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C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000617 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 
TAGS: ICRC PHUM PREF PREL NO KPAS KJUS
SUBJECT: BELLINGER TAKES ON NORWEGIAN CRITICS 
 
REF: OSLO 403 
 
 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Mike Hammer, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  On May 9, Legal Adviser John Bellinger 
presented U.S. policy on detainees to Deputy Foreign Minister 
Johansen, parliamentarians, human rights NGOs, Norway's 
leading foreign policy think tank, Norwegian legal scholars, 
and in several media interviews.  Johansen repeated Norway's 
view that the Geneva Convention (including all its 
protections) should be afforded to U.S.-held detainees. 
Johansen also urged humane and proper treatment of detainees 
at Guantanamo and elsewhere.  Johansen's points reflected the 
core sentiment of the various groups Bellinger addressed 
during his packed one-day visit. 
 
¶2.  (C)  In all his meetings Bellinger thoroughly explained 
U.S. policy on detainees, made clear that the U.S. does not 
torture, and stressed that we are firmly committed to 
upholding our international legal obligations.  Bellinger 
delivered to MFA Legal Adviser Rolf Einar Fife our official 
response to Norway's March 31, 2006 note concerning the legal 
status of U.S.-held detainees (text of our diplomatic note 
included para 12).  Bellinger also publicly clarified the 
U.S. position on Svalbard.  End Summary. 
 
Breakfast with NGOS: the Same Old Criticism 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (C)  Bellinger started his long day in Oslo with a 
breakfast hosted by the Ambassador with Norwegian NGOs and 
distinguished academics.  The discussion centered on the 
legal justification for the U.S. policy on detainees 
(focusing upon the framework of the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions), the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
detainee treatment issues and alleged rendition flights. 
Bellinger stressed our interest in a greater dialogue between 
the U.S. and Europe, the U.S. commitment to upholding its 
international legal obligations and dismissed myths 
pertaining to U.S. treatment of detainees at Guantanamo. 
 
DFM Johansen: Norway Demands Humane Treatment of Detainees 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4. (C) Legal Adviser Bellinger, accompanied by the 
Ambassador, met with Deputy FM Johansen and Legal Adviser 
Rolf Einar Fife for a discussion focused almost exclusively 
on detainee issues.  (Note: Johansen has been the most vocal 
voice in the Norwegian government being critical of U.S. 
treatment of detainees at Guantanamo.  End Note.)  Johansen 
began by stressing that Norway is a "staunch, strong 
supporter on the war against terror."  Norway believes 
terrorists are dangerous people but that they are also "human 
beings" who must be afforded minimum treatment standards and 
granted "full protections" under the Geneva Convention, he 
argued.  Bellinger agreed detainees must be, and are, treated 
humanely, but noted that the detainees do not fall squarely 
under the Geneva Convention, and that the term "unlawful 
combatants" has a basis in existing international law.  DFM 
Johansen, noting that Al Qaida was "fundamentalist" about 
religion, stated that Norway was also "fundamentalist" about 
minimum humanitarian standards and fulfillment of the Geneva 
Convention.  He stated his concern that the U.S. policy 
toward detainees could encourage other countries, such as 
Sudan, to adopt detainment policies.  Citing his own Middle 
Eastern experiences, Johansen believed that popular sentiment 
there was that the West had one set of standards and another 
for Muslim countries.  Johansen commented that "being firm on 
international law will be a factor in the fight against 
terror."  Fife added that there was a "perception" of the 
erosion of the standards of rules by the West.  Bellinger 
made clear that the United States is committed to fulfilling 
its international legal obligations, adding that the U.S. has 
established clear rules and procedures regarding the 
treatment of detainees. 
 
¶5. (C)  Johansen took the opportunity of the meeting to 
inform us of some good news, that Norway was scheduled to 
ratify the Third Additional Protocol on Friday, May 12. 
Bellinger welcomed Norway's decision and quick ratification. 
Note: Bellinger later delivered to Fife our response to 
Norway's March 31 note (reftel), concerning the U.S. position 
on detainees. 
 
