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DE RUEHRB #1042/01 1511849
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311849Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3876
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 4011
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5515
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3186
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4222
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 8899
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2958
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 3000
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0215
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 1740
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0534

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 001042 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, R FOR UNDERSECRETARY HUGHES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2016 
TAGS: EAID ECON KPAO MO PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT TO MOROCCO OF U/S KAREN 
HUGHES 
 
REF: A. RABAT 398 
     ¶B. RABAT 522 
 
Classified By: DCM Wayne J. Bush for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) The US Mission warmly welcomes your upcoming visit to 
Morocco.  Your visit comes as we and the Moroccan government 
are further energizing the substantial reinvigoration of 
bilateral relations that has taken place since the May 2003 
terrorist attacks in Casablanca.  Since the 2003 attacks, 
Morocco has strengthened its commitment to working with the 
international community to fight global terrorism and promote 
widespread reforms, and cooperation with the US on both of 
these fronts is excellent.  We hope that your activities in 
Morocco, which will highlight many aspects of the US-Morocco 
partnership, will underscore to the Moroccan public the 
importance the US attaches to our relationship with Morocco 
and demonstrate interest in the lives of ordinary Moroccans. 
Most importantly, your program has been designed to provide 
illustrations of the components of our proposed pilot public 
diplomacy strategy to combat violent extremism.  The purpose 
of this message is to provide background information on 
overall US-Moroccan relations. 
 
Reform 
------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Morocco is a regional leader in reform, and the 
Moroccan leadership views reform and religious tolerance as 
essential components in combating extremism and terrorism. 
As such, and in keeping with the King's vision of a modern 
monarchy, Morocco is pressing internal reform on all fronts: 
on the political front, with recently passed legislation to 
reform Moroccan political parties; in women's rights through 
implementation of the family code (the "Moudawana") that 
significantly boosts the rights of women and children; in the 
media, with reform of the audiovisual sector; in education, 
where USAID has launched a $40 million five-year program and 
the GOM is partnering with the World Bank for a major push on 
primary education; in the economic realm, with FTA 
implementation and liberalization of the banking/financial 
sector; and, in the religious field, where Morocco's Ministry 
of Endowments and Islamic Affairs is restructuring mosques 
and Islamic education to promote tolerance and moderation. 
Morocco's Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER), 
established to examine human rights abuses between 1956 and 
1999, completed its mandate in November 2005 and shortly 
thereafter submitted its final report to the King, who 
decreed that the findings would be made public, including the 
commission's recommendations.  Despite the GOM's efforts, 
however, we hear persistent concerns that change is not 
happening fast enough and that reform is almost entirely 
driven by the Palace. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs' 
recent graduation of 150 male imams and 50 female 
"mourchidats" (guides) has drawn much national and 
international attention compelling Minister Ahmed Toufiq to 
clarify that the "mourchidats" will not be responsible for 
the same duties as the male imams.  In a public declaration 
in late May, Toufiq emphasized that an imam's "mission" is 
regulated by the sharia (Islamic law) and should not be 
confused with the role of mourchidat.  He stressed that the 
role of imam is to be reserved exclusively for men.  Instead, 
the 50 female graduates will be in charge of "operating in 
the mosques," which will include teaching.  Both imams and 
mourchidats will be able to give courses in different 
"Islamic sciences," and to teach the concepts of the sharia 
(with imams teaching imams and mourchidats training 
mourchidats).  The second tranche of candidates, 160 men and 
60 women, began their annual program on May 15.  We hope to 
be able to send a select few of the mourchidats and imams to 
the US on an International Visitor Leadership Program this 
coming year. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The USG actively supports many of Morocco's reform 
efforts, including through direct funding.  Morocco is a 
major recipient of funding through the Middle East 
Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which funds projects in 
 
Morocco that promote democracy and good governance, economic 
growth, education, and women's empowerment.  Morocco also 
receives money from the US through economic support funds as 
well as development assistance.  In FY 2006, USAID programs 
were funded at $21.6 million.  This is a significant 
reduction from the amounts approved by the Principals 
Committee following the 2003 bombings.  However, the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation is currently negotiating a 
compact with Morocco that may be valued at more than $500 
million over five years. 
 
Public Diplomacy 
---------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Despite deep concerns among many Moroccans about 
aspects of our foreign policy in the Middle East, we continue 
to find Morocco a fertile ground for US public diplomacy 
efforts.  Moroccans openly welcome contact with the United 
States and Americans, even if they disagree staunchly with 
our policies regarding Iraq and Israel/Palestine.  The sister 
city relationship between Casablanca and Chicago is vibrant 
and regarded as a model for sister city relationships.  A 
military exercise in southern Morocco this weekend has drawn 
favorable press coverage.  We look forward to continuing to 
work with your staff on our public diplomacy strategy, as we 
jointly seek more and better ways to advance understanding 
and support for the US. 
 
