VZCZCXRO8192
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHMOS RUEHPW
DE RUEHKU #1638/01 1291054
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091054Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4359
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KUWAIT 001638 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NSC FOR RAMCHAND, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS 
FOR ZEYA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2026 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM KISL KU ISLAMISTS
SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S 
POLITICAL WING: THE ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT, PART II 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 1057 - MFA UNDERSECRETARY DESCRIBES VISIT 
        OF HAMAS LEADER 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 995 - FREEDOM AGENDA: ISLAMISTS SHARE 
        VIEWS ON ELECTORAL REFORM IRAQ AND IRAN 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 661 - KUWAIT SHI'A AND SUNNI CONDEMN IRAQ 
        SHRINE BOMBING SOME BLAME U.S. 
     ¶D. KUWAIT 467 - AMIR APPROVES NEW CABINET: SHI'A 
        AND ICM GAIN 
     ¶E. 05 KUWAIT 4313 - FREEDOM AGENDA: MUSLIM 
        BROTHERHOOD SPOKESMAN SAYS ORGANIZATION 
        COMMITTED TO WORKING WITHIN POLITICAL 
        SYSTEM 
     ¶F. 05 KUWAIT 3266 - READING WRITING AND QUR'ANIC 
        RECITATION: THE ISLAMIST INFLUENCE IN 
        KUWAIT'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM PART II 
     ¶G. 05 KUWAIT 656 - ISLAMISTS IN KUWAIT: CONTOURS OF 
        A GROWING INFLUENTIAL FORCE 
     ¶H. 04 KUWAIT 1274 - NEW ICM LEADERS STRIVE FOR 
        MAINSTREAM 
     ¶I. 04 KUWAIT 495 - KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE OPENS UP TO 
        OFAC 
     ¶J. 03 KUWAIT 3536 - POLITICAL ISLAM WORKING GROUP: 
        KUWAIT SNAPSHOT 
     ¶K. 03 KUWAIT 3217 - DEFEATED ISLAMIST OFFERS VIEWS 
        ON KUWAITI POLITICS 
     ¶L. 91 KUWAIT 2068 - KUWAIT'S PRO-DEMOCRACY GROUPS: 
        SKETCH OF THE ICM 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
(C) This is Part II of a two-part message (see Kuwait 1637 
for Part I).  Part II covers the Islamic Constitutional 
Movement's (ICM) policy positions, funding, and publications. 
 It also outlines Kuwaiti liberals' views on the ICM and 
concludes by recommending limited engagement with the 
organization on shared political objectives.  Part I 
addressed the ICM's origins, influence, structure, and 
connection to the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood (KMB). 
 
Policy Positions: Politically Liberal... 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (C) The ICM is one of the most vocal advocates of 
political reform in Kuwait.  In particular, the organization 
has actively lobbied for a reduction in the number of 
electoral constituencies, official Government recognition of 
political parties, stronger anti-corruption measures, a 
reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18, police and 
military suffrage, and a rotation of power by allowing 
Parliament to choose the Prime Minister.  ICM leaders insist 
they are "firmly committed" to working within Kuwait's 
democratic system to achieve their political objectives, even 
if it means being voted out of office.  "We have to accept 
what the majority wants, even if it differs from our views," 
MP Nasser Al-Sane told Poloff, pointing to the KMB's "long 
history of political cooperation in Kuwait."  In an effort to 
increase transparency and limit corruption at the national 
level, ICM MPs Al-Sane and Mohammed Al-Basiri took the 
unprecedented step of providing their complete personal and 
family financial records to Parliament in January; no other 
MPs followed suit. 
 
¶20.  (C) ICM leaders strongly condemn terrorist violence, 
specifically in Iraq and Kuwait, though they are notably 
silent on Palestinian violence against Israel.  Secretary 
General Dr. Bader Al-Nashi told Poloff the ICM was working 
with leading Sunni clerics on a statement condemning 
terrorism.  (Note: In 2003, the UN listed Lajnat Al-Daawa 
Al-Islamiyya (LDI) - a Kuwait-based NGO affiliated with the 
Social Reform Society (SRS), the social wing of the KMB - as 
a terrorist-supporting organization and some 1.4 million KD 
(approximately $4.5 million) of the NGO's assets were frozen. 
 The ICM has vehemently denied any involvement, even remotely 
through any of its affiliate organizations, in terrorist 
financing activities.  End note.) 
 