Print Press and Television Coverage 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6. (U) The Legal Adviser conducted several interviews, 
including with Norway's newspaper of record Aftenposten and 
TV 2, Norway's private network.  Aftenposten ran two 
articles, one focusing on Bellinger explanation of U.S policy 
on detainees, the other reporting on Bellinger's 
clarification of U.S. policy toward Svalbard.  On Svalbard, 
the newspaper quoted Bellinger as stating that the "U.S. does 
not disagree with Norway on Svalbard.  We have not changed 
positions on any questions that concern Svalbard.  The 
American position is actually the same as it has been for 
several decades, that is to say that we reserve the same 
treaty rights as other countries."  The article goes on to 
note that according to Bellinger, the U.S. is neither behind 
the UK's nor Norway's positions. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: Bellinger was asked to clarify the U.S. 
policy given an erroneous report a few days earlier that the 
U.S. had changed its long-standing position on Svalbard and 
opposed Norway's position.  Bellinger's public correction was 
a big relief to the Norwegian government, which is on pins 
and needles regarding what position we might ultimately take 
given the UK's recent challenge of Norway's position that 
Svalbard's continental shelf is an extension of 
mainland-Norway's continental shelf.  End Comment. 
 
Meeting with Key MPs on the Foreign Affairs Committee 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (C)  Bellinger met with five members of the Parliament's 
Foreign Affairs, including Chairman Olav Axelson (Labor), 
Marit Nybakk (Labor), Vidar Bjornstad (Labor), Center Jon 
Lilletun (Christian Democrat) and Alf Ivar (Center Party). 
Before each parliamentarian asked pointed questions about our 
treatment of detainees and renditions, each stressed the 
importance to Norway of maintaining a strong relationship 
with the United States.  The parliamentarians also urged that 
the U.S. apply the Geneva Convention to the detainees 
Bjornstad concluded that the reason why detainee issues are 
"debated so much" is that "the U.S. is so important."  One of 
the MPs later told us that the session was "fantastic" and 
much appreciated by the committee's members. 
 
Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute (NUPI) and International 
Law Association 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶9. (C)  Bellinger addressed a capacity crowd at NUPI.  The 
value of Bellinger's visit was clearly evident given that 
attendance at this event far exceeded expectations with over 
70 packed into the room, including reporters from almost all 
of Norway's mainstream media covering it.  Issues raised 
included Svalbard, Norway-U.S. relations, detainees and the 
Geneva Convention.   One item of interest is that the local 
Sudanese Ambassador raised the case of Sami Al-Haj, a 
Sudanese whom the Ambassador claimed was an Al Jazeera 
cameraman, who was mistakenly interred at Guantanamo and 
should be released. 
 
¶10. (C)  Later, Bellinger spoke at Norwegian International 
Association lecture (composed of distinguished jurists and 
academics) for over two hours.  The session was lively, with 
attendees challenging Bellinger on detainees and the use of 
Presidential signing statements, specifically with reference 
to the one on the McCain amendment.  Of particular note were 
the comments of a Norwegian Supreme Court Justice who found 
the Guantanamo situation "completely wrong" from "a human 
side," perceiving that the U.S. was "degrading people" at the 
facility.  Despite legal justifications for the U.S. position 
on detainees under international law, the Justice was 
"terrorized" and "disturbed" that the U.S. could keep people 
interred.  In addition, a former Iranian Ambassador to Norway 
(who defected) made a plea for the Mujahideen E Khalq to be 
removed from U.S. designated terrorist group list. 
 
John: We, and the Norwegians, thank you for coming 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11. (C) Comment:  Bellinger's packed one-day stop was exactly 
what we had hoped for, an opportunity for an eloquent 
exposition of U.S. legal views on the detainee issue. 
Bellinger's message that the United States is committed to 
living up to its international legal obligations was welcomed 
by Norwegians.  Fife noted to us that much of the passion 
with which Norwegians challenged U.S. positions can be 
attributed to four years of "bottled aggression" which was 
"uncorked" by a chance to present their views directly to a 
senior U.S. official.  Fife remarked that it was healthy to 
have had such a fulsome exchange on detainees, adding that 
hearing Bellinger at least made Norwegians realize there are 
other legitimate, well-reasoned views.  We agree.  Overall, 
Norwegian public officials, recognizing the need to mandate 
policies which protect their citizens while complying with 
international law and norms, seemed more open to U.S. views 
than the those outside the government, who are not saddled 
with those great responsibilities.  Bellinger's visit 
received extensive press coverage and advanced our public 
diplomacy objectives.  We promise that if he comes again, we 
will go lighter on the schedule.  Again, thanks.  End comment. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Text of U.S. Diplomatic Note in response to 
Norway's note on detainees follows: 
 
"The United States believes that it is in a continuing state 
of international armed conflict with Al Qaida, and, 
therefore, that the law of armed conflict and international 
humanitarian law governs our continuing operations in that 
conflict.  Members of Al Qaida have attacked our embassies, 
our military vessels and military bases, our capital city, 
and our financial center.  The attacks by Al Qaida on the 
United States on September 11, 2001 killed nearly three 
thousand people.  The UN Security Council has reaffirmed our 
right of self-defense in relation to these attacks, which 
were planned and launched from outside the United States, in 
Resolution 1373.  The United States continues to be engaged 
in an active conflict against Al Qaida and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, and the vast majority of Guantanamo detainees 
were captured by or turned over to our armed forces in 
Afghanistan.  Indeed, leaders of Al Qaida repeatedly have 
asserted that they are at war with the United States. 
 