Press Freedom 
------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) While Morocco's reforms remain largely on track, 
press freedom continues to be a problematic area and lags 
behind Western standards.  A handful of newspapers have been 
handed stiff fines recently stemming from charges of libel 
(reftels).  While this may represent an improvement from the 
recent practice of sending journalists to jail (we are not 
aware of any journalists currently in prison), such fines are 
tantamount to forcing publications out of business.  This is 
an issue we follow closely and have raised with the GOM on 
numerous occasions.  On a more positive note, earlier this 
month operating licenses were granted to eleven new private 
radio stations and one new French-Moroccan television 
station. 
 
Middle East: the Palestinians, Iraq, Iran 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Morocco continues to be a moderating voice in the 
Middle East. Mahmoud Abbas visited Morocco April 12-15. In 
what the GOM considered a "working visit," the King offered 
to provide the Palestinians a new embassy in Rabat.  However, 
the GOM refused an official visit by Hamas Secretary General 
Khaled Mishal.  King Mohammed met with Shimon Peres in Madrid 
last year and one of the King's top advisors (and a leader of 
the Moroccan Jewish community), Andre Azoulay, visited Israel 
last November, where the GOI extended an invitation for King 
Mohammed to visit.  However, the Israeli liaison office in 
Rabat, closed during the second intifada, remains shuttered. 
Most recently the GOM, through the Mohammed VI Foundation for 
Solidarity and at the King's urging, sent a large shipment of 
humanitarian aid to help support the Palestinian people. 
 
¶8.  (C) The Government of Morocco continues to play a 
discreet but supportive role in Iraq.  Morocco has welcomed 
some key events in Iraq, but is inconsistent in publicly 
supporting major political developments; the GOM has said 
nothing in public, for example, about Iraq's new government 
and constitution.  The Moroccan MFA has trained Iraqi 
diplomats in Morocco.  The GOM, however, has not publicly 
condemned the terrorist attacks in Iraq in the same way it 
has condemned similar attacks elsewhere.  Two employees of 
the Moroccan Embassy in Baghdad are currently being held 
hostage, and there have been strong public demonstrations of 
support for them, and against the kidnappers, from the King 
and the Moroccan people, but their capture is dragging on 
with no apparent resolution. 
 
¶9.  (C) The Iranian Vice President for Legal and 
 
Parliamentary Affairs visited Morocco in early January and 
was received by PM Jettou.  While the Moroccans support the 
right of Iran to develop nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes, the GOM has said that it made clear to VP Musavi 
that Iran must comply with international law and 
non-proliferation conventions.  Morocco supports US efforts 
to deal with the issue multilaterally and believes another 
military confrontation must be avoided at all costs.  The GOM 
is also concerned about Iranian "meddling" in Iraq. 
 
Western Sahara and Algeria 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Morocco's relations with Algeria are sour with no 
immediate prospects for improvement.  There are quiet 
contacts between the two countries, but relations at the most 
senior levels are not warm.  The Western Sahara issue remains 
a key obstacle in improving relations; without a resolution 
to this long-standing dispute, limited Moroccan resources 
that could be utilized more productively elsewhere will go to 
maintaining a security environment in the territory, where 
two-thirds of the Moroccan army is deployed.  Algeria 
continues to insist on a solution to the Western Sahara that 
allows for self-determination for the Sahrawi people, while 
Morocco insists the territory is an integral part of the 
Kingdom and will consider autonomy for the territory but 
staunchly rejects any option that allows for the possibility 
of independence. 
 
¶11.  (C) We continue to urge Morocco and Algeria to improve 
their dialogue and avoid negative public rhetoric.  We 
contribute to the annual budget of MINURSO, the peacekeeping 
force in the territory, and support confidence-building 
measures such as family visits between Moroccan and 
Polisario-controlled areas.  Senator Lugar visited Morocco 
and Algeria in August 2005 to oversee the release of the 
remaining 404 POWs held by the Polisario, a substantial 
humanitarian contribution facilitated by the US, with 
tremendous positive public diplomacy impact. 
 
Economic Issues: FTA and Anti-Money Laundering 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶12.  (SBU) We are pleased with the initial successes of the 
FTA during the first months of implementation, particularly 
the increased foreign direct investment in the textile and 
garment sector.  Several small irritations have arisen with 
regard to agricultural trade, however.  We hope that we can 
work together in the cooperative spirit of the accord to open 
up markets and liberalize sectors, thus making the FTA a true 
victory for both countries. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) While we were encouraged by the Council of 
Government's passage of draft anti-money laundering 
legislation in April, as it is a keystone of our 
counter-terrorism finance efforts we would like to see timely 
Council of Ministers and Parliamentary approval of the law. 
INL has set aside $800 thousand to help equip a Financial 
Intelligence Unit and help train its personnel.  Disbursement 
of these and other US. funds (including FBI training and 
assistance that may be reprogrammed for Algeria) is 
contingent on passage of the AML law.  Morocco's MENA-FATF 
peer review is scheduled for November 2006. 
****************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
****************************************** 
 
Riley