VZCZCXRO6506
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHRI #0234/01 1441641
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241641Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2431
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8872
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 0282
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0297
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0454
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 2428
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4014
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 0302
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0309
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0149
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0101
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0127
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0064
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0103
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIO DE JANEIRO 000234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC AND WHA/AND 
NSC FOR CRONIN 
DOE FOR SLADISLAW, GWARD 
STATE PASS OPIC FOR RGREENBURG, DMORONESE 
STATE PASS EXIM FOR NATALIE WEISS, COCONNER 
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/MWARD 
AID/W FOR LAC/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PGOV PREL BR
SUBJECT: Petrobras Seeking Alternatives to Bolivian Gas 
 
REFS: A) LA PAZ 1316 and previous 
 
     B) BRASILIA 888 and previous 
     C) SAO PAULO 512 
 
(U) This cable is Sensitive But Unclassified; please protect 
accordingly. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) In a recent conversation with Consul General, 
Petrobras officials indicated that they did not anticipate 
that the Bolivia-Brazil crisis will lead to any short or 
medium term disruption in gas supply to Brazil.  Petrobras, 
however, will accelerate the development of gas reserves in 
the Santos Basin and may turn to fuel oil as a substitute for 
natural gas imports.  Our interlocutors noted that although 
Petrobras expected Morales to nationalize Bolivia's natural 
gas industry, the unfriendly way it was conducted, with 
troops occupying the company's facilities, was a big 
surprise.  Meanwhile, the price of gas imports from Bolivia 
remains to be negotiated.  Our Petrobras contacts further 
stated that the Bolivian nationalization, which was spurring 
the Brazilian government to develop its domestic gas supplies 
with the goal of gas self-sufficiency, had undermined 
Venezuelan President Chavez's planned gas mega-pipeline to 
Brazil and Argentina.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) On May 15, Consul General, Political Officer and 
Pol/Econ Specialist met with Petrobras officials, Edimilson 
Antonio Dato Sant'Anna, Director of Operations and Logistics, 
and Heitor Miranda Madeira da Silva, Executive Manager, to 
discuss the Petrobras-Bolivia gas situation.  In accordance 
with the nationalization decree, Bolivian President Evo 
Morales sent military troops on May 1 to occupy foreign oil 
and gas fields and installations, and gave foreign companies 
six months to agree to new contracts or leave Bolivia (ref 
A).  Petrobras representatives indicated that while the 
company was fully aware of Morales' campaign promise to 
nationalize the oil and gas industry, it had been expecting a 
transition period with negotiations, not the occupation of 
their facilities by the Bolivian military. 
 
---------------------------- 
The Flow of Gas from Bolivia 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Petrobras is the largest foreign investor in Bolivia 
with USD 1.5 billion invested there. According to the two 
Petrobras officials, the company's activities in Bolivia 
generate yearly revenues of USD 1.2 billion, equivalent to 
about 15% of Bolivia's GDP.  Prior to the nationalization 
decree, USD 600 million of this total had been destined for 
Bolivian government coffers, although now the decree would 
raise the government's take to USD 850 million. 
 
¶4. (U) Sant'Anna and da Silva stated that Brazil's daily 
production of natural gas is 10 million cubic meters and 
daily imports from Bolivia are 26 million cubic meters.  This 
total daily consumption of 36 million cubic meters is divided 
as follows: 25.2 for the distributors, 6.3 for the 
thermoelectric plants, and 4.5 for the refineries. (Note: 
official GoB statistics from the National Petroleum Agency 
paint a somewhat different picture, with Bolivian gas 
 
RIO DE JAN 00000234  002 OF 003 
 
 
accounting for between 43% and 47% of Brazil's daily 
consumption.)  According to the Rio de Janeiro State 
Secretary for Energy, the state is partially protected from 
 
SIPDIS 
any shortfall in the supply of natural gas from Bolivia. 
Only 20 percent of the natural gas consumed in the state of 
Rio comes from Bolivia, while 80 percent comes from the 
Campos basin, north of Rio de Janeiro. 
 
----------------------- 
Alternatives for Brazil 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Although our interlocutors declared that "there is a 
general consensus" that Brazil will not suffer any 
disruptions in its gas supply, they also observed that 
Petrobras was already studying alternatives to substitute 
natural gas imports -- from conversion of industrial 
facilities (steel, glass and ceramics in particular) to fuel 
oil from gas, acceleration of the production of natural gas 
from the Santos basin, and development of alternative sources 
of energy (biodiesel, ethanol). 
 