¶21.  (C) The ICM supported the U.S.-led liberation of Iraq, 
but now has some concerns about Sunni exclusion from, and 
Iranian influence on, the nascent Iraqi government, according 
to Al-Nashi.  Despite their criticisms of specific U.S. 
policies, ICM leaders like Al-Dallal are quick to point out, 
"While we may disagree with the U.S. on certain issues that 
will not stop us from cooperating or entering into treaties 
with the USG." 
 
¶22.  (C) On Iran, Al-Nashi told Poloff the ICM supported a 
nuclear-free Middle East and opposed both Iran's and Israel's 
nuclear program.  Dr. Hamad Al-Matar, a Chemical Science 
 
KUWAIT 00001638  002 OF 005 
 
 
professor and an ICM member of the younger, more moderate 
persuasion, recently asked Poloff for information 
highlighting Iran's poor technological safeguards and 
inability to adequately protect its nuclear facilities to use 
during a televised interview on the potential environmental 
impact of Iran's nuclear program on Kuwait. 
 
¶23.  (C) The ICM is also very pragmatic in its relations with 
Kuwait's Shi'a community.  (Note: Approximately one third of 
Kuwaiti citizens are Shi'a.  End note.)  The ICM has 
coordinated positions on parliamentary issues with Shi'a 
political associations, and strongly condemned sectarian 
violence in Iraq, such as the bombing of the Shi'a shrine in 
Samarra (ref C).  According to Al-Dallal, the ICM is even 
developing a plan to incorporate non-KMB members into the 
ICM, starting with other Sunnis and gradually moving to also 
include Shi'a. 
 
¶24.  (C) The ICM's position on economic issues is less 
specific.  Its leaders say they support "reforming the 
economic system of the State," though they offer few 
particulars.  MPs Al-Basiri and Al-Sane voted for legislation 
permitting foreigners to own and trade Kuwaiti stocks, a 
draft law to protect intellectual property rights, and a 
direct foreign investment law.  Al-Sane also voted for an 
anti-money laundering law; Al-Basiri was absent.  In December 
2005, Al-Nashi said the ICM would oppose Project Kuwait, an 
estimated $8.5 billion plan to develop Kuwait's northern oil 
fields, in its current form, without explaining what changes 
the ICM proposed. 
 
...But Socially Conservative 
---------------------------- 
 
¶25.  (C) While forward-looking on most political and economic 
issues, the ICM is decidedly more conservative on social 
issues.  As an organization, the ICM did not support granting 
women full political rights; both ICM MPs voted against the 
legislation, which Parliament approved in May 2005.  Most ICM 
leaders claim, however, they personally supported the 
legislation, but were overruled by the ICM's conservative 
base in a close internal vote on the issue. 
 
¶26.  (C) Despite its initial opposition, the ICM has now 
fully embraced women's suffrage and is now actively courting 
the women's vote.  The organization is still divided, 
however, on women holding political office and is unlikely to 
support any female candidates in the 2007 parliamentary 
elections.  In a recent interview, Al-Nashi claimed women's 
electoral participation would "assist the movement (ICM) in 
achieving positive results."  He concluded that "the ICM is 
very optimistic about women's participation in the next 
elections." 
 
Staunchly Pro-Palestinian 
------------------------- 
 
¶27.  (C) The ICM is staunchly pro-Palestinian and often 
criticizes U.S. support for Israel (see paras 33 to 35). 
According to one local press report, the organization 
supports an "anti-normalization law with Israel."  Hamas 
leader Khaled Al-Mishal was hosted by former ICM MP Mubarak 
Al-Duwaileh at his diwaniya during Al-Mishal's recent visit 
to Kuwait (ref A). 
 
