VZCZCXRO1004
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHRH #3312/01 1221455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 021455Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6969
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2585
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0526
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 RIYADH 003312 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DHAHRAN SENDS 
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS SA
SUBJECT: THE SAUDI SHI'A:  WHERE DO THEIR LOYALTIES LIE? 
 
REF: A. RIYADH 3301 
     ¶B. RIYADH 1196 
     ¶C. RIYADH 888 
 
Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (S) Some Sunni Arab leaders, including Egypt's President 
Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah, have recently publicly 
questioned the loyalties of Arab Shi'a populations in the 
Middle East.  Privately, senior Saudi officials raise similar 
concerns.  Given the ongoing sectarian conflict in Iraq, 
increasing regional tensions vis-a-vis Shi'a Iran, and the 
tenuous status of Saudi Shi'a within their own country, the 
question of whether Saudi Shi'a loyalties belong primarily 
with Saudi Arabia - or, alternatively, to their 
coreligionists elsewhere in the Gulf - is a timely one.  It 
is also of central concern to U.S. strategic interests in the 
region, given the concentration of Saudi Arabia's Shi'a 
population in its oil producing areas. 
 
¶2.  (S) Our conclusion, based on discussions with a broad 
spectrum of Saudi Shi'a contacts over the past eight months, 
is that most Saudi Shi'a remain committed to the agreement 
reached between the Saudi Shi'a leadership and King Fahd in 
1993-4, whereby Shi'a leaders agreed to pursue their goals 
within the Kingdom's political system in return for the 
King's promise to improve their situation.  Saudi Shi'a have 
deep religious ties to Iraq and Iran and are inspired by the 
newfound religious freedom and political power of the Iraqi 
Shi'a; they also have a lengthy history of persecution by the 
Al-Saud and face continuing discrimination (ref B). 
Nonetheless, their leaders still appear committed to working 
for reform from within, a strategy that, thanks to King 
Abdullah, is slowly bearing fruit.  In our view, it would 
require a major internal or external stimulus to move the 
Saudi Shi'a toward confrontation with Riyadh.  Such stimuli 
could include a major shift in SAG policy or leadership, the 
spread of uncontained sectarian violence to the Kingdom, or a 
major change in regional security arrangements, especially 
escalating regional conflict involving Shi'a (ref C).  Absent 
these circumstances, the vast majority of Saudi Shi'a are not 
likely to demonstrate significant external political 
loyalties, either to Iran or to any inchoate notion of a 
"Shi'a crescent."  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
A Tactical Choice:  Advocating for Rights from Within 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) At 1.5 to 2 million strong, the Shi'a comprise 10 
to 15 percent of Saudi citizens.  They are concentrated in 
the Eastern Province (EP), particularly the oasis areas of 
Qatif (where the population is overwhelmingly Shi'a) and 
Al-Ahsa (a mixed Sunni-Shi'a area).  Saudi Shi'a do not have 
the breadth of tribal and clan ties to Iraq and Iran as do 
the Shi'a of Kuwait and Bahrain, though at least one major 
Shi'a tribal confederation, the Al-Tamim, are present in 
Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Wahhabi Saudi state has a long record of brutal 
persecution of both Saudi Shi'a and Shi'a living elsewhere in 
the region.  During the military raids of the first and 
second Saudi states in the 18th and 19th centuries, Shi'a 
were a frequent target of Wahhabi Saudi violence, including 
an all-out attack on major Shi'a cities in southern Iraq and 
the desecration of holy sites there.  When the founder of 
modern Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz, conquered what is now 
the EP, his fanatical Ikhwan army went on a murderous 
anti-Shi'a rampage.  A watershed moment in this troubled 
history came in 1979 when thousands of Shi'a, angry at the 
state, inspired by the Iranian revolution, and organized by a 
young group of leaders, most notably Hassan Al-Saffar, took 
to the streets of Qatif in protest.  The SAG cracked down, 
killing a number of the protesters and arresting many 
activists.  Hundreds of Shi'a, including Al-Saffar, went into 
exile, initially to Iran but later leaving Iran for Syria, 
Lebanon, the UK, the U.S., and other western countries. 
Al-Saffar and many of his political allies returned to Saudi 
Arabia in the mid 1990s after reaching a deal with King Fahd 
in 1993-4.  The King agreed to allow the exiles to return, to 
release Shi'a detained in the Kingdom, and to take steps to 
improve the situation of the Shi'a; for their part, the 
returning Shi'a agreed to cease their opposition activities 
and pursue their goals within the Saudi system. 
 