¶6. (SBU) Sant'Anna stated that Petrobras' strategic plan 
already had contemplated accelerating the development of 
natural gas from the Santos Basin.  Initially, the timetable 
predicts daily production for 2008 in the range of 8 to 9 
million cubic meters, after completion and installation of 
the Mexilhao platform.  By the end of 2010, the company 
estimates daily production would reach 30 million cubic 
meters.  On May 18, Brazil's National Energy Policy Council 
(CNPE), an advisory body to President Lula that includes the 
Ministers of Energy and Agriculture and Petrobras' President, 
approved the accelerated Santos Basin development plan. To 
reach the target production levels, Petrobras estimates 
investments on the order of USD 16 billion, with the majority 
of this investment occurring between 2007 and 2011, when the 
construction of the ten platforms necessary for the 
completion of the project, will take place.  (Comment.  In 
the past, a number of independent analysts have noted that 
the notion that Petrobras will be able to get any significant 
amount of gas from the Santos Basin prior to 2010 is 
extremely optimistic.  End Comment.) 
 
¶7. (U) A second alternative would be to substitute natural 
gas imports with fuel oil.  Petrobras' total natural gas 
imports are equivalent (boe - barrels of oil equivalent) to 
100 thousand barrels of oil per day.  In an interview with 
the press, Petrobras President Jose Sergio Gabrielli said 
that the company has the capacity to substitute all the 
natural gas imported from Bolivia with domestically produced 
oil.  Petrobras exported an average of 250 thousand barrels 
of oil during the first three months of 2006, and could 
easily re-direct part of this volume to domestic consumption. 
Separately, on May 18 Petrobras announced that in September 
2005 it had begun a pilot project in which it converted a 
(relatively small scale) thermal power generation plant to 
burn any one of several fuels, including gas, fuel oil, 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) or ethanol. 
 
------------------------- 
The Need for Compensation 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Petrobras officials believed the company would 
be indemnified adequately for any losses in Bolivia, based on 
 
RIO DE JAN 00000234  003 OF 003 
 
 
the agreements it had previously signed with the Bolivian 
government.  Petrobras will fight for its rights, Sant'Anna 
said, noting that the company has maintained a tough public 
stance and will not make further investments in Bolivia due 
to the 82 percent tax.  Brazil needs to give Bolivia a dose 
of reality, our interlocutors declared. 
 
------------------------ 
Alternatives for Bolivia 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) According to Petrobras officials, it would take a 
minimum of five years for Bolivia to build up alternatives to 
the gas exports to Brazil.  Were Bolivia somehow to identify 
new export customers, it could construct a new gas pipeline 
or a plant to liquefy the gas (LNG) for export.  Another 
option would be to construct a petrochemical plant. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Venezuelan (and Brazilian) Pipedreams 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Sant'Anna also stated that major petroleum projects 
in South America are in danger now, especially the project to 
construct a ten thousand-kilometer gas pipeline connecting 
Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela.  He then turned his fire on 
Lula's foreign policy, arguing that President Lula's dream of 
promoting greater South American integration, with Brazil as 
the continent's leader, was totally impracticable now in view 
of the situation in Bolivia. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Petrobras is mounting a multi-pronged effort to 
persuade the Bolivians that Brazil has alternatives to 
Bolivian gas in both the short and long term.  Some of the 
recent press publicizing these options doubtless is more 
negotiating strategy than reality.  Brazil's ethanol 
supplies, for example, already are strained meeting the 
domestic demand for automotive fuel, and would not serve as a 
serious alternative for thermal power generation. 
Development of the Santos basin, while promising, is likely 
to take longer to yield significant quantities of gas than 
Petrobras posits.  Brazil does, however, have sufficient oil 
should industry need to convert from gas to another fuel. 
Most importantly, there is little doubt that the GoB and 
Petrobras have decided on a gas self-sufficiency strategy and 
will move consistently in that direction.  This will have 
repercussions not only for Bolivia, but for any other 
prospective suppliers. 
 
¶12. (U) This cable was coordinated with AmEmbassy Brasilia. 
 
ATKINS