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Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO505, A BUSY TWO WEEKS FOR LULA'S PARTY: PT READIES FOR CAMPAIGN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06SAOPAULO505 2006-05-10 18:55 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Sao Paulo
VZCZCXRO1703
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0505/01 1301855
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101855Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5023
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6165
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2905
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7078
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2556
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2219
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1359
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0282
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2772
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0965
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 1962
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0283
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0966
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1697
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2420
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SAO PAULO 000505 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR FOR SULLIVAN/LEZNY 
DEPT OF TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND FPARODI 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/OLAC/SHUPKA 
USDOC ALSO FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/EOLSON/DANDERSON 
STATE PASS EXIMBANK 
STATE PASS OPIC FOR DMORONESE, NRIVERA, CMERVENNE 
DOL FOR ILAB MMITTELHAUSER 
NSC FOR CRONIN 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
AID/W FOR LAC/AA 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR ELAB EPET BR
SUBJECT: A BUSY TWO WEEKS FOR LULA'S PARTY: PT READIES FOR CAMPAIGN 
AS SCANDAL SHOWS SIGNS OF REVIVAL 
 
SAO PAULO 00000505  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (Update Text Paragraph 12) 
 
REF: (A) BRASILIA 888 AND PREVIOUS;(B) SAO PAULO 449; 
     (C)BRASILIA 727;(D)BRASILIA 640;(E) 05 SAO PAULO 1376; 
     (F) 05 SAO PAULO 1110; (G) 05 SAO PAULO 1071; 
     (H) 05 BRASILIA 1979 AND PREVIOUS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) The ruling Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT) 
held its National Encounter in Sao Paulo, April 28-30, in 
preparation for the election campaign.  Delegates authorized 
President Lula and party leadership to enter into electoral 
alliances with any willing partners, excluding only two major 
opposition parties and one small left-wing party.  The PT continues 
to court the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), so 
far without success.  The party also announced that internal 
disciplinary procedures would not be pursued against individuals 
implicated in the political corruption scandal until after the 
October elections.   Though PT members put up a brave front, they 
freely admit that while Lula has a strong chance of winning 
re-election, the party's prospects overall are poor.  To make 
matters worse, PT former Secretary-General Silvio Pereira granted 
two lengthy interviews to "O Globo" newspaper in which he recounted 
his version of the corruption scandal, one that was significantly at 
odds with the party line.  While Lula took a soft line - "he has the 
right to say what he knows" - PT President Ricardo Berzoini publicly 
called Pereira a liar and a traitor.  Pereira has been subpoenaed to 
appear before a Parliamentary Investigative Committee (CPI) to see 
if he will repeat his allegations under oath.  In the May 7 PT 
primary in Sao Paulo state, Senator Aloisio Mercadante defeated Sao 
Paulo former Mayor Marta Suplicy to win the party's nomination for 
Governor.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------ 
NATIONAL ENCOUNTER 
------------------ 
 
2.  (U) President Lula's Workers Party (PT) held its 13th National 
Encounter April 28-30 in Sao Paulo.  This was the PT's first 
Encounter since October 2001, and the first ever held while the 
party controlled the federal government.  The purpose of National 
Encounters - which are less frequent and more important than annual 
party congresses - is to gather the faithful to assess the party's 
condition and strategize for the future.  This year, the delegates 
were asked to debate, amend as appropriate, and vote on a document 
outlining the party's situation and proposed tactics in this 
election year, and another laying out the government's program.  The 
National Encounter was attended by members of the PT National 
Directorate (DN), Ministers, Governors, Mayors, and Members of 
Parliament, along with delegations from foreign leftist progressive 
parties.  ConGen Sao Paulo received an invitation from PT President 
Ricardo Berzoini and International Relations Secretary Walter Pomar, 
but was subsequently advised that the PT had decided to hold a 
closed encounter and was unable to accommodate observers. 
 