¶5.  (C) Why did the exiled Shi'a return?  According to 
Mohammed Al-Mahfooth, one of their number and now 
editor-in-chief of a journal on contemporary Islamic issues, 
"There were two main reasons.  First, we realized that, as a 
minority in Saudi Arabia, we could never hope to change the 
regime by revolution, as we might have thought in 1979. 
Second, we felt we were losing touch with our communities 
here, and we were not effective at helping them to develop 
from abroad.  So we decided to come back and work for our own 
rights from within."  We have heard similar explanations from 
other Shi'a who were part of the exile movement.  As a group, 
exiled and indigenous leaders made an important tactical 
decision in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Realizing that 
they could not wrest control over their destiny from the SAG 
by opposition and confrontation, they changed their goal to 
realizing their civil rights as Saudi citizens and their 
tactics to pushing for reform from within.  The same tactical 
calculus remains relevant today. 
 
¶6.  (C) Shi'a activists have consistently emphasized to us 
their continued commitment to pushing for civil rights and 
reform within the system; in the words of one of their 
leaders, "Any place there is room, we are trying to use it." 
We see considerable evidence that the Shi'a are indeed taking 
full advantage of every opportunity, especially with the 
ascension of King Abdullah, whom the Shi'a view as friendly 
to their aspirations.  They were active participants in the 
petition movement in the last years of King Fahd's reign, 
signing petitions calling for reform both as a community and, 
as individuals, in conjunction with other (Sunni) reformers. 
The Shi'a successfully organized to win all the municipal 
council seats in EP areas where they enjoyed demographic 
predominance.  The Qatif municipal council, with Jafar 
Al-Shayeb as its president, will likely prove to be the most 
organized and active of any in the EP. 
 
¶7. (C) The Shi'a are also pushing the boundaries of what the 
SAG allows in terms of civil society (ref A), organizing 
unregistered but tolerated activities ranging from regular 
cultural and political forums to computer and astronomy clubs 
to underground film showings.  Of the five people appointed 
to the Dammam branch of the National Society for Human Rights 
(NSHR), at least four are Shi'a activists, including 
Al-Shayeb.  The Shi'a are pushing for greater religious 
freedom and a reduction in discrimination through the NSHR 
and via direct appeal to senior SAG leaders, albeit with 
limited success.  Pointing to these activities and to their 
vision of a Saudi Arabia where all citizens enjoy civil 
rights, some of our contacts argue that the Shi'a are the 
true Saudi nationalists and reformers. 
 
