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63335
2006-05-09 14:47:00
06MEXICO2460
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL
06MEXICO1963|06MEXICO2240|06MEXICO2409
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TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 002460 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
SUBJECT: WHAT AILS THE PRI? 
 REF: A. A) MEXICO 1963 
     ¶B. B) MEXICO 2409 
     ¶C. C) MEXICO 2240 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR LESLIE A. BASSETT, REASONS: 
 1.4(B/D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  After its considerable successes in the 
2003 midterm elections and in state and local races since 
then, many in the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
expected that 2006 would be the year of its restoration, 
particularly given the public's disappointment with the Fox 
Administration.  Yet despite the party's high expectations 
going into this electoral cycle, polls taken since January 
have consistently shown PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo in an 
often distant third place, and a Madrazo victory appears 
increasingly out of reach.  What accounts for this dramatic 
reversal of fortunes?  First among the factors is the 
candidate himself; even many PRI insiders now privately 
concede that Roberto Madrazo is a deeply flawed candidate. 
By all accounts, his campaign has been chaotic, based on a 
strategy more suited to the days of PRI hegemony than to 
Mexico's current multiparty democracy.  The party's 
relationship with the mass media has been less than smooth, 
possibly because it continues to owe major media outlets 
considerable debts from past campaigns.  To compound 
problems, the PRI never fully adapted to its status as an 
opposition party; lacking an all-powerful arbitrator in Los 
Pinos, party discipline has broken down, and routine disputes 
quickly devolve into feuds and even defections.  In the face 
of these fault lines, unless the PRI's electoral fortunes 
reverse before July 2, it is difficult to see how it can 
avoid a major post-election bloodletting, which may well 
determine its future.  End summary. 
 
A Flawed Candidate... 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Outside observers -- and an increasing number of PRI 
loyalists -- concur that the greatest disadvantage the party 
faces in this campaign is the candidate himself.  Polls 
consistently show that Roberto Madrazo has far higher 
negative ratings than either of his main rivals; the most 
recent Mitofsky poll revealed that 43% of Mexicans held an 
unfavorable impression of Madrazo, as opposed to 26% for PRD 
candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) and only 19% for 
PAN candidate Felipe Calderon.  As a national figure for over 
10 years, Madrazo's reputation for authoritarianism and 
treachery have proven difficult to shake, and indeed, his 
conduct during the campaign has only reinforced it. 
 
¶3.  (C) In fact, Madrazo seems congenitally incapable of 
projecting an image of principle and probity, missing every 
opportunity to take a principled stand.  For example, when 
former PRI presidential candidate and Mexico state Governor 
Arturo Montiel was battling allegations of having illicitly 
enriched himself while in office, Madrazo was quick to rush 
to his defense.  When the scandal broke over the alleged 
abuse of power by Puebla Governor Mario Marin, Madrazo again 
rushed to the defense of the alleged wrongdoer, focusing not 
on the Governor's role in the illegal detention (and 
threatened rape) of a journalist, but rather on the 
possibility that the recordings incriminating the Governor 
may have been illegally obtained.  Only when public outrage 
over the scandal persisted did he back away from his support. 
 More recently, when New Alliance presidential candidate 
Roberto Campa alleged that Madrazo had not paid federal taxes 
in recent years (ref C), Madrazo's first response was not to 
seek to disprove the allegation, but rather to accuse Campa 
of illegally releasing privileged information, reinforcing 
the impression that he had something to hide. 
 
...Running a Campaign in Disarray... 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Aside from Madrazo's weakness as a candidate, 
contacts tell us that his campaign is in deep disarray, 
reflecting a poor structure and the candidate's own 
managerial failings.  At the root of the problem may be that 
the campaign lacks a formal manager, with too many of the 
decisions falling to Madrazo himself.  According to party 
insider Simon Vargas, Madrazo's inability to say "no" to his 
subordinates and allies compounds the problem.  For example, 
Madrazo initially tasked his closest political operative, 
Chamber of Deputies leader Manlio Fabio Beltrones, with 
organizing a committee to produce campaign policy papers; 
party president Mariano Palacios later offered to set up a 
policy committee of his own, an offer which Madrazo accepted. 
 The PRI whip in the Chamber of Deputies, Emilio Chuayfett, 
later offered to set up yet a third policy committee, an 
offer which Madrazo again accepted.  To a large extent, these 
 
MEXICO 00002460  002 OF 003 
 
 
committees drew on many of the same experts, leading many to 
believe that their service on the committees was little more 
than a political exercise benefiting the committee head.  We 
also understand that key campaign staffers occupy redundant 
positions; there are, for example, several different 
spokespersons with indistinct lines of authority and a 
tendency to issue conflicting statements.  Although Madrazo 
has attempted on several occasions to restructure the 
campaign, the internal flaws appear to remain and the 
operational problems clearly persist. 
 
