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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0457/01 1461532
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261532Z MAY 06
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6155
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0700
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000457 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE, AND EUR/SSA, NSC FOR BRAUN, 
USUN FOR DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WISNER TELLS KOSOVO ALBANIANS THEIR 
WORK IS JUST BEGINNING 
 
REF: (A) PRISTINA 437 (B) BELGRADE 817 
 
Classified By: CDA Lynn Gurian for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. During a May 21-23 visit to Kosovo, Special 
Representative Frank Wisner starkly disabused Kosovo Albanian 
leaders of any notion that Kosovo independence can be 
considered a foregone conclusion.  In plain-speaking 
meetings, Ambassador Wisner told the president, prime 
minister, and opposition leaders individually and 
collectively that their final status negotiating team has to 
perform better in Vienna and in the new shuttle phase of 
discussions on decentralization.  To expressions of concern 
that international community resolve to determine Kosovo's 
final status in 2006 may be weakening, Ambassador Wisner 
offered assurances that the USG remains committed to 
concluding the process this year.  He said the USG sees three 
keys to realizing that goal, all held by the Kosovo Albanian 
leaders -- enhanced flexibility and generosity in the talks 
themselves, renewed commitment to implementing the Standards 
for Kosovo program, and continued efforts at interethnic 
reconciliation.  Ambassador Wisner and UNMIK principals 
agreed that a recent KFOR pullback from Kosovo's north is 
regrettable and complicates efforts to engage the Kosovo Serb 
population there.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador Frank Wisner, The Secretary's Special 
Representative for Kosovo Final Status Talks, visited Kosovo 
May 21-23.  In Pristina, Ambassador Wisner met separately 
with President Fatmir Sejdiu, Prime Minister Agim Ceku, 
opposition leader Hashim Thaci and COM KFOR Commander General 
Guiseppe Valotto.  He met collectively with the Kosovo 
Albanian final status negotiating team (Sejdiu, Ceku, Thaci, 
Sejdiu senior advisor Skender Hyseni, opposition leader Veton 
Surroi, and team coordinator Blerim Shala).  Deputy Prime 
Minister/Local Government Minister Lutfi Haziri and 
opposition leader Ylber Hysa joined Ambassador Wisner at a 
COM-hosted dinner.  The ambassador also met in Pristina with 
COMKFOR Giuseppe Valotto, Principal Deputy SRSG Steve Schook, 
Mitrovica area UNMIK representative (and former FSO) Jerry 
Gallucci, Kosovo Serb leaders Oliver Ivanovic, Goran 
Bogdanovic, and Randjel Nojkic, and non-Serb minority leaders 
Sadik Idrizi, Mahir Yagcilar, Dzezair Murati, and Haxhi 
Mergja.  He visited Kosovo Serb returnees as well as Albanian 
and Serb community leaders in the village of Bablak, south of 
Pristina.  Finally he visited USKFOR Camp Bondsteel where he 
met with Commanding General Darren Owens and Romanian 
military officer Stefan Iovanescu.  COM participated in all 
meetings and discussions. 
 
Wisner to Selected Kosovo Albanian Leaders: You Aren't Home 
Free 
---------------------------------- 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Wisner straightforwardly laid out his 
primary message for Kosovo Albanian leaders in a private 
dinner discussion with Prime Minister Ceku, Deputy Prime 
Minister Haziri, and opposition figure (and cultural heritage 
Vienna talks delegation leader) Ylber Hysa.  Wisner said, 
"Your team didn't do very well" in the most recent meetings 
on decentralization with UN Deputy Special Envoy Albert 
Rohan.  "You got bogged down on details of municipalities and 
read from a script rather than engage."  The ambassador made 
clear that this kind of performance would not get Kosovo to 
the final status outcome Pristina negotiators want, saying, 
"The train may have left the station, but could fail to reach 
the destination called independence."  He said the USG wants 
to see not only an improved performance in Vienna but also a 
renewed Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) 
commitment to implementing the "Standards for Kosovo" program 
on the Kosovo ground. 
 
