VZCZCXRO2644
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHKU #1844/01 1421405
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221405Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4603
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001844 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KU FREEDOM AGENDA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
SUBJECT: FREEDOM AGENDA: PARLIAMENT DISSOLUTION PRESENTS 
BOTH OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
 
REF: KUWAIT 1833 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reason 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and Comment:  Elections for a new National 
Assembly will take place on June 29, almost certainly on the 
basis of the status quo 25 constituencies.  Reformers who 
rejected a compromise offer of 10 constituencies in order to 
hold out for their proposed 5 constituency model, will now 
attempt to make their case to a fractured electorate.  While 
some Western media commentators are already suggesting that 
the dissolution of the Kuwaiti Parliament is a setback for 
democratization, that analysis is not prevalent here and 
misses the larger picture of what is happening in Kuwait. 
Reformers are focused on the  opportunity presented by the 
dissolution of Parliament and are eager to use the upcoming 
election to advance their agenda.  (SEPTEL will report in 
more detail local reactions to the decision.) 
 
¶2. (C)  What the dissolution of Parliament means for our 
Freedom Agenda will only gradually become apparent as the 
electoral races heat up and as a newly elected Parliament 
establishes its relationship with the government.  We expect 
the next five weeks to be marked by a vibrant demonstration 
of the democratic process at work in Kuwait.  Given the 
immediacy of the elections, we do not see a significant 
opportunity for programming in support of the election 
process.  We may hear some requests for technical assistance 
from individual candidates.  In such a case, USG interests 
would be best-served by pointing candidates in the direction 
of sources of assistance, which they could contract for as 
they see fit.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
¶3.  (C) Amir Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah exercised his 
constitutional powers and dissolved Parliament on May 21 
after a standoff over electoral reform reached an impasse 
(ref A).  New parliamentary elections in which Kuwaiti women 
will participate for the first time since being granted full 
political rights in May 2005 are scheduled for June 29.  Most 
reports indicate that the elections will be conducted on the 
basis of the current 25-constituency electoral system.  While 
it is within his legal right, it is unlikely that the Amir 
will issue a decree reducing the number of constituencies 
prior to June 29 given the administrative and logistical 
challenges, though he may issue decrees on other, less 
controversial issues. 
 
¶4. (C) With women voting, the average number of voters per 
constituency will rise from 5,500 to more than 11,000, 
diminishing the potential for electoral corruption, such as 
vote-buying and vote-transferring, which has marred previous 
elections.  A member of the ruling family in the Amir and 
Prime Minister's inner circle told the Ambassador recently 
that one of the reasons for a dissolution of Parliament 
(which he had then expected would be inevitable by November) 
was to remind the political system that the Amir can and will 
employ this constitutional prerogative when he deems it 
necessary.  Most Kuwaitis were neither surprised or upset by 
the dissolution, viewing it as an almost inevitable outcome 
of the current divisions. 
 
¶5. (C) While we need to be cautious about our own instant 
analysis, the dissolution presents both opportunities and 
challenges to the Freedom Agenda.  This Parliament was marked 
by corruption, favoritism, and inaction on important 
legislation; its dissolution is not necessarily a bad thing. 
The ad hoc coalition of 29 liberal and conservative MPs 
supporting 5 constituencies versus the Government's 10 
effectively framed the debate as a battle between reform and 
corruption.  Seen by many as heroes, these MPs will likely 
make anti-corruption the main issue of their election 
campaigns.  If they are re-elected, it could be with a clear 
mandate for reform.  The public debate over electoral reform 
has also increased Kuwaitis' awareness of the problems of the 
current electoral system.  Coupled with the increased number 
of voters, these factors may make it more difficult for the 
Government to manipulate electoral outcomes. 
 
¶6. (C) Some reform organizations, like the Islamic 
Constitutional Movement (ICM), the political arm of the 
Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, and the minor Kuwait Society for 
Developing Democracy, may reiterate their previous calls for 
international election monitors to observe the elections. 
(Note: The use of election observers is a very sensitive 
issue for most Kuwaitis who equate observers with the 
fledgling democracies of developing countries and take 
umbrage at the suggestion that observers could add legitimacy 
to the Kuwaiti electoral process.  We recommend that U.S. 
officials not introduce the topic.  End note.)  The voting 
process itself is well-organized and respected in Kuwait. 
 
KUWAIT 00001844  002 OF 002 
 
 
Distortions are introduced through an unregulated campaign 
finance system and the ability to influence individual voters 
in the small districts. 
 
¶7.  (C) Some members of the ruling family and the Government 
will want a clear majority of pro-Government MPs in 
Parliament to ensure they can pass key legislation, such as 
the Kuwait Project (development of the northern oil fields), 
during the next four years.  If it chooses to, the Government 
can bring to bear significant resources to assist sympathetic 
candidates.  There is also a significant chance that Islamist 
representation in Parliament will increase.  Islamists are 
better organized and better funded than other political 
groups.  (Note: The Government does not officially recognize 
political parties.  End note.)  They are also likely to 
benefit most from the women's vote since a majority of women 
are expected to support Islamist candidates. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
LEBARON