VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #1924/01 1371606
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171606Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0507
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 3383
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 6742
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 2389
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 9444
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAY 3340
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 0336
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 0517
RUEAHLC/DHS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001924 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA SHAPIRO 
ALSO FOR WHA/AND, WHA/EPSC, EB/ESC, INL/LP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2016 
TAGS: SNAR PREL KSAF TRGY ENRG TSPL ASEC KNNP VE PE
SUBJECT: PERUVIANS CONCLUDE INVESTIGATION OF COBALT-60 
REMOVAL 
 
REF: A. CARACAS 1297 
     ¶B. LIMA 1809 
     ¶C. CARACAS 1234 
     ¶D. CARACAS 1233 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Phyllis Powers; Reason 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: After exhaustive interviews, investigators 
from GOP nuclear regulator IPEN believe that a poorly trained 
Caddin employee removed the Co-60 source in Lima without 
realizing it.  IPEN, Caddin and Rapiscan officials discounted 
the possibility that the Co-60 removal was a malicious act. 
IPEN faults poor design, labeling, training and Caddin 
conduct; Rapiscan faults Caddin conduct.  IPEN does not 
believe there are any significant health effects to the less 
than 10 people exposed in Peru.  IPEN and the Foreign 
Ministry indicated that the GOP does not plan to ask for IAEA 
assistance but would answer any questions the IAEA 
investigators might have.  IPEN has completed a preliminary 
report; the final version should be completed in 10 days. 
NAS continues to evaluate future contracting with Rapiscan; 
if NAS continues to work with Rapiscan, x-ray rather than 
gamma ray technology will likely be used.  End Summary. 
 
CAPSULE REMOVAL A MISTAKE 
------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) During the evening of May 12, DepEconCouns met for 
several hours with GOP nuclear regulatory agency IPEN 
director and investigators.  IPEN blamed the improper 
Cobalt-60 (Co-60) removal on a combination of several 
factors: poor system design, poor labeling, inadequate 
training by Rapiscan, faulty supervision by Caddin and 
failure to follow standard monitoring procedures.  IPEN and 
Rapiscan had spent many hours interviewing the involved 
employees from Caddin, Rapiscan's Peru representative.  IPEN 
is convinced that Caddin engineer Ricardo Depuy's removal of 
the Co-60 source was inadvertent.  Depuy thought he was 
removing only the electric motor cylinder, leaving the Co-60 
source safely inside the lead canister.  Depuy, although 
certified by Rapiscan and IPEN to operate Rapiscan's GaRDS 
detection system, was not the primary operator for Caddin. 
The primary engineer/operator did not participate since his 
wife was pregnant when in December 2005 the GaRDS unit was 
disassembled for shipping to Venezuela; he was afraid that 
exposure to even low levels of radiation might cause his wife 
to abort the baby. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Depuy told investigators that he had watched the 
disassembly for shipping of the electric motor cylinder by a 
Rapiscan employee in approximately March of 2005.  The 
Rapiscan employee had disconnected the motor cylinder from 
the lead canister that housed the source; but he did it 
correctly, leaving the source within the canister.  (Note: 
This procedure was followed because the motor needed repair; 
normally the motor cylinder would stay attached to the lead 
canister for shipping of the source.  End Note.)  When Depuy 
was tasked to prepare the GaRDS system for shipping, he 
reportedly recalled his March 2005 viewing of the motor 
disassembly and thought that this was a required step for 
shipping the GaRDS separately from the Co-60 source.  Depuy 
withdrew the motor cylinder with attached rod, leaving the 
Co-60 source exposed.  He did not realize that he had failed 
to leave the rod and source inside the lead canister.  Depuy 
placed the motor cylinder (with exposed source) in a box, 
then inside the truck, as he believed the small part was best 
kept with the vehicle.  He then thought the canister, with 
the source inside (he believed) was ready to be shipped 
separately.  At some point (unclear when), Depuy used the 
Victoreen monitor to meter only the lead canister, and found 
nothing extraordinary. 
 
¶4. (C) IPEN officials said that a combination of factors led 
to Depuy's grossly incorrect action.  Rapiscan's design was 
faulty in that it was too easy for a technician to remove the 
cylinder with source exposed.  In IPEN's opinion, the motor 
cylinder should have been labeled to warn that only trained 
technicians should attempt to disassemble it.  It should also 
have warned that exposure of the source is possible if the 
 
