.  Having gathered together a motley collection 
of ex-HVO (Bosnian Croat) generals, Croat "third entity" 
proponents and homeless hangers-on from the left and 
far-right, HDZ 1990 -- a single-issue party -- chose to head 
toward the October elections on this rejectionist platform. 
 
WHAT IT MEANS 
 
¶7.  (C)  The vote means that the process of constitutional 
reform has come to a temporary close, though we continue to 
probe for ways to keep up the momentum and find the necessary 
votes, if not at this moment then in a more conducive 
post-election environment.  For now, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
will keep its inefficient governmental structure and will 
need to consider carefully how it will ultimately achieve the 
constitutional changes needed for its eventual Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  As this experience shows, it will not be easy. 
However, the constructive commitment shown by the package's 
negotiators during the end-game demonstrates that many in 
this country remain capable of seeing beyond narrow party 
interests. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The constitutional reform process has redefined the 
working relationship between this country's major political 
parties.  That is particularly true of the Bosnian Serb 
parties.  The rough-edged and somewhat volatile SNSD leader 
Dodik (who became RS Prime Minister in February) used the 
process to increase his credibility as a leader.  Once-pariah 
Serb SDS leader and RS President Dragan Cavic (dubbed by 
negotiators "the laptop Chetnik" for his attention to detail) 
emerged as a constructive force for compromise and a superb 
tactician in assisting his fellow-political party leaders to 
navigate the shoals of these past weeks of vote-grabbing. 
Even the mercurial PDP leader, BiH FM Ivanic, looked good 
during the end-game.  Among the Bosniaks, SDP leader 
Lagumdzija was eloquent both in Parliament and in public, 
gaining considerable credibility. 
 
¶9.  (C) Croat HDZ leader Covic was a tough defender of Croat 
interests during negotiations, though he ultimately signed on 
to the deal and defended it publicly.  He proved unable to 
prevent the HDZ parliamentarians from changing allegiances 
when HDZ 1990 was founded, and it was his party's internal 
disintegration that proved a major factor in the defeat of 
 
SARAJEVO 00000966  003 OF 003 
 
 
the package.  Covic's political fortunes remain in doubt, 
with his trial for corruption entering its final stages and 
this defeat giving him little ground within the party to crow 
about his leadership. 
 
¶10.  (C)  The largest political loser, however, is SDA leader 
(and BiH Presidency member) Tihic.  Had Tihic been able to 
hold onto Zilic's vote, it is almost certain that Avdic would 
have backed the package; this is the universal view here 
among commentators and, most damningly, his own party 
members.  Simmering resentment in the SDA over Tihic's 
perceived willingness to bargain away the elimination of the 
Republika Srpska -- never a realistic option but one 
promulgated incessantly by Haris Silajdzic -- resurfaced 
during parliamentary debate, when one SDA member (Izet 
Hadzic) blurted out his own objection to the package in 
public remarks.  Though Hadzic was quickly brought back into 
line, it provoked an acerbic Serb reaction and titillated the 
ranks of those working to kill the package. 
 
¶11.  (C)  The vote, and the package, represent the best 
consensus possible at this point.  Without a vote, it is 
likely that the package would have been subjected to even 
more debilitating criticism.  The parliamentary rejection has 
poisoned the political atmosphere and propelled the country, 
early, into the election campaign.  Over the next days and 
weeks, accusations and recriminations will be flying fast and 
furious.  The message that responsible politicians will need 
to convey:  those who favor change and progress toward Europe 
need to make that clear in the October balloting.  This 
Embassy will be working, together with colleagues in the 
international community, to reinforce that message, to 
encourage the pro-reform parties to stand by what they 
achieved, and to maintain the momentum so painstakingly 
created.  We also need to focus on how to institutionalize 
the constitutional reform process so that what was gained 
during the arduous months of negotiations -- rare unanimity 
of purpose among the entire spectrum of Bosnian leaders -- 
can be built upon once the sensitive pre-election period is 
over. We will follow up with a further cable on strategy. 
 
MCELHANEY