This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

201518Z May 06

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 000690 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/W 
STATE FOR INR/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NI THIRDTERM
SUBJECT: THIRD TERM DEFEAT TRIGGERS EUPHORIA AMONG SOUTHERN 
POLITICOS 
 
REF: ABUJA 1149 
 
Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for Reason 1.4 (D). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The demise of the third term amendment has most 
southern politicians happier than they have been in months. 
Many believe the President will not easily accept defeat and 
will search for another device to extend his presidency. 
Cynics believe he will foment or encourage unrest, 
particularly in the Niger Delta, in order to create a state 
of emergency where elections are impossible and thus tenure 
extension is warranted.  His staunch critics warn the only 
way to ensure Obasanjo behaves responsibly is to keep him on 
the defensive -- by starting impeachment proceedings against 
him for attempting to bribe his way into a third term.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
ELEVENTH HOUR MANEUVERS FAIL TO KEEP TERM EXTENSION ALIVE 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶2.  (C) Most southern politicians and many prominent 
businesspeople were ebullient when the National Assembly 
shelved the proposed third term constitutional amendment. 
However, most politicians tempered their euphoria with the 
sober recognition that this issue, for now dead, could be 
resurrected. 
 
¶3.  (C) Lagos State sources report President Obasanjo was 
actively canvassing for help as late as Sunday.  Showing a 
sense of desperation, he even stooped to soliciting aid from 
an unlikely source, his Yoruba political arch-enemy Lagos 
Governor Tinubu.  On Sunday, Obasanjo summoned Tinubu to a 
one-on-one.  The usually rough-edged President was at his 
friendliest in attempting to coax Tinubu his way.  Obasanjo 
appealed to Tinubu to exercise ethnic solidarity and pressed 
the Lagos executive to back a "compromise" wherein Obasanjo's 
and the state governors' current terms would be extended by 
two years, thereby obviating elections in 2007.  Tinubu 
refused to bite the Obasanjo lure, according to a Tinubu 
aide.  Tinubu saw Obasanjo's request for a two-year extension 
as an attempt to sneak in through the back door what was 
denied through the front.  A two-year extension would simply 
move the third term debate from 2006 to 2008, Tinubu felt. 
 
¶4.  (C) Noted economist and Lagos Business School Dean Pat 
Utomi recounted a conversation with Nasir El-Rufai, Minister 
of the Federal Capital Territory, who said members of the 
Presidents economic team warned the President not to let the 
third term amendment go to a decisive vote in the Assembly. 
However, Obasanjo's political hacks prevailed.  El-Rufai 
feared the defeat would now make the President the lamest of 
ducks, and may make it difficult to govern for the remaining 
period of this term, particularly should officials start to 
abandon the President in droves. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
THE PRESIDENT IS DOWN, BUT NONE SAY HE IS OUT...YET 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5.  (C) While El-Rufai feared the President might suffer a 
mortal political wound, many southern politicians still felt 
Obasanjo had enough political ammunition and personal 
gumption to revisit tenure extension, either by reviving 
debate in the National Assembly, perhaps after engineering 
the removal of some key members who opposed this initial 
attempt, or perhaps by simply waiting for violence in the 
Delta to erupt, providing justification for a state of 
emergency which would "compel" him to stay in office and 
postpone elections.  For the time being, most observers 
thought he would act conciliatory, in order to break the 
unity his political opponents forged against the third term 
campaign.  These observers think Obasanjo's talk of 
reconciliation is not heartfelt but just a tactical retreat 
to keep the heat off him and give him time to seek another 
opening to press his objective. 
 
¶6.  (C) Differing opinions emerged regarding how to encourage 
the President to shelve any future moves to extend his 
tenure.  Some have discussed engineering a graceful exit by 
offering him a special position for African peacekeeping 
under the joint auspices of the UN and AU, or perhaps a 
professorial chair at a university (reftel).  Others favor a 
more aggressive approach to contain Obasanjo, such as a 
motion of impeachment or various offenses, including the 
bribery and coercion of assemblymen during the third term 
debate.  (The impeachment option was raised by an attorney 
who is a close associate of Usman Bugaji, Vice President 
Atiku's most trusted ally in the National Assembly.) 
 
¶7.  (C) Even if he does not succeed in extending his stay in 
office, Obasanjo would still have control of the PDP. 
Observers believed the President would use his position in 
the party to actively block Atiku from the nomination. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The reactions communicated to us following the third 
term defeat indicate that most southerners, even in 
Obasanjo's Yoruba homeland, opposed the third term and the 
political temperature has eased somewhat.  There were actual 
reports of small public celebrations in some southern cities. 
 Ironically, Obasanjo's third term setback makes the future 
more uncertain than if the obverse had occurred.    The 
jockeying for position has already intensified, not only at 
the Presidential level but for state governorships as well. 
While everyone is now looking to their political future, the 
most prudent, astute practitioners will also keep an eye on 
Obasanjo.  End comment. 
BROWNE