unit was disassembled.  Rapiscan (according to IPEN) did not 
adequately train Caddin employees in preparation of the 
system for shipping; they were trained only to operate the 
system, plus some minor maintenance.  Nevertheless, Depuy 
should have realized that there was no good reason to spend 
the several hours dismantling the motor cylinder/lead 
canister assembly.  IPEN officials said that the Rapiscan 
instruction manual was deficient in its explanation for how 
to prepare the system for shipping.  Finally, Depuy and other 
Caddin employees clearly should have metered for radiation 
the vehicle, canister, and motor cylinder when it was 
separated from the canister -- before and after the 
dismantling-for-shipping procedures.  Standard Victoreen 
monitoring procedures, had they been followed, would have 
shown immediately that the source was unshielded. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Rapiscan engineer Ted Alston told DepEconCouns on 
May 12 that Depuy's actions continued to mystify him in its 
inappropriateness.  But after talking with Depuy, Alston did 
not think Depuy had acted maliciousy.  Alston questioned how 
much Depuy had been involved in GaRDS operations after 
Depuy's initial Rapiscan training.  The GaRDS system is 
designed for easy shipping: when 8 bolts are removed, the box 
housing the canister and motor is removed and the entire box 
is shipped separately from the vehicle.  On two prior 
occaisons, the system had been disassembled for shipment 
(once the vehicle and once the motor/source housing) to the 
U.S. for repair or service.  (Note: we see some discrepancies 
between the Caddin and Rapiscan stories regarding timing when 
the motor cylinder was shipped back for repair. End Note.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Alston explained that the system was designed to 
make it very difficult for the source to be pulled out 
accidentally; nevertheless, the fact that Depuy did it might 
require that Rapiscan reconsider the design of this part of 
the system to make it even more difficult to accidentally 
expose the source.  Alston noted that it was inconceivable to 
him that Depuy would not have used the Victoreen to monitor 
the before and after stages of his disassembly, to protect 
himself if nothing else.  Victoreen metering of the lead 
canister with the source inside would have shown a higher 
reading than the surroundings, so Depuy could have been 
alerted by a too-low reading on the canister as well as a 
too-high reading of the vehicle -- had Depuy bothered to use 
the Victoreen. 
 
IPEN REPORT DUE IN TEN DAYS 
--------------------------- 
¶7. (U) DepEconCouns had a brief opportunity to review the 
preliminary report that IPEN officials had completed on May 
12, but IPEN was unwilling to release it as updates were 
necessary to reflect final interviews with Caddin and 
Rapiscan officials.  IPEN also asked Rapiscan for additional 
technical data on the system, which will be incorporated into 
the final report.  IPEN officials said that they would give 
DepEconCouns the final report when completed, probably during 
the week of May 22. 
 
HEALTH EFFECTS MINIMAL - NO NEED FOR IAEA 
----------------------------------------- 
¶8. (U) IPEN officials do not believe that anyone in Peru was 
significantly exposed to radiation, based on interviews with 
the Caddin actors and blood test results for all Caddin 
employees, showing no extraordinary radiation-related values. 
 Depuy's exposure was probably around an hour, with only 
around 5 to 10 minutes of being near the source as he exposed 
it, placed it in a box and put the box in the control module 
of the truck.  Caddin President/owner Alfonso Paredes was 
exposed for the longest time: 1.5 to 2 hours spent driving 
the vehicle from Chorillos to the Callao port (the truck 
walls provided some minimal shielding).  An estimated five 
people in Peru were exposed.  IPEN investigators have not yet 
established the identities of longshoremen involved in 
loading the vehicle, but they consider the exposure of those 
people to have been less than Depuy or Paredes.  IPEN has no 
way to find out which ship crew members might have been 
exposed. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Based on its investigation and assessment, IPEN: 
(1) understands how the incident happened, and (2) concludes 
that there were no significant radiation exposures, IPEN has 
no intention to ask the IAEA for assistance.  However, IPEN 
Director for Standards and Authorizations Carlos Ampuero said 
that IPEN would answer any questions that IAEA investigators 
might have.  IPEN requested that any radiation meterings 
taken in Venezuela be forwarded to IPEN, so that IPEN could 
have an authoritative basis for calculating Lima exposures. 
 
FOREIGN MINISTRY MEETING 
------------------------ 
¶10. (C) On May 12, DepEconCouns met with MFA North America 
Director Nestor Popolizio and assorted consular and Americas 
office officials.  Popolizio confirmed that at this time 
there were no plans to ask IAEA for assistance.  The GOP had 
received no communications from the Government of Venezuela 
concerning the radiation events.  Popolizio asked that we 
work together on managing the incident, and asked if we would 
share any press statements with him as soon as produced so 
that the GOP could be prepared.  Popolizio asked for 
confirmation that no Peruvians were exposed in Venezuela or 
on the transport ship. 
 
NAS CONTRACT UPDATE 
------------------- 
¶11. (C) NAS is still evaluating its options with Rapiscan, 
regarding lease of two maritime container scanners.  Rapiscan 
has offered to supply an x-ray system that should have 
adequate penetration for NAS purposes.  Since the x-ray 
source can be switched off, unlike gamma radiation, there 
will be much less chance for accidental exposure.  IPEN told 
DepEconCouns that at this time the agency does not intend to 
withdraw Caddin certifications for operating the GaRDS.  On 
the other hand according to Alston, Rapiscan would seek 
another Peruvian representative for its systems. 
STRUBLE