3. (U) Poloff met May 5 with PT Senior Advisor for International 
Affairs Ana Maria Stuart to obtain a readout of the National 
Encounter and an update on the PT's preparations for national and 
state elections.  Stuart explained that in 2005, the PT had invited 
 
SAO PAULO 00000505  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (Updated Text Paragraph 12) 
 
a wide variety of individuals and institutions to participate in the 
celebration of its twenty-fifth anniversary, and had inadvertently 
and erroneously used the same mailing list for this year's National 
Encounter, resulting in a number of invitations that had to be 
rescinded, since the National Encounter was an event "of a different 
nature" than the anniversary party. 
 
4.  (U) Stuart, who had earlier (see ref E) shared with CG her 
concern over the divide between the PT's moderate, pragmatic 
majority faction and various leftist tendencies, especially over the 
government's conduct of macroeconomic policy, characterized the 
National Encounter as a success, noting the active participation of 
some 1,200 militants.  She described how lengthy internal 
negotiations had ensured that the Encounter would be relatively free 
of acrimony and conflict.  Though delegates ultimately adopted a 
resolution calling for an adjustment of economic policy, and 
especially a reduction of interest rates, they did so in a 
non-confrontational manner.  The voices on the left that have 
accused Lula of selling out the working class and the poor since 
assuming the Presidency in January 2003 were mostly muted.  The 
leftists, Stuart explained, realized that the PT was in trouble, and 
they too face a tough challenge getting re-elected and believe their 
best chance is via party unity. 
 
5. (SBU) Another reason the leftists didn't try to disrupt the 
Encounter over economic policy, Stuart said, is that new Finance 
Minister Guido Mantega is much less a lightning rod for leftist 
criticism than his predecessor, former Minister Antonio Palocci. 
She nonetheless acknowledged that the loss of Palocci, who resigned 
under pressure March 27, was damaging to the party and the 
government.  "It's too bad, what happened to him.  He made a 
mistake.  He thought he could do it within the law, access the 
financial information of that boy that was causing him so much 
trouble, but he was wrong, and he paid the price."  (COMMENT: This 
version of events lacks plausibility.  See ref D for an account of 
the events that brought Palocci down.  END COMMENT.) 
 
------------------------------------------- 
PT SEEKS ELECTORAL ALLIANCES WITHOUT REGARD TO IDEOLOGY 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) The most important decision that emerged from the Encounter, 
according to Stuart, was the authorization granted to President Lula 
and the PT's National Directorate (DN) to pursue electoral alliances 
across the political spectrum.  Some wanted to limit any alliances 
to the PT's traditional partners on the left, the Communist Party of 
Brazil (PCdoB) and the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), but the 
majority approved an initiative that excluded only three parties as 
possible allies: the opposition Brazilian Social Democracy Party 
(PSDB); its conservative ally, the Liberal Front Party (PFL); and 
the leftist Popular Socialist Party (PPS), whose President (and 
likely presidential candidate), Roberto Freire, has been vocal in 
calling for Congress to pursue Lula's impeachment over corruption 
allegations.  Delegates passed a "motion of repudiation" against the 
"PPS pro-impeachment movement." 
 
7.  (U) Stuart predicted that the PT will continue to court the 
large and influential centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party 
(PMDB).  The PT has for some time been reaching out to the PMDB, 
offering the Vice-President's spot on the ticket, so far to no 
avail.  The PMDB is scheduled to hold a national convention May 13, 
which may help determine its election strategy.  Many of its leaders 
 
SAO PAULO 00000505  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (Updated Text Paragraph 12) 
 
prefer to remain neutral in the presidential election to maintain 
flexibility at the state level, where the party is running 
gubernatorial candidates in 17 of the 27 states.  An alliance with 
the PMDB, Stuart suggested, would, in some parts of the country, 
enhance the PT's appeal to middle-class voters who supported Lula in 
2002 but have since distanced themselves from the party. 
 
