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INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000758 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PGOV ASEC BA REGION BILAT
OFFICIALS 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND COMMANDER 
GENERAL ABIZAID'S MAY 8 VISIT TO BAHRAIN 
 
REF: A. MANAMA 0727 
     ¶B. MANAMA 0595 
     ¶C. STATE 57548 
     ¶D. MANAMA 0442 
     ¶E. STATE 47881 
     ¶F. STATE 45386 
 
Classified by Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) General Abizaid, we warmly welcome your May 8 visit 
to Bahrain.  Your Bahraini interlocutors are most concerned 
about heightened tensions with Iran and will want to hear 
your views on U.S. plans to deal with Iran.  The Bahraini 
government is deeply suspicious of Iran's nuclear program and 
its assertiveness in dealing with the Arab Gulf States but 
remains engaged with the Iranian leadership.  Bahrain is 
closely watching political and security developments in Iraq, 
and you can use your meetings to urge greater Bahraini 
engagement with Iraq, particularly after the formation of a 
government.  The domestic political environment is becoming 
more highly charged as parliamentary and municipal elections 
draw nearer.  The security situation is somewhat unsettled 
following a rash of confrontations between masked youth and 
security forces in March, the April 26 detonation of an 
explosive device in an upscale commercial district, and 
Molotov cocktail attacks April 29 on a police vehicle and 
other property.  There is no indication that American or 
Western interests are being targeted. 
 
----------------- 
Dealing With Iran 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The Bahrain leadership is greatly concerned about the 
increased tensions between the international community and 
Iran.  Crown Prince Salman and Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid 
bin Ahmed Al Khalifa visited Washington in mid-March and 
discussed Iran with Secretary Rice, Secretary Rumsfeld, and 
National Security Advisor Hadley.  State Department Counselor 
Zelikow and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security Joseph visited Bahrain and raised the 
concept of a U.S.-GCC strategic dialogue addressing regional 
threats, especially Iran.  Bahrain is interested but cautions 
that all GCC countries would have to agree (read Saudi 
Arabia) before launching the dialogue (Refs B-F).  In his 
meetings in Washington, the Crown Prince requested 
consideration of a formal U.S. or NATO security umbrella for 
Bahrain in the event of a nuclear threat.  During his meeting 
with Secretary Rumsfeld, the CP inquired about obtaining 
Patriot missiles. 
 
¶3.  (C) Bahrain's relationship with Iran is complex.  The 
Bahraini leadership is united in its suspicion of Iranian 
intentions regarding Bahrain and often see an Iranian hand in 
incidents involving Bahrain's Shia community, which comprises 
some 70 percent of the country's citizens.  They are 
convinced Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons and assert 
its influence around the region.  At the same time, Bahrain 
faces the reality that it must live with its large neighbor 
across the Gulf.  The Iranians, angered when Foreign Minister 
Shaikh Khalid accused elements from Iran of "playing with 
fire" in the Gulf, have been actively pursuing engagement 
with Bahrain, including a recent Ahmadi-Nejad phone call to 
the King and a visit by NSC Secretary General Larijani. 
Trade relations are reportedly growing.  It is not clear that 
the Bahraini leadership has come to grips with how it will 
handle efforts to ratchet up the pressure on Iran if that 
includes, for example, calls for cutbacks in trade and 
engagement. 
 
------------------ 
Next Steps on Iraq 
------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) The GOB has issued public statements in support of 
each step in Iraq's political development.  It has remained 
quiet, however, during the period of uncertainty as Iraqi 
politicians have tried to form a government.  You could brief 
your interlocutors on the state of play in Iraq and urge them 
to issue supportive public statements following the formation 
of a government. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Bahraini leadership is concerned about the 
spillover of sectarian tensions in Iraq to Bahrain.  Tens of 
thousands of Bahrainis, Sunni and Shia, marched peacefully to 
protest the Samarra mosque bombing in February, and there has 
been no spike in inter-communal friction.  However, some in 
the Sunni community worry about Shia political empowerment in 
 
MANAMA 00000758  002 OF 002 
 
 
the run-up to parliamentary and municipal council elections 
later this year.  The government has yet to set a date for 
the elections (anticipated this fall), and some rumored 
amendments to the election law may be designed to inhibit 
Shia participation in the elections.  Leading Shia opposition 
society Al Wifaq has not yet announced if it will field 
candidates in the parliamentary elections, but the group 
appears to be leaning in favor of participation. 
 
-------------------------- 
Domestic Politics Heats Up 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) During the month of March, there were repeated 
clashes between small groups of Shia men and security forces. 
 The incidents typically began with young masked men burning 
tires or trash dumpsters on the edge of a village, and 
throwing Molotov cocktails at police vehicles when security 
forces responded.  Police routinely employed tear gas to 
disperse protesters.  Villagers caught in the middle demanded 
that the youth stop provoking the police as small children, 
the sick and elderly were harmed by the gas.  Following 
public statements by Shia leaders calling on the instigators 
to stop, the incidents subsided.  The clashes were likely 
organized by the breakaway hardline Shia Haq Movement, which 
is in competition with Al Wifaq for the support of the Shia 
community.  In this case, it appears that Haq overreached and 
provoked a backlash that could damage its longer term support. 
 
¶7.  (C) In a recent development, an explosive device that 
newspapers referred to as a "stun grenade" or "sound bomb" 
exploded the evening of April 26 in the upscale commercial 
district of Adliya.  There was no damage or injuries, but 
word of the incident hit the international news, including 
CNN.  A police patrol vehicle carrying two officers was hit 
by Molotov cocktails on April 29, and seven other vehicles 
were burned the same night.  The Embassy and NCIS are in 
close contact with the Ministry of Interior about these 
incidents.  The confrontations appear to be a further 
extension of Shia extremists' activities against the 
government.  There is no indication that American or Western 
interests are being targeted. 
 
MONROE