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DE RUEHMK #0907/01 1441123
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O 241123Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4784
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000907 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KMPI BA BILAT POL REFORM
SUBJECT: BAHRAINI POLITICAL SCENE PART II:  ROYAL FAMILY 
CONSERVATIVES TIGHTEN REINS ON POLITICS 
 
REF: A. MANAMA 0891 
     ¶B. MANAMA 0869 
     ¶C. MANAMA 0765 
 
Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) At a time when the Bahrain's King and ruling family 
should be congratulating themselves for having successfully 
maneuvered major opposition society Al Wifaq into deciding to 
end its boycott and participate in this year's parliamentary 
elections, recent developments suggest that at least some in 
the top echelons of the royal family are apprehensive about 
where this is heading and are looking for ways to protect 
royal family power.  Manifestations of apparent royal 
skittishness include efforts to curtail NDI and Bahrain 
Transparency Society activities (Ref A), and a series of 
trial balloons that could, if implemented, diminish Shia 
participation in the elections.  Sources say that two 
well-placed Al Khalifa brothers - Minister of State for 
Cabinet Affairs Shaikh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah and President 
of the Royal Court Shaikh Mohammed bin Attiyatallah - have 
been leading the effort to contain the electoral process. 
Sources also indicate that royal court elements have had a 
direct hand in a scathing press campaign launched by Arabic 
daily Al Watan against NDI, other NGOs, and even the U.S. 
Embassy.   The King himself appears to have remained above 
the fray, even publicly welcoming Al Wifaq's decision to 
participate in the elections, and not all in the royal 
family, or the government leadership more broadly, support 
the hardball approach we have seen lately.  But there can be 
no doubt that regional developments - Shia empowerment in 
Iraq, belligerent rhetoric and actions out of Iran, unhappy 
election experiences in Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, 
concerns about Shia advancements enunciated  publicly or 
privately by key allies like Jordan and Saudi Arabia - have 
frightened or emboldened those in Bahrain who want to protect 
traditional Sunni power and privileges.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) The May 12 departure of National Democratic Institute 
(NDI) program director Fawzi Guleid is but one manifestation 
of an apparent strategy by elements within the ruling Al 
Khalifa family and government to attempt to control the 
political scene and influence the results of the upcoming 
parliamentary and municipal elections.  According to 
well-placed sources, there are those who advocate continued 
reform and openness while others want to circle the wagons to 
protect their authority against moves by oppositionists to 
develop a power base within the elected lower house of 
parliament.  Part I of this two-part series looks at GOB 
harassment of civil society groups supporting political 
reform, and the press campaign against them (Ref A).  Part II 
explores dynamics within the royal family as it reacts to the 
political challenge posed by opposition participation in the 
elections. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Hardliners Act to Preserve Power 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Although King Hamad and the government have 
consistently called for full participation in the 2006 
parliamentary and municipal elections, the long-expected 
early May decisions by formerly boycotting political 
societies Al Wifaq (Shia opposition) and Al Waad (secular 
socialist) to participate (Refs B, C) has prompted elements 
in the royal family and government to act to protect their 
power from the challenge posed by oppositionists.  In 
reference to intra-family dynamics, MFA Assistant Under 
Secretary Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa (strictly 
 
SIPDIS 
protect throughout) told the Ambassador in an 
"off-the-record" conversation that there was a battle between 
two camps inside the regime, between hardliners seeking to 
clamp down and those advocating greater openness.  (Note:  He 
placed himself and Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid in the 
latter group.) 
 
¶4.  (C) Shaikh Abdul Aziz said that Minister of the Royal 
Court Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa was supposed to be 
the decision maker for the Palace on a range of political 
issues, including NDI's status in country.  He is strongly 
influenced, however, by two "reactionary" brothers -- 
President of the Royal Court Shaikh Mohammed bin Attiyatallah 
Al Khalifa and Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and 
President of the Central Informatics Organization Shaikh 
Ahmed bin Attiyatallah Al Khalifa.  These two brothers, who 
use their personal relationships with the King and their 
official positions to leverage their influence, want to 
"throttle" civil society and the opposition, in Shaikh Abdul 
Aziz's view.  Referring to the Ministry of Social 
Development's harassment of BTS, Shaikh Abdul Aziz said the 
two brothers had pressured ministers to take decisions with 
which the ministers did not personally agree. 
 