8.  (U) The PT came into some media criticism for leaving the door 
open to alliances with such centrist and rightist parties as the 
Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), the Liberal Party (PL), and the 
Progressivist Party (PP), all of which form part of the governing 
coalition but have leaders and members who were implicated in the 
Congressional bribery scandal ("mensalao").  These three parties 
will all struggle to achieve the five percent threshold required in 
elections for the Chamber of Deputies to retain their privileges and 
their viability, and it is unclear whether any will be interested in 
an alliance with the PT, which, apart from Lula's prospects, faces 
rough sledding in Congressional elections.  Stuart agreed with other 
insiders (ref B) who predicted that the PT, which in 2002 elected 91 
members to the Chamber and currently holds 81 seats, will likely 
fall to around 60 seats; many would consider this an optimistic 
estimate. 
 
----------------------- 
ACCOUNTABILITY DEFERRED 
----------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) With respect to another critical issue, the PT ducked.  The 
question arose at the Encounter of what to do about the numerous 
members implicated in the "mensalao" and other corruption scandals 
that dominated the political scene during the latter half of 2005. 
The delegates agreed that these members must be investigated by the 
PT's internal disciplinary machinery, but not until 2007, after the 
election, to prevent the opposition's taking advantage of the 
situation during an election year.  This decision also generated 
cries of derision from the opposition and the media.  The press also 
commented acerbically on the presence at the Encounter of Lula's 
former Chief of Staff, Jose Dirceu, who continues to advise Lula and 
influence PT strategy behind the scenes, and of former PT President 
Jose Genoino, who resigned in disgrace last July (ref H).  Stuart, 
however, defended the decision and the discredited individuals: The 
PT, she said, didn't want to commit suicide in an election year; why 
give the opposition ammunition?  She asserted that many PT Federal 
Deputies had "merely made the mistake of doing what the party 
Treasurer told them to do," and that when the PT had discovered the 
wrongdoing of the Treasurer, Delubio Soares, it had expelled him. 
To prevent the problem from recurring, she said, the PT is seeking 
to name a campaign Treasurer (separate from the party's Treasurer), 
a financial expert, preferably a businessman, with a reputation for 
probity. 
 
10.  (SBU) Asked about the lingering impact of the corruption 
scandal, Stuart predicted that the opposition would continue to 
raise it.  Sounding much like Lula himself, she complained that "the 
people who have been running this country for five hundred years 
will never be able to get over having a worker as President. 
They're unable to spare him any criticism or give him credit for 
anything."  But the public, she continued, was tired of the constant 
reporting of the scandal, and wouldn't pay attention.  Besides, 
there were newer, fresher scandals to exploit.  She pointed to the 
fact that none of the 46 individuals - including two former Deputies 
and more than ten current and former Congressional staffers - 
 
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C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (Updated Text Paragraph 12) 
 
arrested the previous day by Federal Police in "Operation 
Bloodsucker" -- a scheme to defraud the public in the purchase of 
ambulances for municipalities -- was affiliated in any way with the 
PT. 
 
11.  (SBU) COMMENT: Per press reports, the PT is having trouble 
finding a campaign Treasurer who meets the requirements and is 
willing to take on the task.  Stuart's explanation of the bribery 
scandal lacks plausibility, but no more than that of many PT leaders 
 - former Sao Paulo Mayor Marta Suplicy comes to mind, but she is 
far from alone - who continue to assert, in the face of the final 
report (ref D) of the Parliamentary Investigative Committee on the 
Postal Service ("CPI dos Correios") and the accusations of the 
Attorney General (ref C), that the existence of the "mensalao" 
(payoffs to Deputies of the governing coalition in return for votes 
on government-sponsored legislation) has never been established and 
that the PT was at worst guilty only of use of "Caixa 2," the 
solicitation and use of unreported and unaccounted campaign funds. 
END COMMENT. 
 
