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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001359 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2026 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KDEM YE
SUBJECT: HAMEED AL-AHMAR: YEMEN'S NEXT KINGMAKER? 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( 
D). 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY:  Hameed al-Ahmar, son of powerful tribal 
leader Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, made his entry into Yemeni 
politics this year by increasingly distancing himself from 
his father's traditional alliance with President Saleh.  To 
the surprise of many, Hameed has emerged as an articulate 
regime critic who enjoys a larger popular base than virtually 
any other oppositionist, primarily due to his powerful tribal 
ties and his personal fortune.  Hameed bears watching as he 
takes his place among the next generation of Yemen's power 
brokers, but his implicit claim to the title of Yemen's next 
"kingmaker" is probably overblown -- for now.  END SUMMARY 
 
----------------------- 
HAMEED'S DEBUTANTE BALL 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Over the past six months, Hameed al-Ahmar has become 
an increasingly vocal critic of Saleh's administration, 
laying out his concerns in newspaper interviews, press 
conferences, and qat sessions -- Yemen's daily free flowing 
discussions among men that take place in homes.  Yemeni 
political observers have remarked to poloff how surprised 
they were to see that Hameed is articulate in both Arabic and 
English.  In an election season dominated by what many 
contacts view as sterile debates about election procedures 
and fantastical constitutional amendments, Hameed's entry 
onto the political stage has piqued the interest of 
oppositionists and has become a cause for concern for the 
ruling party. 
 
¶3. (C)  Hameed's eloquence aside, family lineage and a 
sizeable personal fortune are the primary reasons Yemeni 
politicos take him seriously.  Hameed is the son of the 
ailing Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, the paramount sheikh of the 
Hashid tribal confederation, of which President Saleh's 
Sanhani tribe is a member.  Abdullah, despite being the head 
of the Islah opposition party, has been an important ally for 
Saleh since 1978.  Most observers believe that without 
Abdullah's tribal support, Saleh would not have been able to 
remain in power for so long.  Similarly, Abdullah and his 
family would not have been able to amass their fortune -- and 
the friends it has bought -- without Saleh's staunch support. 
 As a result of this alliance, Islah nominated Saleh as its 
presidential candidate during the 1999 election season, 
before Saleh's own party had formally nominated him. 
 
¶4. (C)  According to Hameed, that alliance is now shifting. 
In a private meeting with poloffs, Hameed said several times 
that his father's support for Saleh "is not guaranteed" this 
year, and that his father "does not want to see everything he 
and others fought for swept away" during Saleh's next term. 
Many observers speculated that Sheikh Abdullah's six-month 
stay in Jeddah -- officially for health reasons -- was a 
subtle signal to Saleh and the public that 2006 would not be 
a re-play of 1999. 
 
------------------------------ 
"JUST GIVE ME THE GREEN LIGHT" 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C)  Brushing aside the issue of his father's lack of 
support for Saleh this election cycle, Hameed told poloffs it 
is "now time to look beyond Abdullah and Saleh" for the 
future of Yemen.  A new generation is ready and able to take 
the reins of power, he said, in order to restore the 
government's role of serving the people.  Saleh's rule has 
increasingly become a personal enterprise, with major cabinet 
portfolios and business deals reserved for his family and 
virtually no economic development or political involvement 
for the south. 
 
¶6. (C)  What Yemen needs now, Hameed asserted, is a southern 
presidential candidate backed by the tribes.  "I can deliver 
the tribes," he said, "but they are very expensive."  Hameed 
then stated that if the USG would "only give the green light 
to the Saudis," then he could find financing to pay off major 
tribal groups in exchange for their support for a southern 
candidate, preferably Yassin Saeed Noman, the Secretary 
General of the Yemeni Socialist Party. 
 
¶7. (C)  PolChief informed Hameed that the USG would not get 
involved in Yemeni politics in this fashion, but would 
 
SANAA 00001359  002 OF 002 
 
 
continue to press the Yemeni Government to produce a free and 
fair election.  It is now up to the opposition, PolChief 
emphasized, to field a serious candidate and seek broad 
support for him.  Hameed replied that a "relatively fair 
election" would also result in an opposition victory -- which 
makes USG public support for the process crucial. 
 
------------------ 
RATTLING THE SABER 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (C)  Asked what would happen if this year's election is 
marred with fraud, Hameed replied that "war is possible."  He 
said there was no question that he would lead the opposition 
in calling supporters into the streets in protest.  "We will 
not be violent," he emphasized, but said clashes instigated 
by Saleh's Republican Guard would be inevitable. 
 
¶9. (C)  The problem with Saleh, Hameed continued, is that he 
is Janus-faced.  "One side of Saleh truly wants to be a 
democrat, but the other side cannot stand the thought of 
anyone more popular than him -- and that is the side that is 
winning," he explained.  The conflict between the two sides 
has grown to the point that Saleh is no longer the rational 
leader he once was, which is why it is time for a new man to 
take power with the backing of the tribes. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (C)  COMMENT:  Hameed's idea of uniting powerful armed 
tribal groups around a credible southern politician appears 
to be the closest anyone in Yemen has come to suggesting a 
truly national campaign that could present a challenge to 
Saleh.  The likelihood that it will happen is slim.  Saleh 
will seek to keep the tribes in check by sowing discord among 
them -- a tactic he has successfully used for three decades. 
He may even lean on Sheikh Abdullah to gain the support of 
the Hashid Confederation once again, despite what Hameed may 
want.  Whether or not Hameed and his supporters can bring 
protestors into the street if the elections are marred by 
serious fraud is anyone's guess. 
 
¶11. (C)  COMMENT CONTINUED:  We suspect that, for all his 
bluster, Hameed is actually setting his sights on the next 
presidential election, not this one.  Sanaa is rife with 
rumors about how Saleh will engineer putting his widely 
disliked son Ahmed in the presidential chair sometime during 
his next term.  Hameed is likely using this election cycle to 
test the political waters and build tribal and political 
alliances in order to be in a stronger position to oppose 
Ahmed's ascendance. 
Krajeski