Shari'a: A Contentious Issue 
---------------------------- 
 
¶28.  (C) One of the ICM's most important, and contentious, 
political objectives is the implementation of Islamic 
Shari'a, a goal its leaders claim is not contradictory to the 
organization's commitment to democracy and political 
pluralism.  Specifically, the ICM supports the amendment of 
Article 2 of the Kuwaiti Constitution, which states that "the 
religion of the State is Islam, and the Islamic Shari'a shall 
be a main source of legislation," to read "the source of 
legislation."  Al-Dallal explained this was necessary to 
institutionalize the GOK's commitment to implementing Islamic 
Shari'a by ensuring all legislation passed by Parliament, 
regardless of which group controlled it, would have to be 
approved by a Shari'a committee before implementation. 
Elaborating, Al-Dallal said certain issues like the 
prohibition of alcohol and homosexuality, and inheritance law 
favoring male heirs were non-negotiable under Shari'a, but 
others like strict punishments for stealing, adultery, and 
conversion were subject to interpretation and revision. 
 
¶29.  (C) Al-Nashi told Poloff that Shari'a was "a grouping of 
 
KUWAIT 00001638  003 OF 005 
 
 
laws whose interpretation can change over time."  He 
stressed, however, that the adoption and implementation of 
these laws should only be achieved through Parliament. 
According to Al-Dallal, the ICM is "in the process of 
reassessing (its) ideology and policies," including its 
support for amending Article 2.  Al-Nashi argued similarly in 
a recent interview that political participation would lead 
Islamist groups like the ICM to be more realistic and 
pragmatic. 
 
Funding: No Double Dipping 
-------------------------- 
 
¶30.  (S) ICM leaders claim the organization's routine 
political activities and publications are funded through 
monthly "ICM" dues.  Campaigns are funded by candidates, ICM 
donations, and sponsors who provide money for specific events 
like campaign dinners.  Al-Nashi explained that the 
organization does not have an official budget or produce an 
annual expense report since political parties are prohibited 
in Kuwait.  The ICM recently created an investment fund 
specifically earmarked to pay for its future political 
activities, Al-Dallal reported.  Al-Dallal reported 
unspecified charity organizations used to partially fund ICM 
activities, but that due to increased scrutiny and stricter 
auditing procedures, funds were no longer being raised this 
way.  Both Al-Nashi and Al-Dallal insisted the ICM did not 
receive or provide money from/to Muslim Brotherhood branches 
outside of Kuwait.  (Note: According to one local press 
report, the Egyptian government complained to the GOK that 
the KMB provided "at least $10 million" to the Egyptian MB 
during the recent elections.  We were unable to shed any 
light on this accusation.  End note.) 
 
What They Say to Everyone Else 
------------------------------ 
 
¶31.  (U) In addition to its website (www.icmkw.org), the ICM 
publishes a weekly newspaper entitled Al-Haraka.  Recent 
issues featured articles by local and regional authors, 
including women and at least one Shi'a, on a wide range of 
subjects, such as regional efforts to combat youth drug use, 
private sector job opportunities, educational reform, 
instilling Islamic values in young people, junior traders' 
influence on the Kuwait Stock Exchange, electoral reform, 
women's political participation, and Palestinian internal 
politics. 
 
¶32.  (U) In an article published in the April 10 edition of 
Al-Haraka, MP Al-Sane argued that rampant corruption in Arab 
countries was caused by the absence of democracy.  In another 
article in the same issue, a female board member of the 
Kuwait Teachers, Society, which is allegedly dominated by 
the KMB (ref F), praised the rising number of women writing 
in local dailies, but argued that this was "not sufficient as 
we are still in dire need for committed women's voices in 
this domain."  An article in the March 27 edition addressed 
the obstacles to women being elected in the 2007 
parliamentary elections; outlined measures that could be 
implemented to improve their chances, such as a quota system; 
and concluded, "We say to all: help the women!"  An article 
in the March 20 edition reported neutrally on a Kuwaiti 
conference on women and human rights organized by liberal 
MPs, the main objectives of which were to "spread the culture 
of human rights," share human rights experience with 
"neighboring countries," and "confirm the role of women in 
social development." 
 