 
-------------------- 
VOICES FROM THE LEFT 
-------------------- 
 
12.  (U) Stuart noted that despite the general unity and amity at 
the Encounter, one tiny faction on the farthest left wing of the 
party, the Trotskyite group O Trabalho ("Work"), had garnered some 
attention with its motions.  A proposal to undo the privatization of 
the Rio Doce Valley Company (CVRD), the world's largest mining 
company, was defeated by the surprisingly slim margin of 358-305. 
This may have been the PT's way of criticizing privatizations 
carried out during the PSDB administration of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso; their efforts to convoke a CPI to investigate these 
privatizations have come to naught.  Another resolution, much more 
easily defeated, called for nationalization of troubled air carrier 
Varig, a bizarre notion that would probably have required the State 
to assume the company's large debts.  Stuart also noted that O 
Trabalho had called for Brazil's withdrawal from Mercosul on the 
grounds that the trade bloc was an instrument of multinational 
corporations; this motion also did not prosper.  She predicted that 
many of the social movements that comprise the PT's core 
constituencies, such as the Landless Rural Workers' Movement (MST), 
would continue to criticize the Lula government's economic and 
social policies while at the same time working for Lula's 
re-election. 
 
------------------------- 
SILVIO PEREIRA SPEAKS OUT 
------------------------- 
 
12.  (U) The PT's post-Encounter peace was disturbed May 7 when "O 
Globo" published two lengthy interviews with Silvio Pereira, the 
party's former Secretary-General.  Pereira resigned last July amid 
allegations that he had controlled the "mensalao" scheme.  He became 
for a time a poster-boy for corruption when it was revealed he had 
accepted the gift of a Land Rover from a company that did a lot of 
business with Petrobras, the partially privatized state petroleum 
company.  Pereira told journalists that: 
 
-- Businessman Marcos Valerio Fernandes de Souza had planned to 
raise the sum of one billion reals (approximately USD 400 million at 
 
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C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (Updated Text Paragraph 12) 
 
that time) via state-owned enterprises or companies with extensive 
ties to the State or lucrative government contracts.  He listed 
three banks - Banco Economico, Banco Mercantil de Pernambuco, and 
Banco Opportunity - and indicated that Valerio was involved in shady 
livestock deals as well. 
 
-- Valerio's plan was to establish and maintain a pool of companies 
dependent on government contracts to draw on for funds to pay off 
2002 campaign debts and 2004 municipal campaign expenses. 
 
-- Valerio, a former Central bank employee, provided ordinary and 
entirely legitimate services to the PT in the 2002 elections, but 
later grew so powerful that he was unaccountable and uncontrollable. 
 For example, PT ex-Treasurer and designated scapegoat Delubio 
Soares knew nothing about the withdrawals of funds from Banco Rural 
that were among the most concrete criminal acts of the scandal. 
Delubio "is not corrupt.  He isn't." 
 
-- Four individuals - President Lula, then-Chief of Staff Dirceu, 
then-PT President Genoino, and Senator Aloisio Mercadante (see 
paragraph 15) - were in charge of the PT, but Lula wasn't 
responsible for any criminal activity.  Dirceu also kept his 
distance from Valerio and his activities. 
 
-- Valerio's schemes involved numerous political parties and 
politicians, and were par for the course in Brazilian politics. 
"Behind Marcos Valerio, there must be a hundred Marcos Valerios. 
It's a mechanism, and now it's continuing in the country."  When the 
scandal broke, Valerio threatened to "give over everything and bring 
down the Republic," but settled in the end for telling only about 
half of what he knew. 
 
-- Pereira himself had the difficult task of finding jobs in the 
federal government for all the PT loyalists and allies who wanted 
them.  "These people aren't easy; they tried everything...My job was 
to convince PT Ministers to free up jobs for allies.  When the PMDB 
came on board in April [2003] and the government was already filled, 
I was stuck with the hot potato."  He claims that neither he nor the 
PT Ministers did anything unethical, but rather ran a legitimate 
process, despite the claims of ex-Deputy Roberto Jefferson (PTB-RJ). 
 