¶8.  (C) Another indication that the Shi'a are, at least for 
now, committed to working within the system is that Shi'a 
leaders and activists from a variety of backgrounds are 
gravitating toward this tactic and that they are actively 
building bridges with other reform elements in Saudi society. 
 The returned exiles are the most politically active Saudi 
Shi'a, were the major force in brokering the 1993-4 deal with 
King Fahd, and are in the forefront of most of the 
initiatives mentioned above.  (Note: While they do not form a 
single political block, they are sometimes referred to as 
"Shirazis" because at the time of their exile many of them 
followed the late Ayatollah Mohammed Al-Shirazi, who 
advocated that clerics should play a greater political role 
in demanding Shi'a rights, although Shirazi opposed the 
concept of wilayat al-faqih.  End note.)  Other Shi'a 
activists, both secular and religious, have also adopted the 
tactic of pushing for reform from within, although they do 
not have the same broad organizational networks of the 
Shirazis.  These activists include former leftists like Najib 
Al-Khunaizi, who hosts one of the regular cultural forums in 
Qatif, and purported Saudi Hezbollah leader Hassan Al-Nimr, 
who participated in the most recent National Dialogue in 
Abha.  The Shirazis, Al-Khunaizi, Al-Nimr, and other Shi'a 
leaders are also making efforts to reach out to secular and 
religious reformers from Sunni society, trading visits to 
each other's forums and majlises and seeking other means for 
dialogue. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Iran:  Religious Ties but Few Political Loyalties 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9.  (S) While there are strong religious ties between the 
Saudi Shi'a and Iran and the potential for Iranian influence 
in the EP is a legitimate concern, especially given the 
increasing bellicosity of Iranian rhetoric and policy, our 
best assessment is that, under prevailing conditions, the 
Shi'a are not looking to Tehran for political guidance. 
 
¶10.  (S) As argued in ref C, given the importance of the EP 
to Saudi Arabia's oil industry, Iran has a strategic 
rationale for laying the groundwork to exert its influence. 
It also has a history of doing so.  The Iranian revolution 
inspired the Saudi Shi'a to rise up in opposition in 1979, 
and the Iranians played a role in organizing Saudi Hezbollah 
in the 1980s.  Most Saudi Shi'a clerics have studied 
extensively in Iran, especially Qom, and many politically 
active Shi'a spent time in Iran in the early and mid 1980s. 
A militant Saudi Shi'a group, at least inspired if not 
directed by Iran, carried out the attack on the Al-Khobar 
military barracks in the summer of 1996.  More recently, a 
few of our Shi'a contacts have claimed that there are active 
pro-Iranian networks in the Qatif area and alleged other 
signs of Iranian activity, although a much larger number of 
others discount these claims.  (Note:  Recent sensitive 
reports from other channels also suggest possible Shi'a links 
with militant Shi'a in Iran, Iraq, and/or Lebanon.  One 
report suggests that Iranian-affliated Iraqi militias may 
have begun low-key efforts to establish contacts in the EP, 
and another report suggests that one Saudi Shi'a may have 
visited a Lebanese Shi'a leader to seek financial support. 
End note.) 
 
¶11.  (S) The vast majority of our Shi'a contacts, however, 
have told ConOffs that they see no evidence of current 
Iranian efforts to exert political influence in the EP.  Our 
contacts, who include community activists, political leaders, 
journalists, businessmen, cultural figures, academics, and 
sheikhs, many of whom studied in Iran, are also generally 
skeptical of Iranian motives as they pertain to Saudi Arabia. 
 We heard over and over variants of the following statement: 
"We were used by Iran before, and we won't let it happen 
again.  Their interests are completely different than ours." 
Indeed, the exiled Shirazis appear to have left Iran in the 
mid 1980s because it became clear they were being used: 
several contacts independently told us that the group left 
because they refused Iranian pressure to organize or take 
credit for sabotage operations against Saudi oil 
installations. 
 
¶12.  (C) Time and time again, Shi'a sheikhs have explained 
that the Saudi Shi'a prefer to study in Najaf or Karbala 
(where Arabic is spoken everywhere, including outside the 
religious community), have much stronger historical ties to 
religious institutions in Iraq, and studied in Qom only 
because Saddam Hussein's regime made it impossible for them 
to study in Iraq.  They also caution that a Shi'a who has 
studied at a hawza in Qom would not necessarily share a 
pro-Iranian religious or political perspective and note that 
all the important ayatollahs, including those from Najaf, 
have hawzas in Qom.  All of our contacts concur that among 
Saudi Shi'a who emulate a marja' or mujtahid, the large 
majority of Saudi Shi'a follow Iranian-born but Iraq-based 
Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, with the rest divided among a 
number of other ayatollahs. 
 