The conflict against Al Qaida is not geographically limited 
to Afghanistan, however: Al Qaida and its allies have engaged 
and continue to engage in attacks against the United States, 
its facilities, and its allies worldwide.  This international 
armed conflict does not fall within the ambit of Common 
Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions because Al Qaida is 
not and cannot be a &High Contracting Party8 as defined by 
those Conventions.  At the same time, the conflict is not 
confined to the territory of single state, and thus does not 
fall within the scope of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. 
 
This does not mean that the United States believes that it is 
engaged in an armed conflict with all terrorists everywhere. 
The U.S. Congress,s Authorization for Use of Military Force, 
passed on September 18, 2001, states that &the President is 
authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts 
of international terrorism against the United States by such 
nations, organizations or persons.8  In any case in which 
the United States considers whether to use armed force, the 
U.S. Government would evaluate whether the use of force would 
be authorized, and whether the specific action to be taken is 
necessary and proportional to the goal to be achieved.  The 
U.S. Government would evaluate a variety of factors in 
determining whether military force is appropriate in any 
given case, including whether the country in which we would 
act has consented to the action, or is willing and able to 
address the threat posed by the individual or group at issue. 
 This does not mean that military force will be appropriate 
in every circumstance.  Where it is appropriate to detain, 
question, and prosecute an individual, we do so; in many 
cases, this will be the preferred course of action. 
 
In applying the law of armed conflict to the conflict in 
Afghanistan and with Al Qaida, the United States has 
determined that Al Qaida and Taliban detainees are not 
entitled to prisoner of war (POW) privileges provided by the 
Third Geneva Convention.  The Third Geneva Convention accords 
POW status to enemy forces that follow certain rules 
specified in Article 4: being commanded by a person 
responsible for subordinates; having a fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance; carrying arms openly; and 
conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war.  The President determined that Taliban detainees are 
not entitled to POW status because they have not effectively 
distinguished themselves from the civilian population of 
Afghanistan and have not conducted their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war.  Because Al 
Qaida is not covered by the Third Geneva Convention, as 
explained above, it is not a High Contracting Party to the 
Convention and, in any event, its members fail to meet the 
requirements of Article 4 of the Convention. 
 
Although the Third Geneva Convention does not apply as a 
matter of treaty law to those detained at Guantanamo, the 
United States has provided all such detainees with Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs).  These CSRTs, which 
determine whether individuals are being properly detained as 
enemy combatants, are patterned after Article 5 tribunals as 
those tribunals have developed in practice.  In fact, the 
CSRTs provide greater process for the detainees than have 
Article 5 tribunals set up by other countries.  In 
proceedings before a CSRT, a detainee may call reasonably 
available witnesses, question other witnesses, and testify, 
or decline to do so, at his choice.  Each detainee has the 
right to a personal representative to assist in preparing his 
case, to receive an unclassified summary of the evidence 
before the hearing, and to introduce relevant documentary 
evidence. 
The United States has used the term &unlawful combatants8 
to describe those found by a CSRT to be Al Qaida and Taliban 
fighters.  This term is used to describe enemy combatants who 
are not entitled to POW protections by the terms of the Third 
Geneva Convention, as explained above, and who, because they 
are combatants, are not protected persons under the terms of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention.  This category of individuals 
is not a newly-created category; rather, it has appeared for 
the past fifty years in various treatises on military law and 
in U.S. and British military manuals.  (See, for example, 
Adam Roberts, &Counter-terrorism, Armed Force, and the Laws 
of War,8 Survival, Spring 2002; Alan Rosas, The Legal Status 
of Prisoners of War, Helsinki 1976.) 
 
