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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 002425 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/FO (DAS JGASTRIGHT), SA/A, S/CR, SA/PB, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
OSD FOR BREZEZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL 
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2026 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC SNAR KCRS AF
SUBJECT: PRT-QALAT - GOVERNOR ARMAN'S FIRST YEAR IN ZABUL: 
STRONG LEADERSHIP AND PROGRESS, BUT ALSO FRUSTRATION 
 
KABUL 00002425  001.3 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: DCM RICHARD NORLAND FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.    (U) SUMMARY: Governor Arman has been a strong governor 
and, overall, Zabul Province has improved over the past year. 
 However, as he well realizes, security and high-level visits 
are not enough for effective government, and the GoA still 
lacks the ability to provide goods and services to its 
citizens here, especially in the more remote districts not on 
the Ring Road.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.    (U) ZABUL PROVINCE BACKGROUND: Zabul Province is poor 
and backwards even by Afghan standards.  It is located in 
southeastern Afghanistan, and is bordered by Helmand, 
Uruzgan, Ghazni and Paktika Provinces.  It also has a 161 km 
border with Pakistan.  The population estimates range from 
258,000 (TF Warrior) up to 444,585 (World News), of whom an 
estimated 30,000 live in the capital of Qalat.  There were 
102,000 voters registered for the September 2005 elections. 
The literacy rate is reportedly 15 percent, which is much 
higher than provincial officials have indicated to the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team State Representative (PRTOff). 
 The size is almost 7,000 square miles.  The province has 
remained troublesome since the fall of the Taliban in late 
2001 and Governor Arman came here as governor in March 2005. 
 
¶3.    (U) ARMAN'S APPROACH TO GOVERNMENT: Arman is a strong 
governor and has served as a deputy governor, National 
Security Council (NSC) staff member and mujahideen commander. 
 He is an engineer by training.  Like most GoA officials 
here, he views Zabul as more ignorant and backwards than the 
rest of the country. 
 
¶4.    (U) While he blames Pakistan for most of the Taliban 
problems here (as do all our Afghan interlocutors), Governor 
Arman is objective and understands that lack of reach of the 
GoA is a separate, albeit related, problem from the Taliban 
threat.  He admits that the GoA is weak out in the districts. 
 He is concerned about its weakness becoming a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, if GoA forces hunker down in 
district centers, and do not spread out to encounter and 
oppose the Taliban.  As he phrases it, if the Taliban come to 
a house to demand something, it is either because the GoA is 
weak there and not providing security or else because that 
household is pro-Taliban.  However, he sees three 
simultaneous steps as being necessary: in addition to 
spreading out forces, the GoA must also be providing food or 
other assistance to villagers, and establishing a 
relationship with them. 
 
¶5.    (C) He openly admits that corruption pervades the GoA 
and that he is suspicious of most Afghans.  Concerning drugs 
(septel), he is proud of resisting pressure from Kabul to 
send all large drug seizures to the capital.  The procedures, 
now implemented under the new law, are to send only forensic 
samples to Kabul and burn the rest of the seizure locally, 
which he says Kabul officials do not like since they can no 
longer steal the seized drugs and resell them.  PRTOff has 
observed him at a shura in Shamulzai and at a meeting with 
Khaki Afghan elders where he appeared visibly angry, accusing 
them of collaborating with the Taliban, and asking why he 
should do anything at all for them and their districts. 
 
¶6.    (U) The US notion of "separation of church and state" 
 
KABUL 00002425  002.3 OF 005 
 
 
is virtually unknown here and would be incomprehensible to 
most Afghans.  Governor Arman is personally very devout, and 
many of his speeches stress the points that the GoA is an 
Islamic republic and that education is in accordance with 
Islam and the Koran -- the bottom line being that the Taliban 
are wrong and not following Islam correctly. 
 
¶7.    (C) WORKING RELATIONSHIPS: President Karzai calls Arman 
fairly frequently and occasionally summons him to Kabul.  The 
Governor argues his case directly with President Karzai, if 
he is not satisfied with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
(which has authority over the provincial governors).  During 
his recent meetings in Kabul to address Afghan National 
Police (ANP) pay arrears of four months, he implicitly 
threatened to resign, stating he would not go back to Zabul 
without anything for his ANP officers.  That MoI/National 
Security Council (NSC) meeting resulted in a partial fix of 
payment of two months, back pay for the ANP officers in the 
provinces bordering Pakistan. 
 