¶13. (S) The current role and activity of Saudi Hezbollah 
remains a question mark about which we have been able to 
develop only limited information.  Some contacts claims the 
group no longer exists, but prevailing evidence suggests that 
it encompasses a small group of religious figures who believe 
in the concept of wilayat al-faqih, emulate Iran's Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i as their marja', but have few 
current followers.  Our contacts report that its leaders are 
not very active politically, do not take their cue from the 
Iranian regime, and do not espouse violence (at least not 
currently, in all three cases).  While we continue to seek 
additional information on Saudi Hezbollah, what limited 
knowledge we have supports the views espoused by our 
contacts.  We do not know of any anti-SAG or anti-American 
violence ascribed to any Saudi Shi'a group since the Khobar 
Towers bombing in 1996; at least one of Saudi Hezbollah's 
purported leaders has participated in the National Dialogue 
(suggesting that the SAG does not consider the movement or 
the individual as much of a threat and that he supports the 
Dialogue's concept); and we have heard that other Shi'a 
leaders have, over time, convinced Saudi Hezbollah's leaders 
that violence would not help the Shi'a cause.  We cannot rule 
out the possibility that Iran or its proxies could recruit 
and train small Saudi Shi'a cells to carry out disruptive or 
terrorist activities.  However, we cannot see such cells 
developing a broad following given the present Shi'a 
leadership and their strategy unless there are major changes 
in the regional political landscape. 
 
------------------ 
The Impact of Iraq 
------------------ 
 
¶14.  (C) The Saudi Shi'a follow events in Iraq with intense 
interest.  In stark contrast to non-Shi'a Saudis, most Shi'a 
express support for the U.S. intervention in Iraq despite the 
current strife and violence.  Many Shi'a contacts have 
explicitly thanked ConOffs for the U.S. role in freeing their 
coreligionists in Iraq from Saddam Hussein's oppressive 
regime and helping them obtain political power commensurate 
with their numbers.  Saudi Shi'a feel deep emotional and 
religious ties to Iraq and look forward to visiting Shi'a 
holy sites and participating in religious festivals there as 
soon as the security situation permits.  The expanded 
political and religious freedoms for Shi'a in Iraq have 
empowered Saudi Shi'a to push further than they previously 
dared against SAG restrictions on religious freedom and civil 
society.  For example, contacts have linked expanded Ashura 
celebrations in Qatif, as well as more cautious expressions 
of Shi'a identity elsewhere in the Kingdom, directly to the 
new situation in Iraq. 
 
¶15.  (S) However, although Saudi Shi'a are certainly aware 
that Shi'a form a significant part of the population on the 
Arab side of the gulf, to date we have seen no indication 
that the Saudi Shi'a have any realistic vision of a pan-Arab 
Shi'a political block.  Any such realization of an Arab 
"Shi'a crescent" would have to be led by Iraqi Shi'a, and at 
this point, as several contacts have noted to us, domestic 
challenges occupy their full attention.  Saudi Shi'a are not 
currently traveling to Iraq in significant numbers, and 
political and religious contacts between Saudi and Iraqi 
Shi'a post-Iraqi liberation, while they have occurred, appear 
to have been limited to date. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
The Future of the Shi'a Strategy and U.S. Policy 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶16.  (S) Will the Shi'a strategy of seeking to realize their 
rights as Saudi citizens by engaging the SAG hold firm over 
the next several years?  We believe that it will, as long as 
the SAG does not backtrack on reform through a change in 
policy or leadership and/or as long as there are not 
compelling external pressures or influences that change their 
calculus of interests.  Although Shi'a leaders have 
frequently expressed to us their frustration with the slow 
pace of reform and with the continued discrimination against 
the Shi'a community, they have invested a great deal in the 
strategy of engagement and it is slowly bearing fruit in the 
form of some advances in religious freedom (in Qatif at 
least) and civil society.  If the SAG does backtrack, e.g. by 
clamping down harshly on unlicensed civil society 
organizations or undoing the limited measure of religious 
freedom recently gained by the Shi'a, or if other elements of 
the current equilibrium change, the strategic calculations of 
the Shi'a leadership could change as well.  While we have not 
seen any signs of radical young Shi'a leaders who disagree 
with the goals or tactics of the current leadership, such 
leaders could emerge if sectarian violence initiated by Sunni 
extremists spreads uncontained to Saudi Arabia, if the 
employment situation for young Shi'a worsens, if Ayatollah 
Sistani is succeeded by a more radical cleric as marja' to 
most Saudi Shi'a, or if conflict breaks out with Iran. 
 
