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DE RUEHSO #0526/01 1352028
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O 152028Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5054
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6195
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2919
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7098
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2570
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2233
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1976
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2794
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000526 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/WHA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/OSAC, WHA/BSC 
NSC FOR CRONIN 
DEA FOR OEL/DESANTIS AND NIRL/LEHRER 
DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/PDA, DRL/PHD, INL, DS/IP/WHA, DS/DSS/ITA 
BRASILIA FOR RSO AND LEGAT; RIO DE JANEIRO FOR RSO 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KCRM SOCI SNAR ASEC BR
SUBJECT: GANG WAGES WAR ON SAO PAULO POLICE 
 
REF: A) Sao Paulo 42; (B) 05 Sao Paulo 975; (C) Sao Paulo 319 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The notorious Sao Paulo organized crime gang 
First Capital Command ("PCC") waged a deadly and brutal assault 
against the police over the weekend, killing 44 officers and 
injuring another 27 in up to 180 attacks across Sao Paulo state. 
The police, in turn, killed 23 suspected criminals, and 15 deaths 
were also reported in numerous related prison riots.  Amazingly, 
only two civilians not suspected of criminal activity were killed, 
and one of those was with an officer during an apparent 
assassination.  Simultaneously, major riots broke out in 71 Sao 
Paulo state prisons, and ten in prisons in two other southern 
states.  Thus far we have no reports of Americans involved in any of 
the incidents, although one AMCIT is in custody in a prison that 
experienced a riot but is now considered under control of 
authorities. PCC targets were initially limited to police and other 
security personnel, but overnight on Sunday (May 14), 61 public 
buses were torched and ten banking facilities were attacked with 
incendiary devices, mostly Molotov cocktails. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY CONTINUED:  Other than mass transit delays for lack 
of buses and occasional police roadblocks, Sao Paulo functioned 
normally during daylight working hours on Monday (May 15), but as 
the day progressed more businesses closed early as random attacks on 
busses continued.  Congonhas Airport suspended activity in the 
afternoon due to a bomb threat, but no device was found.  The 
governor of Sao Paulo has declined federal assistance to quell the 
attacks, insisting that state forces have the capacity to handle the 
situation.  This wave of violence was primarily motivated by the 
transfer of key PCC leaders from various prisons around the city of 
Sao Paulo to higher security facilities in the outreaches of the 
state.  The PCC is apparently sending a message that it remains as 
powerful, if not more so, than the police, and that its demands 
cannot be ignored.  The police, for their part, are on high alert, 
but are still reeling from the ferocity and scope of the attacks, 
which are unprecedented in local history.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
PCC WAGES ALL OUT WAR ON SAO PAULO POLICE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) Beginning on the evening of Friday (May 12) and continuing 
throughout the weekend, police officers and their facilities came 
under vicious attack, presumably by Sao Paulo's notorious organized 
crime gang known as the First Capital Command ("Primeiro Comando de 
Capital," or "PCC").  The PCC is thought to have orchestrated the 
attacks -- unprecedented in scale -- in retaliation for the transfer 
of several of its key leaders from prisons in and around the city of 
Sao Paulo to facilities in the outlying regions of Sao Paulo state. 
So far, reliable statistics indicate that up to 180 separate attacks 
across Sao Paulo state have left 81 dead and nearly 50 injured. 
Those killed include 44 police officers, 23 suspected criminals, and 
15 prison inmates.  Only two civilians not suspected of criminal 
activities have been reported killed, one of whom was the girlfriend 
of an off-duty police officer.  Both were killed while riding in his 
car, apparently the victims of a planned assassination. 
 
¶4. (U) Simultaneously, rebellions broke out in 71 of Sao Paulo's 144 
prison facilities.  The PCC and its allied factions exercise vast 
control over inmates in most of Sao Paulo's prisons, hence the 
prison riots and assaults on police and municipal targets appear to 
be two elements in a coordinated PCC offensive.  Images from news 
broadcasts showed some facilities clearly in the control of the 
inmates, who set fires and took to the roofs.  As of 9:00 p.m. 
Sunday night (May 14), the State Prison Authority reported ongoing 
riots in 46 facilities, with hostages reported in each.  (NOTE: 
Brazilian prison riots often include hostages, who are generally 
visiting family members.  Thus, it is unclear how cooperative, and 
perhaps complicit, these hostages really are with their supposed 
captors.  Hostages such as prison officials and other prisoners 
often filmed by news crews being beaten or otherwise tortured are 
more obviously genuine. END NOTE)   Riots also broke out in at least 
 