¶33.  (U) Articles on regional issues are generally critical 
of U.S. policy in the region, specifically U.S. support for 
Israel.  One April 10 article reported on a statement issued 
by participants in a recent conference in Cairo entitled "For 
Resistance in Palestine and Iraq against American and Zionist 
Occupation," which called for "adopting resistance as the 
sole option for the peoples of the world to counter the 
American and Zionist aggression and to combat the corruption 
and despotism of the rulers of states that have chosen 
subservience and submission to American policies."  (Note: 
Written by an Egyptian author, the article did not 
specifically endorse or condemn the statement.  End note.) 
 
¶34.  (SBU) Three columnists in Al-Haraka are particularly 
vehement in their criticisms of the U.S.: Adel Al-Qasser, an 
Islamist; Dr. Sami Khalifa, a conservative Shi'a; and Issa 
Majed Al-Shaheen, a former ICM Spokesman.  In a March 27 
article entitled "American-Iranian Cooperation," Al-Shaheen 
argued that possible U.S.-Iranian dialogue on Iraq was the 
result of regional developments, such as "the exposure of the 
 
KUWAIT 00001638  004 OF 005 
 
 
American role in funding and training the sectarian death 
squads" of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.  He further 
criticized the "confusion and carelessness" of U.S. policy in 
the region, especially "giving Iran a critical role in Iraq"; 
U.S. willingness to "divide Iraq into mini-states to weaken 
(it) as a future threat to the Zionist entity"; and, U.S. 
involvement in "igniting sectarian conflicts to menace the 
social fabric of the region."  Dr. Khalifa's and Al-Qasser's 
articles are similarly critical of U.S. policy, particularly 
towards Israel.  All three columnists also regularly write 
similar articles for local Arabic dailies. 
 
¶35.  (SBU) The SRS also publishes a weekly entitled 
Al-Mujtima, which features articles written by both Kuwaiti 
and non-Kuwaiti authors and tends to be much more critical of 
the U.S.  The "In Brief" section of the March 25-30 edition 
reported that "supporting Hamas and backing it economically 
and politically would represent backing the Palestinian cause 
versus the expansionist Zionist scheme that menaces the 
future of the region."  The author of an "Opinion" article in 
the same edition noted that the "fourth anniversary of 
(Iraq's) foreign occupation...coincided with the mounting by 
American troops of a barbaric campaign against the Samarra 
region and its people under the pretext of resisting terror." 
 The article continued: "Iraq has become over the past three 
years a vulnerable entity under foreign occupation, open to 
Zionist penetration, espionage, sabotage, and attempts at 
Christianization."  Another article by an Egyptian author, 
Dr. Jamal Nasser, commemorated the death of Hamas spiritual 
leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin, praising him for "awakening the 
nation" and "instilling in it the spirit of jihad."  He 
concluded, "Undoubtedly, the martyrdom of Shaykh Ahmed will 
push the Arabs towards solidarity to protect their homelands 
against this (unspecified) brutal monster." 
 
Liberals Advise Cautious Approach to ICM 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶36.  (C) Many liberal Kuwaitis acknowledge that political 
reforms will primarily benefit the Islamists, at least in the 
short-run, but advise a cautious approach to Islamist 
organizations like the ICM.  Ahmed Deyain, a columnist and an 
astute political analyst, downplayed the ICM's popular 
support.  Comparing the ICM to a "deflated balloon," Deyain 
claimed the organization was "no longer the most important 
political power in Kuwait."  Other groups, like the more 
conservative Salafis, were rising in its place, he said. 
Deyain noted that while increasingly pragmatic the ICM was 
also "opportunistic," and cautioned that "they are still 
Islamists" and support conservative social policies. 
 
¶37.  (C) Haila Al-Mekaimi a political science professor at 
KU, echoed this view, cautioning that the ICM's substantial 
political influence did not necessarily reflect widespread 
popular support.  She pointed out that the group failed to 
win KU's Faculty Elections, despite the general impression 
that the university is dominated by the KMB.  Al-Mekaimi also 
noted that many non-conservative students participated in 
KMB-dominated student groups without sharing the KMB's 
ideology.  Dr. Ahmed Al-Baghdadi, a columnist and retired KU 
political science professor, told Poloff that the KMB, which 
he characterized as "the evil face of Islam," wanted to 
"control Kuwait both socially and politically."  Decrying the 
Government's "co-optation" of the KMB, Al-Baghdadi blamed 
what he saw as growing conservatism in education and the 
media on the KMB's influence. 
 
