VZCZCXYZ0037
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLGB #0428/01 1281142
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081142Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2715
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0046

UNCLAS KIGALI 000428 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
DEPT ALSO FOR IO/PSC 
USUN NY FOR SANCTIONS UNIT 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR KPKO ETTC RW
SUBJECT:  UN DRC Sanctions Committee Group of Experts 
Discusses Current Mandate, Challenges 
 
REF:  KIGALI 34 
 
This is sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect 
accordingly. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  During its visit to Kigali April 20-29, 
the UN DRC Sanctions Committee Group of Experts briefed 
Embassy on the focus of its current mandate and its 
challenges in the region.  The experts highlighted the need 
for tighter immigration control at the DRC border, a GDRC 
mechanism for tracing and registering arms to reduce arms 
proliferation in the DRC, and enhanced traceability of 
illicit exploitation of natural resources fueling armed 
groups.  They urged greater GOR cooperation, in particular 
in providing access to requested information.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The five-member UN DRC Sanctions Committee Group of 
Experts briefed Ambassador and emboffs April 26 on its 
previous work, current mandate, and purpose of its April 20- 
29 visit to Kigali.  Senegalese Chairman Ibra Deguene Ka 
noted that during its previous mandates, the group met with 
various individuals and compiled information in London, 
Paris, Kinshasa, and Kampala.  During its current (fifth) 
mandate, the group will focus on southern DRC (Katanga), 
eastern DRC (Ituri and the Kivus), and Kinshasa.  Under 
UNSCR 1596 and 1649, it will continue investigating 
individuals and companies violating the DRC arms embargo. 
The group has submitted an annex to the initial list of 
proposed names for targeted sanctions for which it will seek 
additional information. 
 
Visit to Neighboring Countries 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (U) In the DRC the group met with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Minister of Defense, and the diplomatic community, 
including the U.S. Embassy.  Ka described the pre-electoral 
atmosphere in Kinshasa as tense.  The group also visited 
Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ka observed that cooperation from Uganda and Rwanda 
were "not as expected" and that the group had encountered 
several problems.  In Uganda the group experienced 
difficulty gaining access to an ammunition factory (which 
was accessible to the diplomatic community) despite repeated 
requests for access during its previous mandates. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In Kampala, while investigating movements of rebel 
leaders between Uganda and the DRC, the group observed 
leaders freely moving about and receiving logistical support 
from the government.  Ka noted that any assistance provided 
to rebel leaders is a clear violation of the arms embargo 
imposed by the Security Council.  The group also faced 
problems in getting access to air traffic logs at Entebbe 
civil airport.  Ugandan civil aviation authorities refused 
to provide the logs, directing them to MONUC instead for the 
information. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ambassador told the group that UN presence in DRC 
has helped improve cross-border relations and that Rwanda 
sees peaceful co-existence as the preferred alternative to 
the chaos of the past.  Rwanda recognizes the need for 
bilateral cooperation with DRC for its economic development, 
in such areas as the Lake Kivu methane gas project, and 
views the relationship between President Kagame and 
President Kabila as improved. 
 
Access to Arms in Rwanda 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ka said that the group has encountered problems in 
accessing the arms seized by the GOR in 2004 to trace their 
source.  The group has met with Congolese dissident Colonel 
Jules Mutebutsi (reftel) and will meet with Amb. Sezibera, 
Special Presidential Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, and 
other GOR officials to discuss the problem.  Ka noted that 
the Chair of the DRC Sanctions Committee had sent a letter 
to the GOR, as well as to GOU and GDRC, urging them to 
cooperate with the investigations of the Group of Experts. 
The group will make an evaluation at the conclusion of its 
visit to Kigali, and the Security Council will consider 
taking action if cooperation has not improved. 
 
Traffic at DRC Border 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) French immigration expert Jean Luc Gallet noted 
 
many problems at the porous DRC-Rwanda border and pointed 
out the need to secure the border, particularly prior to the 
DRC elections, to stabilize the region.  In response to 
Ambassador's query as to whether the UN panel sees Rwanda as 
a source or transit country for arms flows to rebel groups 
in the DRC, the panel said that there is no evidence of any 
such current activity.  Ambassador noted that the GOR does 
not have any incentive to permit the transit of arms from 
Rwanda to the DRC. 
 