¶17.  (S) The argument outlined above, that the Saudi Shi'a 
remain committed to a strategic choice to push for 
realization of their rights as citizens from within the Saudi 
system and, under current conditions, do not entertain any 
serious external political loyalties, has several important 
implications for U.S. policymakers.  Most Saudi Shi'a 
currently see their interests as directly aligned with U.S. 
interests in key respects, particularly with the U.S. 
interest in promoting participatory governance and human 
rights in the Middle East as an antidote to extremism.  They 
appreciate any pressure the U.S. puts on the Saudi government 
to reform, although they wish the U.S. would increase this 
pressure and worry that other interests, such as regional 
stability and security of the oil supply, cause the U.S. to 
draw back from urging greater steps toward political reform. 
 
¶18.  (S) The most important implication of this argument is 
therefore that it is unlikely that the vast majority of Saudi 
Shi'a would support Iranian or Iranian-proxy interference in 
Saudi Arabia as long as the current equilibrium holds, 
particularly the promise for gradual reform.  King Abdullah 
embodies this promise of reform, particularly for the Shi'a, 
and with good cause:  no less a figure than Prince Talal bin 
Abdulaziz told the Ambassador that King Abdullah has decided 
to give Saudi more religious freedom as part of an effort to 
better incorporate them into Saudi national life.  By 
supporting the reform process, the U.S. is also playing a 
role, an important one in Shi'a eyes, in maintaining the 
current equilibrium.  (Comment:  As suggested in ref C, the 
USG can certainly use SAG concern about potential Iranian 
influence as one means of urging the SAG to grant fuller 
rights to its Shi'a citizens.  End comment.)  A secondary, 
more tactical implication is that the Saudi Shi'a currently 
make natural allies in U.S. efforts to promote political 
reform and human rights in Saudi Arabia.  Post is already 
directing some programmatic resources in this direction and 
will explore this potential further in a later cable. 
 
------- 
Sources 
------- 
 
¶19.  (SBU) This cable draws on hundreds of conversations over 
the past eight months between CG, PolOff, and PAO and a 
diverse group of Saudi Shi'a contacts, as well as on related 
observations and on publicly available sources such as Saudi 
Shi'a websites and other reports.  We have reported many of 
these conversations and observations in previous cables 
(NOTAL), including RIYADH 964, RIYADH 179, RIYADH 42, 2005 
RIYADH 9142 (reform, Iran, Iraq); RIYADH 3306, RIYADH 1741, 
RIYADH 1380, 2005 RIYADH 7589, 2003 RIYADH 2698 (reform); 
RIYADH 1706, RIYADH 1377, RIYADH 1252 (civil society); RIYADH 
1461, RIYADH 280, RIYADH 275 (Shi'a leadership); 2005 RIYADH 
9048, 2005 RIYADH 8565 (Iraq, Iran); RIYADH 1053 (Iraq); 2005 
RIYADH 8741 (Iran); RIYADH 2840 (reactions to Mubarak); and 
2005 RIYADH 8323 (EP governance). 
 
(APPROVED:  KINCANNON) 
GFOELLER