 
13. (SBU) Many of Pereira's allegations are not new, though this may 
represent the first time a PT insider has spoken this explicitly, 
and many seem self-serving.  He was reportedly nervous throughout 
the interviews and later regretted having granted them.  He even 
went so far as to ask "Globo" not to publish them, claiming he was 
under intense pressure to maintain silence and could be killed for 
having spoken.  President's Lula's reaction to the publication was 
calm, perhaps reflecting Pereira's assertions that he was not 
involved in any wrongdoing.  "He's free to tell what he knows," Lula 
said.  Other party officials were not so forgiving.  PT President 
and former Labor Minister Ricardo Berzoini expressed surprise at the 
revelations, noting that Pereira "had every opportunity to say that 
to the CPI, the Federal Police, and the Public Ministry 
[prosecutor's office."  He went on to accuse Pereira of telling lies 
and betraying the party.  One immediate result of the interviews was 
that he was immediately subpoenaed to appear before the "Bingos 
CPI."  His attorneys immediately sought a dispensation, but the 
Supreme Court denied it, and he is scheduled to testify May 10.  His 
attorney claims Pereira is emotionally over-wrought and is taking 
anti-depressants. 
 
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C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (Updated Text Paragraph 12) 
 
--------------------------------- 
MERCADANTE WINS SAO PAULO PRIMARY 
--------------------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) Also on May 7, nearly 70,000 PT members went to the polls 
in Sao Paulo state to choose the party's gubernatorial candidate. 
Senator Aloisio Mercadante defeated Marta Suplicy by 3,757 votes, 
52.8 percent to 47.2 percent.  Prior to the primary, each candidate 
had pledged to support and work for the other, and for the entire 
party ticket, in the event of defeat.  By all accounts, Mercadante - 
the government's leader in the Senate who has coordinated every Lula 
campaign since 1982 and was Lula's running mate in his unsuccessful 
1994 presidential campaign - was clearly Lula's preferred candidate. 
 As predicted, Suplicy outpolled Mercadante almost 2-1 in Sao Paulo 
city, but Mercadante defeated her by about 2,000 votes on the city's 
periphery and trounced her by 10,000 votes in the state's interior. 
Per ref B, Mercadante benefited significantly from the support of 
Federal Deputy Joao Paulo Cunha of Osasco (western suburbs), who is 
influential throughout the periphery and had himself originally 
planned to run for Governor.  One of the most notorious of the 
"mensaleiros" (politicians implicated in the mensalao scandal, Cunha 
was recently acquitted of wrongdoing by the full Chamber of Deputies 
amidst vocal public reprobation, though he still faces federal 
charges (ref C).  Even though Mercadante is not expected to defeat 
PSDB nominee and Sao Paulo ex-Mayor Jose Serra, who polls still show 
as likely to prevail in the first round, the PT is counting on his 
high national profile to enable him to give Serra a run for the 
money and to garner votes for Lula in critical and populous Sao 
Paulo state.  In 2002, Mercadante received 10 million votes for 
Senator in the "red wave" that swept into office not only him and 
Lula but many PT Senators and Deputies. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
15.  (SBU) Silvio Pereira's comments certainly don't help the PT 
cause, but it's too early to tell whether or not they will do 
lasting damage to Lula's re-election campaign.  It is similarly 
difficult to predict the fallout from Bolivia's May 1 
nationalization of Petrobras facilities in that country (ref A). 
Most observers say there will be none, because Brazilians don't pay 
attention to foreign policy and don't base their votes on it, 
although significant increases in the price of gasoline, cooking 
gas, or electricity, should such occur, could get their attention. 
Lula's soft response may also generate opposition; many Brazilians 
do not enjoy or appreciate the optics of Brazil and Petrobras 
seemingly getting kicked around by lowly Bolivia.  On the domestic 
front, the PT continues to face a challenge in securing an alliance 
with the PMDB; the opposition PSDB is also avidly courting the PMDB, 
and these two parties are in some ways more compatible.  The PMDB is 
holding a national convention May 13 at which, literally, anything 
can happen.  We also are continually being reminded that this is 
Brazil, and that life does not begin until after July 9, the day the 
World Cup championship ends.  END COMMENT. 
 
16. (U) This cable was coordinated/cleared with Embassy Brasilia. 
 
MCMULLEN