The United States does not agree with the contention of the 
Government of Norway that all combatants not meeting the 
definition of prisoner of war fall within the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.  There is a genuine gap in the application of the 
two Conventions with respect to certain persons during an 
armed conflict.  The drafters did not intend the Fourth 
Convention to protect organized military forces in systematic 
combat; rather, it is designed to cover civilians.  Indeed, 
aspects of this gap are expressly recognized in the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, which specifically excludes from its 
definition of protected persons certain individuals whose 
countries of nationality maintain diplomatic relations with 
the detaining power, and which limits protections to a 
parties own territory and occupied territory (neither of 
which pertain to Afghanistan, which is not U.S. territory and 
never occupied by the United States).  Contemporaneous 
statements by the negotiators of the Conventions recognize 
this gap, and include a statement by the ICRC representative 
at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference that &although the two 
conventions might appear to cover all the categories 
concerned, irregular belligerents were not actually 
protected.8  At that same conference, the Dutch 
representative stated that to conclude that individuals who 
are not POWs under the Third Geneva Convention &are 
automatically protected by other Conventions is certainly 
untrue. . . .  (The Fourth Geneva Convention) certainly does 
not protect civilians who are in the battlefield, taking up 
arms against the adverse party.8 Statements from the UK and 
Swiss negotiators supported this view as well.  Indeed, the 
very lack of full coverage for non-traditional armed forces 
in part led states to call for the negotiations that led to 
Additional Protocols I and II.  Although the United States 
participated in those negotiations, we have not ratified 
those treaties, partly because we are concerned that 
Additional Protocol I could allow organizations such as Al 
Qaida to claim POW status or other protections that are 
inappropriate for terrorist groups.  Because the United 
States is not a party to Additional Protocols I and II, the 
United States does not bear any treaty obligations under 
those instruments. 
 
As the President of the United States stated in his February 
7, 2002 order, the values that the United States shares with 
other civilized nations countenance humane treatment of 
detainees.  Because of these shared values, the President 
ordered the U.S. Armed Forces to treat detainees in the 
conflict with Al Qaida and the Taliban humanely and, to the 
extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in 
a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva 
Conventions. 
 
Norway,s note also discusses the applicability of the 
Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to these conflicts.  The 
U.S. position on torture is clear: U.S. criminal law and 
treaty obligations prohibit torture, and the United States 
will not engage in or condone torture anywhere.  In addition, 
the recently enacted Detainee Treatment Act codifies in U.S. 
law the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment contained in Article 16 of the Convention Against 
Torture, as applicable to the United States by the terms of 
its reservation to this Article, and makes clear that the 
prohibition applies to the treatment of all detainees under 
U.S. control anywhere in the world. 
 
The United States believes that the ICCPR does not apply 
extraterritorially, and has taken this position consistently 
since the time at which States adopted the ICCPR.  The United 
States is not alone in interpreting the ICCPR as 
territorially limited.  For example, the Government of the 
Netherlands told the Human Rights Committee that it disagreed 
with the suggestion that its U.N. peacekeepers in Srebrenica 
fell within the ambit of the ICCPR, explaining, &Article 2 
of the Covenant clearly states that each State Party 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
 within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, the 
rights recognized in the Covenant(It goes without saying 
that the citizens of Srebrenica, vis--vis the Netherlands, 
do not come within the scope of that provision.8 
U.S. Government policy, applicable to all agencies, is not to 
transport anyone to a country if we believe it is more likely 
than not that the individual will be tortured.  In some 
contexts, the United States seeks specific assurances that 
extend beyond questions of torture.  For example, if the 
receiving State in question is not a party to the CAT, the 
United States may pursue more specific assurances, which, for 
example, assure that an individual will be treated humanely 
and not be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 
 Renditions, in appropriate circumstances, can be a useful 
tool to bring terrorists to justice or prevent them from 
carrying out terrorist acts.  Both the United States and 
European countries have used renditions for many years.  For 
example, a rendition by the French government brought one of 
history,s most infamous terrorists, best known as Carlos the 
Jackal, to justice in France, where he is now imprisoned. 
Indeed, the European Commission of Human Rights rejected 
Carlos,s claim that his rendition was unlawful. 
 
Although the United States has no obligation to provide the 
ICRC with notification of or access to Al Qaida or Taliban 
detainees (who are not entitled to either the status of POWs 
or protected persons), the United States has made clear that, 
as a matter of policy, it will provide ICRC notice of and 
access to such detainees to the maximum extent practicable, 
consistent with the unique and compelling military and 
security needs posed by this type of conflict.  Consistent 
with this policy, the ICRC has notice of and access to the 
vast majority of the detainees held by the U.S. Government in 
this conflict, and has full access to detainees held at 
Guantanamo. 
 
The United States appreciates its continuing dialogue with 
the Government of Norway on these and related issues."  End 
text. 
 
¶13. (U) Legal Advisor Bellinger did not have an opportunity 
to clear this message. 
 
 
 
Visit Oslo's Classified website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/oslo/index.cf m 
 
WHITNEY