-------------------------- 
Wrath of the Reactionaries 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Shaikh Abdul Aziz said that he had personally 
experienced the wrath of the two brothers in early 2006.  In 
a press interview, he had made remarks in support of 
transitional justice, the term used locally to address the 
issue of the government assisting victims of torture at the 
hands of security forces during the 1990s.  He stated 
publicly that Bahrain should learn from the experience of 
other countries that had dealt with similar issues, and 
should conform to international standards.  He said Shaikhs 
Mohammed and Ahmed came down on him so hard that he had 
offered his resignation to the Foreign Minister.  He 
weathered the controversy but learned the lesson not to get 
involved in this matter or others related to domestic 
political affairs.  He said that when local NGOs organized a 
conference on transiTQFE4ct), who is a political 
advisor to President of the Royal Court Shaikh Mohammed bin 
Attiyatallah and acts as a liaison between the Court and his 
fellow Shia, confirmed to Pol/Econ Chief that Shaikh Mohammed 
and Shaikh Ahmed play an influential role within the regime. 
(Note:  Another brother, ShaikH8N'At Bahrain cannot get too 
far out in front of its GCC partners.  According to Al Aali, 
Saudi Arabia reacted negatively when the King appointed women, 
a Christian, and a Jew to the upper house Shura Council in 2000. 
The Saudi leadership opposes open elections in Bahrain for fear that 
the Shia would gain too much power.  In Al Aali's view, every 
GCC leader is worried that if one regime falls, they could 
all fall, commenting that the regimes "are weak at the core." 
 He also cited a specific concern of the Bahraini government. 
 Understanding a conflict is brewing with Iran, the 
government wants to be firmly in control of the domestic 
political environment.  Strong Shia opposition representation 
in parliament could result in "unpredictable reactions and 
consequences." 
 
--------------------------- 
King - PM Interests Aligned 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Shura Council member Faisal Fulad told Pol/Econ Chief 
that Royal Court Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa 
is "one of the most powerful figures in the country."  He 
confirmed the influence of the "bin Attiyatallah" brothers 
and commented that Prime Minister Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman 
Al Khalifa shares their policy views vis-a-vis the Shia.  A 
common analytical paradigm in Bahrain often pits the King and 
Crown Prince against the PM on issues related to political 
and economic reform.  On the immediate issue of Shia+ 
----------------------- 
Living "Among Monsters" 
----------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) In a late April meeting covering several subjects, 
the Ambassador asked Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs 
Shaikh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah about his views of the upcoming 
elections.  In stark contrast with the first half of the 
meeting, Shaikh Ahmed became defensive.  He said there is 
talk that the government is trying to keep the opposition out 
of parliament, but there is no truth to this.  "They only 
want to say that the government is bad and is working against 
the interests of the people," Shaikh Ahmed stated.  He 
claimed there are 17 "Iran-friendly" satellite television 
channels broadcasting into Bahrain that "lead" the views of 
the Shia opposition.  He argued that Bahrain is at the center 
of a dangerous triangle encompassing Iran, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia.  Other countries in the region including Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, 1P`Q0ain's leadership.  "We are a small country," he 
said, "and it is hard to live among monsters." 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Proposals Could Diminish Shia Representation 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) In the view of many observers, in particular those 
in the opposition, the government is proposing or floating 
amendments to the election laws that could result in 
diminishing Shia participation in the elections and 
representation in the lower house Council of Representatives 
(COR).  Some of these actions include: 
 
- (a) Denying the vote for a period of ten years to people 
who had been sentenced for a crime punishable by at least six 
months in jail, even if a special pardon had been issued. 
This would directly impact former Shia exiles who received a 
royal pardon upon their return to the country in the late 
1990s and early 2000s; 
 
- (b) Unifying the 40 constituencies for the COR with the 50 
constituencies for the municipal councils.  When this idea 
was first floated in early April, oppositionists immediately 
interpreted it to mean that the lightly populated (Sunni) 
Southern Governorate would gain additional seats in the COR 
at the expense of the more densely populated (and Shia 
dominated) Northern and Capital Governorates, thus skewing 
the Council's balance further in favor of the minority Sunni. 
 Although this negative interpretation may not be valid, the 
trial balloon was widely interpreted in this way; 
 
- (c) The government withholding announcement of the dates 
for the parliamentary and municipal elections.  Accepted 
wisdom has it that municipal elections should take place 
between July and September, and parliamentary elections 
between September and December.  The government has not yet 
made an announcement.  Further complicating the issue, there 
is talk the two elections could be held at the same time; 
 