Exploitation of Natural Resources 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Swiss finance expert Michael Buisson observed that 
much of the regional cassiterite trade is illegal.  In its 
previous report, the group made a recommendation for 
enhanced traceability.  He noted that the Governor of North 
Kivu is extracting a lot of money from mining operations, 
enriching himself and his partners and friends, and that his 
NGO has been sanctioned.  (Note:  The NGO, "Tous Pour la 
Paix et Le Developpment," All for Peace and Development, is 
subject to travel restrictions and an assets freeze per 
UNSCR 1596.  End note.)  Buisson noted that there are 
reports that the proceeds from the cassiterite trade are 
benefiting armed groups. 
 
¶10. (SBU) In response to the question as to whether Rwanda 
imports cassiterite from the DRC, Ambassador expressed his 
view that Rwanda sees trade with the DRC as perfectly 
normal, but that Rwandans are sympathetic to the need to 
refrain from doing anything that could exacerbate DRC-Rwanda 
relations. 
 
Arms Trafficking within DRC 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Canadian arms expert Enrico Carisch, who has been 
conducting samplings of guns and ammunition throughout the 
DRC, reported that internal DRC arms trafficking of legal 
military stock to influential GDRC officials is of serious 
concern.  He noted that arms trafficking from the military 
to the rebels is relatively easy given that the GDRC has no 
centralized recordkeeping.  The few records kept by the GDRC 
are inaccurate.  He said that the GDRC needs to develop a 
recordkeeping mechanism to mark, trace, and register weapons 
to reduce arms proliferation. 
 
¶12. (SBU) During its previous mandate, the group examined 
4,000 AK-47s in Goma.  All were non-NATO compliant, with 
about 65 percent manufactured in China and about 20 percent 
in Russia and former Soviet block countries.  Following its 
visit to Kigali, the group will travel to China and Russia 
to review their surplus and export regulations. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Carisch noted that in December 2004 the GOR 
purchased 5,000 AK-47s from the Bulgarian government and 
that both governments have refused to provide details on the 
purchase.  The other difficulty, he said, is separating "the 
wheat from the chaff."  He explained that the Group spends 
considerable time investigating allegations made by Amnesty 
International, for example, only to find that many of the 
suspect transactions were legal. 
 
Civil Aviation 
-------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Malian civil aviation expert Adboulaye Cissoko 
reported that he has been monitoring cross-border civil 
aviation flights to ensure they do not violate the arms 
embargo.  In addition, he has been checking the cargo and 
passenger manifests of domestic DRC flights, with assistance 
from international civil aviation organizations.  He 
reported lack of cooperation from the DRC's neighboring 
countries. 
 
Tripartite Plus Fusion Cell 
--------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) The Canadian arms expert remarked that while the 
fusion cell is "a worthwhile political initiative" with the 
potential for reducing arms embargo violations, its 
practical benefit is limited due to the inherent nature of 
intelligence operations. 
 
Call for Greater GOR Cooperation 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) The chairman asked the Ambassador to urge the GOR 
to cooperate with the Group, noting that the P-5 are 
concerned about improving coordination.  Ambassador assured 
the group of Embassy's support and acknowledged that the 
group has a difficult job and that getting credible 
information and full cooperation is difficult.  He said that 
he would encourage the GOR to cooperate fully but reminded 
the group that Rwandans have a very difficult history with 
the UN.  There is some bitterness at the top levels, which 
may partially explain the difficulty the group has 
experienced.  He pointed out that it's a complicated process 
because anything included in their report, even if reported 
with caveats, is regarded by the international community as 
the truth. 
 
¶17. (SBU) He encouraged the Group to mention to the GOR the 
improved cooperation from the GDRC and requested that it 
inform Embassy of any noticeable change in GOR dynamics 
following its meeting with GOR officials.  At the conclusion 
of its trip to Kigali, the Group will return to the DRC, and 
then travel to China and Russia for further investigations. 
It will prepare a midterm report due May 22 and a final 
report due July 10. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Ambassador subsequently encouraged GOR Special 
Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Sezibera, to cooperate 
with the UN panel.  Sezibera said the GOR wished to do so, 
but some requests, such as providing serial numbers of all 
5,000 weapons imported from Bulgaria, would be very 
burdensome. 
 
Arietti