¶8.    (C) Governor Arman cultivates excellent relationships 
with the PRT and maneuver battalion.  He strongly supports 
Coalition Forces (CF), both philosophically and for the 
development and assistance that they bring to Zabul.  He is 
very concerned about International Security Assistance 
Force's (ISAF's) taking over the maneuver battalion.  He 
fears they will be more defensive-oriented, and not go out 
actively looking for the Taliban in districts like Day Cho 
Pan. 
 
¶9.    (C) He is cordial to the members of the Provincial 
Council (PC), but does not have much faith in them. 
(Comment: Objectively, we concur.  End Comment.)  At one 
point, he was considering undercutting them by working with 
select village and district elders, but PRTOff and others 
recommended against that since the PC members were, after 
all, democratically elected. 
 
¶10.   (C) His relationships with the various directors run 
the gamut.  On one hand, Arman is very pleased with the new 
Director of Courts, Judge Qasim, for trying to keep judges 
and prosecutors honest.  He has shown his support by inviting 
Judge Qasim to help officiate or make speeches at high-level 
public meetings and ceremonies.  (Note: The judge advised 
PRTOff recently that he had personally transferred two judges 
he felt were dishonest; as is usual, no one was fired, but 
they were transferred to other districts where they do not 
have any influence.  End Note.)  On the other hand, the 
Governor has repeatedly expressed his desire to see the 
Director of Prosecutors removed.  Among other things, Arman 
believes the Director released a Taliban, who had killed a 
female teacher and sought bribes from prisoners in order to 
be released. 
 
¶11.   (U) SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS: Governor Arman believes 
that overall the Taliban is on the run, but has repeatedly 
pushed his idea for 200 "auxiliary" police in each district 
for the next year or two; he claims they would not degenerate 
into militias.  Arman respects Colonel Rizak, the ANA kandak 
commander for the province, as both a mullah and commander 
(Rizak's nickname is "the fighting mullah," as a mullah who 
joined the mujahideen and then became an ANA commander). 
Nevertheless, Arman does not hesitate to offer his own ideas 
 
KABUL 00002425  003.3 OF 005 
 
 
on how to improve district security, which combine military 
and political approaches.  Most are very practical, like 
having sub-district centers in remote, large districts, and 
having additional patrols and checkpoints along known Taliban 
infiltration routes. 
 
¶12.   (C) PERSONNEL ISSUES: Governor Arman has replaced 
district governors in Day Cho Pan, Mizan, Shajoy, Shinkay, 
Shamulzai, Atghar, Arghandab and Suri.  He has chastised the 
Nabahar district governor for spending too much time in Qalat 
and not enough in his district. (Note: Suri and Nabahar are 
not yet officially recognized as separate districts of Zabul. 
 End Note.)  He has tried to get local input on appointments, 
using both a carrot and stick approach.  If he believes the 
elders are supportive of the GoA, he will listen to their 
preferences.  If he believes they are dealing with the 
Taliban, he will read them the riot act, but hint that, if 
they become supportive of the GoA, he may later replace the 
district governor with someone preferred by the district 
elders. 
 
¶13.   (C) Arman prefers to move carefully and deliberately 
when having officials replaced in order to avoid exacerbating 
problems.  When the previous provincial chief of police (CoP) 
was reassigned last December, the MoI intended to replace him 
with an allegedly dishonest officer.  The Governor could not 
block the appointment, but secured an agreement from 
President Karzai that the individual would come by himself, 
without bringing any cronies with him as his staff.  As a 
result, the individual subsequently declined the appointment, 
and the Afghan Highway Police (AHP) Chief between Kandahar 
and Ghazni, General Nabi, became the CoP.  He has proven to 
be an excellent CoP and, in fact, the Governor has lately 
threatened to resign if General Nabi is replaced.  Arman 
moved a trusted deputy to the Afghan National Border Police 
(ANBP) in Zanjshir on the Pakistani border several months 
before having the chief there replaced (Chief Sbeen, whose 
replacement was one of our PSA recommendations).  The 
Governor encountered resistance to this change, as the ANBP 
is not actually under his control, but he somehow made it 
stick. 
 
¶14.   (U) Arman has complained that he lacks direct authority 
over the directors, who report to their respective ministers 
in Kabul.  He also believes strongly that he and other 
governors should have operational control over the Afghan 
Highway Police (AHP) and ANBP forces that are stationed 
within their provinces. 
 