SAO PAULO 00000526  002 OF 004 
 
 
four prisons in each of the states of Parana and Mato Grosso do Sul, 
some of which have been resolved by the use of police "shock troops" 
and/or negotiations. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
NO AMCITS KNOWN AT RISK; CITY CLOSING EARLY 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) No Americans are known to have been involved in any of the 
attacks, and only one is known to be in a prison that was the scene 
of a riot, but the State Prison Authority reported that this 
facility was back under government control by Sunday evening, and 
officials told us that no deaths were reported there.  Americans or 
American interests (and foreigners in general) in Sao Paulo have 
not/not been targeted by the violence, nor has any particular 
service or location frequented by Americans.  Air flights ran 
normally throughout early Monday afternoon (May 15), but Congonhas 
Airport, which primarily serves domestic flights, was the target of 
a bomb threat that resulted in suspended activities in the 
afternoon.  No device was found.  Road systems remained largely 
clear up until the evening hours, with reports of an additional five 
to seven empty buses set on fire during the day.  However, due to 
continued reports that circulated throughout the day that the 
government was ordering a curfew or advising people to stay indoors, 
many businesses released employees early, and some schools and 
universities closed.  Consequently, traffic congestion picked up 
earlier than normal for Sao Paulo's rush hour, with widespread 
gridlock an immediate result as evening fell. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
PCC TARGETS EXPANDED TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND BANKS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6. (U) Initially, the crime wave was limited to attacks on 
individual police officers, both on and off-duty, and to police and 
other public security facilities, including one fire station where a 
firefighter was killed.  Most of the attacks occurred in outlying 
neighborhoods of greater Sao Paulo, but also in isolated incidents 
throughout the state from the coastal beach haven of Guaruja to the 
small city of Franca on the state's northeastern border with the 
state of Minas Gerais. 
 
¶7. (U)  But overnight Sunday (May 14), 61 public transportation 
busses were set afire after passengers were ordered off, and more 
than ten bank offices or bank ATM machines were damaged by 
incendiary devices, mostly Molotov cocktails.  The attacks may have 
been an attempt to disrupt transportation and business functions for 
the beginning of the work-week in Sao Paulo, Brazil's financial 
center.  If so, the attacks proved marginally successful regarding 
public transportation; six bus companies refused to operate Monday 
morning (May 15), delaying or preventing workers living in mostly 
outlying areas of Sao Paulo from getting to work.  But while long 
lines of people were seen at many bus stops, traffic flowed mostly 
as normal through Sao Paulo, and Consulate sections reported only 
seven of nearly 300 staff absent due to transportation issues. 
Calls to the banking community indicate that the sector is taking no 
particular action regarding security or operations, and currently is 
not concerned that it is being targeted other than in crimes of 
opportunity.  However, throughout the afternoon, reports continued 
of buses being set afire, and of businesses closing early to send 
employees home (see paragraph 5 above). 
 
------------------------------- 
HAPPY MOTHER'S DAY FROM THE PCC 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) The series of attacks, which is being described throughout 
Sao Paulo as a state of war, is the most recent in a long line of 
audacious and deadly attacks and riots carried out by the PCC (see 
reftels).  Born in the state's prisons in 1993, the PCC is a 
criminal organization blending elements of street gang, drug cartel, 
and mafia.  It is highly organized along almost corporate lines (ref 
B), and continues to be run from within the state's prisons by 
Marcos Wilians Herbas Camacho, aka "Marcola," a 39-year old 
 
SAO PAULO 00000526  003 OF 004 
 
 
convicted bank robber serving a 44-year sentence.  Using cell phones 
(ref C) and a network of message runners that may include family 
members and possibly even lawyers, Marcola consolidated control of 
an estimated 90 percent of the drug and contraband trade within Sao 
Paulo state's 144 prisons between 2001 and 2002, and then expanded 
his organization beyond prison walls to the poorer neighborhoods and 
favelas scattered throughout greater Sao Paulo city, running drugs, 
guns and contraband, and imposing taxes on unlicensed businesses 
(ref B).  The daily newspaper Estado de Sao Paulo estimated 
yesterday that the PCC's monthly take is now one million reals, or 
almost $500,000 USD, doubled in the last three years by activities 
outside of prison. 
 