¶38.  (C) Dr. Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb, a liberal sociology 
professor at KU, claimed Islamists like the KMB were 
exploiting Arab disillusionment with Western liberal 
democracy and U.S. policy for political gain.  Although he 
warned that the KMB was "not at all democratic," Al-Naqeeb 
believed (somewhat contradictorily) that the KMB was 
nonetheless very pragmatic and politically opportunistic, 
willing to discard its ideologically-influenced policy 
positions, like support for amending Article 2 of the 
Constitution, when politically expedient.  He noted that the 
KMB never openly challenged the ruling Al-Sabah family and 
always worked within the political system to achieve its 
objectives.  Al-Naqeeb believed the organization's more 
moderate, pragmatic elements were stronger than its 
conservative tribal base and that, ultimately, the KMB was 
"not a threat" to democracy in Kuwait.  Both Al-Naqeeb and 
Al-Baghdadi predicted the ICM would make significant gains in 
the 2007 parliamentary elections. 
 
¶39.  (C) Kuwaiti liberals reacted strongly to the recent 
statement by the SRS calling on the Government to amend 
 
KUWAIT 00001638  005 OF 005 
 
 
Article 2 of the Constitution.  Many accused the SRS of 
wanting to "turn Kuwait into a Taliban state."  Former 
Minister of Oil Ali Al-Baghli, a Shi'a, argued that adopting 
Shari'a would restrict the freedoms currently enjoyed by 
Kuwaitis.  Dr. Ayad Al-Mana, an advisor to the Kuwait 
Journalists, Association, accused the SRS of merely trying 
to gain popular support. 
 
Engaging the ICM by Challenging Its Moderate Credentials 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶40.  (S/NF) While there are legitimate concerns about the 
ICM's positions on certain issues, these should not obstruct 
constructive USG engagement with the organization to promote 
political reform.  Specifically, in tandem with our efforts 
to support Kuwaiti liberal activists, occasionally nominating 
moderate ICM's members for appropriately themed International 
Visitor and MEPI-funded programs, such as "Grassroots 
Democracy," "U.S. Legislative Elections," "U.S. Foreign 
Policy and Human Rights," or American University's Summer 
Institute on Democracy and Elections, would help ICM members 
better understand U.S. policy positions and give U.S. 
officials an opportunity to more thoroughly assess the ICM's 
commitment to democratic governance.  Such participation 
would also be a direct challenge to the ICM to moderate some 
of its conservative social positions and could potentially 
contribute to the further marginalization of the ICM's more 
conservative elements.  Additionally, the Embassy can 
continue its efforts to dialogue with Islamist organizations 
through "American diwaniyas" (ref B), movie nights, and other 
representational events. 
 
¶41.  (S/NF) Of Kuwait's four established Islamist political 
associations, the ICM is the most moderate and poised to 
benefit most from continued democratic reforms.  The other 
three - the Traditional Salafis, the Scientific Salafis, and 
the Ummah (Nation's) Party (also Salafi) - are much more 
vitriolic in their criticisms of the U.S. and Israel and 
hard-line in their positions on social issues like women's 
rights and religious freedom.  Absent measured engagement 
with moderate ICM members, the U.S. risks promoting political 
reform without engaging the political associations likely to 
benefit most if the reforms are implemented.  Other political 
associations are not as organized and influential as the 
Islamists, and less likely to be able to take full advantage 
of the reforms.  Kuwait's Shi'a community is fragmented 
politically, and lacks well-organized political groupings, a 
cohesive political agenda, and appeal among the non-Shi'a 
population.  Kuwait's liberal political associations, largely 
relics of the Arab nationalist movements popular here in the 
1960s and 1970s, are similarly divided and lack strong public 
support. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
LEBARON