- (d) Amending the municipality election law to allow the 
Prime Minister (who is responsible for implementing the 
municipal elections) to postpone eections for up to six 
months, thus bringing the law into line with the 
parliamentary election law, which already allows the King to 
delay elections for up to six months; 
 
- (e) The Central Informatics Organization, which falls under 
MinState Shaikh Ahmed bin Attiyatallah, withholding any 
census or demographic data from parliamentary or municipal 
council candidates, despite their repeated requests.  This 
type of solid information drives the development of voter 
communications and policy platforms addressing the concerns 
of constituents; 
 
- (f) Authorizing e-voting over the Internet.  Central 
Informatics Organization Director for Elections Shaikha 
Muneera bint Abdullah Al Khalifa publicly confirmed May 20 
that Bahrain would employ e-voting, including over the 
Internet, in the next elections.  Al Waad President Ibrahim 
Sharif found it "strange" that Shaikha Muneera would announce 
the plan to use an e-voting system without engaging with the 
groups that had expressed concern.  MP Fareed Ghazi said 
publicly that "e-voting could allow mistakes to occur.  Even 
if we rule out tampering, we cannot rule out mistakes when 
using this mechanism." 
 
----------------------- 
Off-Balance Politicians 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) While none of the preceding issues presents a 
fundamental challenge to the integrity of the electoral 
system, their net effect to date is to keep politicians 
off-balance.  Some of the proposals (a, b) seem to directly 
target Shias while others (c, d, e) hurt candidates who are 
new to politics and are unfamiliar with their districts or 
have never run a campaign before, including the former 
boycotters.  By changing the rules, withholding information, 
and delaying an announcement on the timing of the elections, 
the government will be in a position to exert more control 
over the elections process.  Al Waad President Sharif 
commented publicly May 21 on possible attempts to influence 
election results.  He said, "It seems that the situation will 
not calm down until the government has guaranteed the outcome 
of the next elections."  Although he was referring 
specifically to a canceled NDI program for Bahraini political 
leaders to be held in Morocco, the sentiment reflects the 
broader suspicions of oppositionists. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Columnists Criticize GOB Actions 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Arabic daily Al Wasat Editor-in-Chief Mansour Al 
Jamri  Qb$Qiof the State Security Law while the second is a 
hopeful world that values freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, 
NGOs, freedom of thinking, criticism of official parties, and a 
spirit of human dignity and sustainable development.  On May 15, he 
hoped that what has happened recently in Bahrain did not mark 
a retreat in the progress of the King's reform plans.  He 
said the King can bring hope back to the hearts of Bahrainis 
by "pushing away the ruthless people who want to strangle the 
citizens."  On May 14, in reference to the government forcing 
out NDI Director Guleid, he said, "the methods of the past 
are so painful.  The majority of Bahrainis who have recovered 
from their pains and support the King and his reforms hope 
that the ways of the past do not return to Bahrain." 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Al Watan columnist Sawsan Al Shaer, demonstrating 
her independence from the paper's usual hardline Sunni 
editorial stance, wrote on May 14 that those who are calling 
for election monitoring are concerned about the best 
interests of the country and are not interested in carrying 
out some kind of coup.  She says, "My advice to those who are 
close to decision-makers is to take it easy on themselves. 
The stability of the regime is not in imminent danger.  We 
should not exaggerate our concerns and in return show the 
regime as fragile and confused, and make it appear as if the 
government is about to take illegitimate actions during the 
elections." 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14.  (C) Conservatives in key positions in the royal family 
and government are playing political hardball to confront the 
challenge posed by oppositionists.  Not content to allow the 
elections to play out naturally, they are trying to place 
obstacles in the way of the opposition while circling the 
wagons to protect traditional Sunni power and privileges. 
Having viewed the results of elections in Iraq, Egypt, and 
the Palestinian Authority, and heard the public or private 
warnings from key allies like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the 
regime is skittish and likely wants to avoid an outcome that 
would place its interests at odds with newly empowered 
oppositionists, who could comprise the largest bloc in the 
elected lower house Council of Representatives.  The recent 
decision by the Kuwaiti Amir to dissolve parliament and call 
for new elections serves as a close-to-home reminder of the 
potential power of opposition forces in an elected chamber. 
The government may also believe that the West's attempts to 
build a coalition (to include the GCC countries) to confront 
Iran may result in some tolerance if Bahrain slow rolls its 
democratic reform as the elections approach. 
 
MONROE