...While Pursuing a Dubious Strategy... 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Party contacts have shared with us their criticism of 
Madrazo's campaign strategy, which appears more suited to the 
old days of PRI hegemony than to Mexico's current multiparty 
democracy.  PRI insider Simon Vargas notes that a 
disproportionate number of Madrazo's campaign events have 
been small, private events targeting the elite; until 
recently, he has eschewed the mass gatherings favored by AMLO 
and, increasingly, Calderon.  Vargas concluded that Madrazo 
does not seem to understand that in Mexico's new, multiparty 
political system, presidents are no longer annointed. 
 
...at the Head of a Dysfunctional Party... 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) One of the most significant problems faced by the PRI 
is its inability to adapt to its status as an opposition 
party.  Having lost the presidency, it lacks a single 
authoritative figure to impose his or her will on, and 
mediate disputes between, rival factions and strongmen.  In 
the absence of such a supreme arbitrator, internal party 
rivalries have flourished, as faction leaders freely pursue 
their own agendas without regard for broader party interests. 
 PRI Deputies Angel Buendia and Jose Alberto Aquilar told 
poloff that without the check of an authoritative figure such 
as the President, PRI state governors have wrested 
considerable power from the party hierarchy.  Buendia notes 
that PRI governors -- whom he calls "little emperors" -- have 
felt free to challenge party leaders for the right to select 
legislative candidates from their states, a privilege 
formerly reserved to the party hierarchy.  Given the 
increased autonomy PRI governors now enjoy, Buendia asserts 
that many see a Madrazo victory as undesirable, fearing that 
a PRI President would seek to rein them in (ref B). 
 
...that Remains at Odds with the Press 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) To top off the PRI's troubles, the party appears to 
have had difficult relations with some national media 
outlets.  Arturo de las Fuentes, a protege of PRI President 
Mariano Palacios, complained to us that the national press 
accords Madrazo campaign events considerably less coverage 
than equivalent events held by the AMLO or Calderon 
campaigns, while taking pleasure in giving front page 
coverage to the first hint of scandal within the PRI.  De las 
Fuentes attributes this allegedly unfair treatment -- not 
necessarily convincingly -- to the large debts that the PRI 
still owes major media outlets from past campaigns.  It has 
had difficulty paying these debts due to the $100 million 
fine levied against it for campaign finance violations in 
¶2000.  De las Fuentes noted that while the party is 
attempting to pay down the debts, doing so leaves less cash 
on hand for the current campaign. 
 
¶8.  (C) Senate Vice President Carlos Chaurand concurred that 
the press is according Madrazo less favorable coverage, 
although he attributed it to a somewhat different monetary 
motive:  he noted that the Fox Administration spends vast 
sums of money on public service advertising and publicity for 
its programs and achievements.  He argued that Reforma and 
other major outlets accord Calderon more favorable treatment 
than Madrazo because they do not want to jeopardize their 
richest source of advertising revenue. 
 
Comment: Can the PRI Survive a Third Place Finish? 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶9.  (C) Madrazo's biggest problem may simply be that he 
reminds Mexicans of all that they disliked most about the PRI 
during the days of its hegemony.  Having diagnosed several of 
the PRI's most serious ailments, the question remains whether 
these ailments may prove terminal.  The present campaign has 
revealed the party in its current state to be an artificial 
construct, serving largely as a vehicle for the personal 
ambitions of its members, rather than to unite ideological 
fellow travelers.  As the party confronts the possibility of 
a third place finish, its internal fault lines appear ever 
 
MEXICO 00002460  003 OF 003 
 
 
more apparent.  These fault lines divide rival cliques; they 
also divide party reformers from party dinosaurs.  Unless the 
PRI's electoral fortunes quickly reverse, these internal 
conflicts are liable to intensify after the election.  The 
outcome of the resulting bloodletting may well determine 
whether the PRI can adapt and survive as a modern, centrist 
party or whether it will wither as a vestige of Mexico's 
authoritarian past. 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity 
 
GARZA