¶9.  (U) In a sadly ironic plot twist, this particular wave of 
violence seems to have been precipitated by a prison system attempt 
to forestall an expected prison riot.  Police are said to have 
received intelligence last week that the PCC was planning a 
large-scale prison uprising on Mother's Day (May 15), similar to a 
mass rebellion that occurred in 2001.  In an attempt to head off the 
rebellion, on Thursday (May 11), officials moved 756 inmates thought 
to be influential members of the PCC to high security facilities at 
the Presidente Venceslau II prison in the interior of Sao Paulo 
state.  It appears the plan was to disrupt the gang's lines of 
communications and isolate its leadership in advance of Mother's 
Day, thus preventing the riots from fomenting and spreading 
throughout the prison system as happens periodically. (NOTE: In 
another ironic twist, prison officials simultaneously released some 
10,000 inmates on weekend furlough for Mother's Day, many of whom 
are now believed to have been involved in the attacks across Sao 
Paulo.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶10.  (U) At the same time, the PCC's Marcola made several peculiar 
demands of the prison system, including new uniforms, 60 additional 
television sets for inmates to watch the upcoming World Cup soccer 
matches, and increased conjugal visits.  On Friday (May 12), Marcola 
and seven other top leaders of the PCC were transferred for 
questioning to the headquarters of the organized crime unit (DEIC) 
of Sao Paulo state's police force (Policia Militar), located in 
Santana on the near North side of Sao Paulo.   Within hours, a riot 
broke out at the Avare maximum security prison, and attacks were 
launched against police targets throughout that night. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) On Saturday (May 13), Marcola was transferred to the 
maximum security prison at President Bernardes, considered by many 
to be the most secure prison in Brazil, and the only one in Sao 
Paulo that is impenetrable to cellular phone transmissions. 
Nonetheless, the attacks escalated on Saturday night, and given the 
number of off-duty police officers targeted and killed (including an 
officer killed while eating with his family in a restaurant, and the 
burning of a high-ranking officer's car while parked in his garage), 
it appears the PCC has an intelligence network capable of 
surveillance and relatively sophisticated planning.  Police sources 
tell us almost 100 weapons have been confiscated thus far, mostly 
hand guns and rifles or shotguns, and television news footage showed 
a military-style grenade being recovered from the scene of one 
attack. 
 
------------------------------------ 
GOVERNOR DECLINES FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (U) The federal government apparently offered up to 4,000 
personnel to help quell the violence in Sao Paulo, but on Sunday, 
recently ascended Governor Claudio Lembo declined any outside 
assistance, insisting state officials are capable of controlling the 
situation.  This came in the wake of news reports that while prison 
and police officials were aware that the PCC was preparing for some 
kind of criminal activity over the weekend, officials did not fathom 
the scope and severity of the attacks carried out, and police in the 
field received no warning of any imminent danger.  Colonel Elizeu 
clair Teixeira Borges, Commandant General of the state's Military 
Police (NOTE: Brazil's Policia Militar is the country's general law 
enforcement police force, organized and administered at the state 
level.  END NOTE.) avoided calling the attacks "terrorism," but 
 
SAO PAULO 00000526  004 OF 004 
 
 
instead, referred to them as cowardly attacks carried out on soft 
targets such as small, outlying police sub-stations and off-duty 
officers traveling unarmed and alone.  Publicly, officials say they 
are not willing to negotiate with the PCC, but in the past, prisoner 
transfers have been rescinded in order to obtain the release of 
hostages and the cessation of violence. In response to this 
weekend's attacks, all police stations and sub-stations have been 
cordoned off and blocked from traffic, protected by groups of 
officers armed with assault rifles.  Some increased police 
checkpoints were also noted today. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
COMMENT: JUST WHO HAS THE KEYS TO THE PRISONS? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶14. (SBU) This extraordinary wave of violence demonstrates just how 
precarious the prison system is in Sao Paulo, and probably 
throughout Brazil.  It is widely known and publicly lamented that 
the PCC and other criminals conduct business in and from prison 
using illicit phones and through messenger services involving 
friends and associates, but prison administrators and police are at 
a loss to stop it due largely to widespread corruption of rank and 
file prison officials in the far-flung system (ref C).  Furthermore, 
the extent to which the PCC is well-organized is notable by the very 
demands it places and the way it conducts its violent raids.  While 
ostensibly couched as efforts to improve prisoner conditions in the 
often squalid prisons, many demands, such as the recent request for 
more televisions, actually help pacify prisoners and solidify the 
support base of the PCC leadership, and benefits, such as visitation 
privileges from prisoners' friends and family, in reality help the 
PCC monitor and administer its operations on the outside.  In 
addition, the bus attacks may serve two purposes for the PCC.  The 
first is obviously to disrupt city services and embarrass the 
government.  But it is also known that the PCC taxes and controls 
the routes of unlicensed public transport vans and buses (ref B). 
Thus, given the fact that most of the incidents occurred in poorer, 
outlying areas of Sao Paulo, and that those most affected by bus 
closures would rely on the unlicensed transport services, the PCC 
may also be making a profit while making a statement.  END COMMENT. 
 
WOLFE