¶4. (C) The Kosovo Albanian leaders absorbed these messages. 
Haziri, who led the Pristina delegations to three of the four 
Vienna sessions on decentralization, reacted a bit 
 
PRISTINA 00000457  002 OF 004 
 
 
defensively, claiming that Pristina's proposal would leave 80 
percent of Kosovo Serbs living in Serb-majority 
municipalities and that the Belgrade proposal included 
"strange" elements that would create municipalities without 
inhabitants, leave 54 percent of Kosovo's territory 
(including most resource-rich areas) under Kosovo Serb 
control, and create "ethnic corridors" to Serbia in much the 
same way late Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic had proposed 
three years ago.  Ceku alleged that Serbian President 
Kostinica is aiming to create a Serb "entity" in Kosovo using 
ethnically-based decentralization and broad patriarchal 
territorial carve outs as tools.  In urging a more flexible 
and generous approach in Vienna, Wisner assured the Kosovo 
Albanian leaders that the USG would not allow Serbia to 
control Kosovo territory under a municipal guise or to 
control Kosovo's natural resources.  Wisner reassured the 
Kosovo Albanian leaders that the USG would resist in the 
strongest way any functional or territorial carve-out for 
Serbia. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Wisner repeatedly urged the Kosovo Albanian 
leaders to know their "red lines" delineating truly 
unacceptable proposals and to share them with the USG and the 
team of United Nations Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.  Ceku 
immediately replied that he and his colleagues share two 
overriding fears -- that the international community 
(especially the U.S.) was beginning to talk about a delay 
that would carry the talks into 2007 and that some corners of 
the international community were again contemplating 
"conditional" independence for Kosovo.  He said the Pristina 
team could be much more flexible in the negotiations if the 
international community issued a clear signal on 
independence.  Wisner replied, "I can't give you that -- we 
need a partnership to get to the end," to which Ceku said 
that Pristina negotiators could be more flexible in Vienna, 
even in the face of rising public anxiety in Kosovo, if they 
came to the negotiating table confident that the talks were 
on track for conclusion in 2006.  Wisner assured him that the 
USG "is absolutely determined to stick with the process we 
have in place and determined to conclude the process in 
2006." 
 
Wisner to Broader Kosovo Albanian Leadership: Things Will Get 
Even Tougher 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Wisner opened his meeting with the 
collected Kosovo Albanian final status negotiating team by 
praising the ongoing minority outreach efforts of team 
members, especially President Sejdiu and Prime Minister Ceku, 
saying, "I know these efforts are tough, that not all Kosovo 
Albanians approve of forming friendships with Serbs."  Wisner 
especially praised Sejdiu's Easter visit to Decani monastery 
and visits to Serb enclaves in Peja/Pec and Decan/i 
municipalities and encouraged Sejdiu to communicate to his 
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) mayors to do the same as 
examples of "humane leadership" (NOTE:  The LDK holds the 
mayorship of 19 of Kosovo,s 30 municipalities.  END NOTE.). 
 
¶7. (C) Wisner then renewed his call for flexibility in the 
negotiations and for "laying your cards on the table."  He 
said, "there are two reasons for not holding back: the more 
you are forward-leaning, the more the UN will be able to put 
together a final proposal in keeping with your goals; and the 
more you hold back, the more room you create for Belgrade to 
maneuver."  Referring to a Government of Serbia letter to 
Contact Group ministers suggesting significant changes in the 
format of the status talks (ref B), Ambassador Wisner said 
that we are seeing the first public signs that Serbian 
officials are becoming uneasy with the negotiations because 
"it must be increasingly obvious to Belgrade where the 
negotiations will end."  He said the USG "expects (the talks) 
to end in independence in 2006, but the outcome is not 
inevitable -- it will take work." 
 
¶8. (C) Prime Minister Ceku appreciated Wisner's reiteration 
of the 2006 goal for final status determination, especially 
 