¶15.   (U) NASIR-SHAMULZAI LAND DISPUTE: The Governor has been 
trying to broker an agreement between the Nasir and the 
Shamulzai tribes.  The Shamulzai took over the Nasirs' land 
when the latter fled to Pakistan.  The Nasirs (about 15,000 
people) want to leave Pakistan and return to their land 
which, legally, they have the stronger claim on.  However, to 
avoid future bloodshed, the Governor wants both sides to 
negotiate and agree themselves to a resolution, rather than 
refer the case to the Supreme Court. 
 
¶16.   (U) FRUSTRATIONS: The Governor's biggest frustration is 
the lack of reach by the GoA.  Even if the Taliban did not 
exist, there would still be a virtual vacuum of GoA authority 
and provision of services once off the Ring Road.  Arman 
 
KABUL 00002425  004.3 OF 005 
 
 
values visits to the districts to show support and establish 
a relationship, but also realizes that visits need to be 
followed up by deliverables of goods and services to enhance 
GoA authority. 
 
¶17.   (U) Governor Arman is also frustrated by the lack of a 
permanent UN presence, which he believes is necessary to 
convince NGOs that the province is safe enough for their 
operations.  As a result of the security reputation of Zabul, 
it is difficult to hire PRT contractors in some districts and 
UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS) projects have virtually 
come to a standstill.  The Governor and the PRT have been 
trying since October to convince the UN to establish a 
permanent presence in Qalat.  (Note: They already have a 
compound here.  End Note.)  After that, he would like to have 
a conference of NGOs in order to convince them to establish a 
presence in Zabul. 
 
¶18.   (U) SOME PROGRESS: The Governor noted that, when he 
first assumed office, he visited Shinkay District.  He met 
with only eight people and they covered their faces to avoid 
being seen talking with him.  Recently, Shinkay hosted a 
large shura with representatives from several southern 
districts and warmly greeted Arman, along with five GoA 
ministers and LTG Eikenberry.  Arman also notes the presence 
today along the border of 70-80 ANBP officers, which did not 
exist a year ago.  He is also proud of his weekly 
inter-agency security meetings and believes they would be a 
useful model for neighboring provinces to adopt.  Zabul now 
leads by far in drug seizures (septel), which Governor Arman 
has made a priority.  However, he laments that Kabul does not 
acknowledge just how much contraband has been seized here or 
the fact that provincial officials have received threats from 
drug traffickers as a result. 
 
¶19.   (U) In the Governor's estimation, the Ring Road is 80 
percent safe and most of the districts in the province are 
now safe.  He is very proud of high-level visits as they 
demonstrate the relative safety of the province, plus GoA 
interest in the province.  Since last October, President 
Karzai and five ministers have visited Zabul, the first ever 
high-level GoA visits to the province.  Ambassador Neumann, 
LTG Eikenberry, and numerous other US and CF officials have 
also visited Qalat. 
 
¶20.   (U) VISION FOR THE FUTURE: The Governor's emphasis is 
on roads.  His master plan for the next few years, which is 
being implemented through the PRT,s master CERP plan, is to 
have a gravel road loop north and west from the Ring Road in 
Shajoy, through Khaki Afghan and Arghandab, and then 
intersect with the Mizan Road (already constructed) which 
connects back to the Ring Road in Qalat.  In the southern 
part of the province, the master plan is to extend the gravel 
road from the Ring Road to Shinkay (already constructed) 
through Shamulzai to the Pakistani border at Zanjshir.  That 
would allow commercial trucking from Pakistan to enter 
directly at Zanjshir, rather than having to go from Quetta to 
Spin Boldak and then through Kandahar in order to get on the 
Ring Road to Qalat and points north, such as Ghazni and Kabul. 
 
¶21.   (C) COMMENT: Arman has improved Zabul, although serious 
challenges remain.  The PRT expects the Governor to 
ultimately continue on to a higher office, either the 
 
KABUL 00002425  005.3 OF 005 
 
 
governorship of a larger province or a cabinet appointment. 
There had been some speculation he would be reassigned 
shortly, but now we are hearing that he will remain in Zabul 
following the next shuffle of governors, which is a good 
thing for the province.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶22.   (U) Dushanbe minimized considered. 
 
NEUMANN 
NEUMANN