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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 001456 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL EFIN BL
SUBJECT: TUTO QUIROGA ON CHAVEZ DOMINO EFFECT 
 
Classified By: Amb. David N. Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Former President and opposition leader Jorge 
"Tuto" Quiroga told the Ambassador on May 30 that the USG 
should help "stop Chavez" in Peru, or risk the domino effect 
in Ecuador and elsewhere.  Quiroga talked at length about 
Chavez's visions of a Bolivarian state, and said that after 
Peru, Chavez will focus on the upcoming electoral contests in 
Mexico and Nicaragua.  Quiroga had firm ideas about how the 
international community and the United States should respond 
to the Morales government, suggesting that World Bank and IDB 
debt relief for Bolivia be blocked, and that the U.S. take 
ATPDEA and MCC off the table.  Quiroga remains hopeful about 
his party's chances for the Constituent Assembly, and thinks 
Podemos has a realistic chances of winning one-third of the 
255 seats.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Former President and opposition leader Jorge "Tuto" 
Quiroga told the Ambassador on May 30 that the USG should 
help "stop" Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in Peru, or risk 
the domino effect in Ecuador and elsewhere.  Quiroga said if 
former Peruvian President Alan Garcia wins on June 4, Chavez 
will mobilize the opposition (via presidential candidate 
Ollanta Humula) at some point to riot and force Garcia to 
respond.  When Garcia uses force to restore order, and the 
inevitable casualties result, Quiroga says that Garcia will 
"go down like (former Bolivian President) Gonzalo "Goni" 
Sanchez de Lozada."  After Peru, Quiroga predicts a showdown 
between the United States and Venezuela in Ecuador.  Quiroga 
says that because Ecuador has many people who oppose free 
trade and hosts a significant indigenous population, it is 
"ripe" for Chavez's influence. 
 
¶3. (C) Quiroga talked at length about Chavez's visions of a 
Bolivarian state, and said that after Peru, Chavez will focus 
on the upcoming electoral contests in Mexico and Nicaragua. 
He said we should make no mistake -- Chavez, who Quiroga 
called "delusional," thinks he is the new Simon Bolivar and 
wants to take over Latin America.  Quiroga cited the many 
Chavez posters plastered across the Chapare for the MAS 
Constituent Assembly kickoff May 26, and that the Venezuelans 
were teaching their national anthem to the Bolivian crowd. 
Quiroga said that in addition to his grip on Bolivia, Chavez 
holds Argentina, Brazil and Chile "hostage" by controlling 
the radical left in each of those countries, and effectively 
uses such control to minimize the actions those governments 
are willing to take against him publicly.  Quiroga asserted 
that even Lula's closest advisors are Chavistas (including 
Jose Dirceu and Mario 
Aurelio Garcia), and that those under indictment in Brazil 
are more loyal to Chavez than Lula, as Chavez has promised 
them asylum in Venezuela if necessary.  Quiroga characterized 
Chavez's power as "black" (referring to oil/energy) and 
"white" (referring to cocaine, given that Venezuela has 
become one of Latin America's biggest transshipment points 
for the drug trade). 
 
¶4. (C) Quiroga, a technocrat with a clear understanding of 
international finance, had firm ideas about how the 
international community should respond to the Morales 
government.  His primary concern is that Morales can 
nationalize hydrocarbons, undermine democratic institutions 
and increase coca growth without consequences, particularly 
from the IDB and World Bank.  Quiroga said if Bolivia 
receives significant debt relief from the IDB and World Bank, 
"we can turn the light off in Bolivia and give the keys to 
Chavez."  Quiroga said that Brazil and Mexico oppose IDB debt 
relief for Bolivia and that based on his recent consultations 
in Washington, the IDB package might be on hold.  He urged 
the USG to coordinate with Brazil, Mexico and Europe to block 
further debt relief for Bolivia. 
 
¶5. (C)  Regarding the bilateral relationship, Quiroga 
advocated that the United States refuse to extend ATPDEA and 
 
LA PAZ 00001456  002 OF 002 
 
 
reject Bolivia's MCC proposal, but continue to offer a free 
trade agreement.   Quiroga said an FTA is the one thing that 
"Chavez would never allow Bolivia to sign."  In response to 
the Ambassador's question as to whether a decline in U.S. 
presence would create more space for Chavez in Bolivia, 
Quiroga said that "Chavez has already taken the territory" 
and will continue to expand his influence "no matter what the 
U.S. does."   Quiroga believes that within two years, Bolivia 
will be in economic dire straits and that Morales' political 
project will unravel.  In the meantime, he thinks the United 
States should work with the prefects and municipal 
governments, and possibly build up Vice-President Alvaro 
Garcia Linera, who he says is not a Chavista. 
 
¶6. (C)  Quiroga remains hopeful about his party's chances for 
the Constituent Assembly, and thinks Podemos has a realistic 
chances of winning 86 of the 255 seats.  Quiroga says that 
twelve candidates on the MAS lists are actually sympathetic 
to Podemos, undermining the MAS's chances of controlling the 
Assembly.  He lamented voter apathy for the Assembly 
election, stating that even the MAS has "gotten lazy" now 
that it is in government. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: While Quiroga can sound alarmist about 
Bolivia's political future, his insights regarding Chavez's 
regional plans merit attention.  Quiroga's strong public 
comments following Chavez's May 26-27 visit that decried the 
Venezuelan leader's interference in domestic Bolivian 
politics indicate that Quiroga may be re-engaging as an 
opposition leader.  Allaying doubts expressed by many that 
Quiroga might leave the country, he told us the MAS would 
have to "detain him or kill him" to silence his dissenting 
voice.  End comment. 
GREENLEE