PRISTINA 00000457  003 OF 004 
 
 
in the face of what he sees as Belgrade's emerging blocking 
strategy. Blerim Shala said the Pristina negotiators are 
fully prepared to be flexible on decentralization, 
particularly on the basis of Ahtisaari's criteria for 
creation of new municipalities which he listed as 
"sustainability, functionality, feasibility, and 
rationality."  Ceku said the PISG would likewise attempt to 
exhibit greater flexibility regarding Standards 
implementation, especially by accepting as fully as possible 
the Contact Group's proposed 13 priority actions.  Wisner 
said "moral support" from Kosovo Albanian leaders is needed 
over the next months for doing "everything Kosovo,s limited 
financial means allow you to do, to give us the tools we need 
to work with."  He then listed illustrative action items: 
resolving property issues; creating a public bus system for 
Kosovo,s ethnic Serbs to feel connected across municipal 
boundaries; passing important legislation (on religious 
freedom, preservation of cultural heritage, and language 
use); concluding financial audit of PISG officials; creating 
an anti-corruption commission; and setting up public, 
transparent bidding on construction projects.  Acknowledging 
that the next round of talks will focus on economic issues, 
Sejdiu asked for help in making available international 
financial institution data regarding Kosovo. 
 
Thaci: Staking Out The Fringe 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) In an incoherent but mercifully brief private meeting 
with Ambassador Wisner, opposition leader Hashim Thaci 
inadvertently gave evidence of the internal challenges faced 
by leaders of the Kosovo Albanian negotiating team.  Alleging 
that he remains on the team "for the sake of Kosovo and the 
international community," Thaci said his steadfastness "puts 
my life in jeopardy."  The U.S., he said, should not want the 
"yes" men currently in authority to create weak and corrupt 
structures which will present a security risk for Kosovo post 
final status.  Ambassador Wisner implored Thaci to focus on 
occupying a constructive place on the negotiating team, to 
appeal to the mayors of his political party to continue 
multi-ethnic outreach in their municipalities, and to 
concentrate on those domestic issues which could become 
problematic because "the international community is watching 
and deciding whether or not Kosovo is equipped to assume its 
own sovereignty." 
 
Kosovo Serb Leaders Would Like to Lead 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Serbian List for Kosovo and Metohija (SLKM) leaders 
Goran Bogdanovic, Randjel Nojkic and Oliver Ivanovic told 
Ambassador Wisner that Belgrade should recognize 
decentralization as a crucial mechanism for keeping Kosovo 
Serbs in Kosovo instead of seeing it as a bargaining tool. 
Ivanovic said the SLKM will soon send its own proposal on 
decentralization to Belgrade and, if there is no response, 
will forward it to Ahtisaari, UNMIK, and to Wisner,s office. 
 Bogdanovic and Ivanovic described the SLKM proposal as 
maximizing the number of Kosovo Serbs living in Serb-majority 
municipalities and transferring to municipalities a greater 
number of governing competencies, including social affairs, 
primary health and education, public utilities, land 
ownership/property administration and local police and 
courts, as well as some influence over privatizations. 
 
Internationals Concerned About Northern Kosovo 
------------------------------ --------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Several interlocutors expressed concern about recent 
events in northern Kosovo.  PDSRSG Steve Schook (formerly 
COMKFOR chief of staff) acknowledged that a French KFOR 
withdrawal of fixed checkpoints from the area north of the 
Ibar River greatly concerns him, especially as final status 
talks progress and the Serb majority in northern Kosovo 
likely becomes increasingly agitated over prospects of an 
independent Kosovo.  COMKFOR Giuseppe Valotto later told 
Wisner he is aware of the potential problems created by the 
 
PRISTINA 00000457  004 OF 004 
 
 
French pull-back and has plans to raise KFOR's profile in the 
north. 
 
¶12. (C) Schook and Ceku, in separate meetings, both said the 
PISG would ideally be increasing outreach efforts in the 
north as the talks progressed -- perhaps channeling funds 
thru UNMIK, which is a generally more accceptable funding 
source than the PISG for northern Kosovo Serbs.  Schook and 
UNMIK representative for northern Kosovo Jerry Gallucci 
agreed with Ambassador Wisner that such UNMIK and PISG 
outreach to northern Kosovo Serbs, complemented by 
international community assistance programs, is essential to 
building pragmatic links across the ethnic divide roughly 
delineated by the Ibar.  All contacts, though, were likewise 
aware of a need to avoid exacerbating that divide by funding 
programs that could inadvertently discourage displaced Serbs 
in the north from returning to their homes elsewhere in 
Kosovo as circumstances otherwise warrant. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Ambassador Wisner cleared on this message.  USOP 
clears this message in its entirety for release to Special 
Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. 
GURIAN