VZCZCXRO2442
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2008/01 1231400
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031400Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0012
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2509
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2681
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5922
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1336

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/FO (AMB MQUINN), SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, 
S/CT, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KRDP AF
SUBJECT: PRT/HELMAND - HELMAND ERADICATION WRAP UP 
 
KABUL 00002008  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
(SBU) SUMMARY: The Helmand poppy eradication 
campaign is essentially finished.  The campaign 
represents an improvement over last year's in 
absolute numbers if not percentage of hectares (ha) 
cultivated.  Pending verification, it appears that a 
relatively modest amount of the estimated 40,000 ha 
cultivated will have been eradicated - less than ten 
percent.  The effort may also have provided some 
temporary security enhancement in specific areas. 
However, this may have been counterbalanced as 
significant numbers of police deserted their posts 
to work as day laborers in the poppy fields. 
Eradication appeared selective, often focusing on 
poor farmers.  There are reports of widespread 
corruption, including payoffs to district officials 
and deals struck among farmers, suspected Taliban, 
government officials, and eradication forces. 
Central Helmand, where about 70 percent of Helmand's 
poppy is cultivated, was largely ignored.  The 
effort did extend the reach of the government, but 
not always in a positive manner.  Cash for Work 
(CFW) efforts suffered from a labor shortage because 
day wages for poppy harvesting far exceeded CFW 
wages.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------- 
MORE ERADICATION COMPARED TO 2005 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  On the plus side, the 2006 campaign 
represented a stronger effort compared to 2005. 
According to United Nations Office of Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) data, 1,031 ha were eradicated in 
¶2005.  This year, there were two eradication forces: 
The Governor's Eradication Force (GEF) and the 
central government's Afghan Eradication Force (AEF). 
The AEF received considerable support from the 
Department of State's Bureau of International and 
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).  The campaign began 
on March 8 and officially ended on April 30.  As of 
April 28, according to UNODC, the GEF reported 
eradicating 6,019 ha.  The AEF eradicated 1,917 ha, 
according to AEF figures.  While 2006 cultivation 
figures are only estimates, at least 40,000 ha is 
widely accepted, representing about a 50 percent 
increase over 2005.  If taken at face value, total 
eradication up to April 28 was about 7,936 ha or 
about 20 percent of the estimated cultivation. 
 
 
------------------ 
BEHIND THE NUMBERS 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  UNODC is officially quite skeptical of 
the GEF's numbers.  UNODC's April 28  eradication 
report stated that, "The GEF's figure is considered 
to be a gross over estimate of the true area 
eradicated."  UNODC's report stated that final 
verification will be done mainly through satellite 
imagery due to security considerations.  AEF 
figures, due in part to the monitoring and advisory 
presence of expatriate civilians, are likely more 
accurate. 
 
KABUL 00002008  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
ERADICATION QUALITY QUESTIONED 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Eradication quality appears to have been 
uneven.  The UNODC report stated that, "The quality 
of (GEF) eradication is often very poor, with 
tractors making a small number of passes throughout 
poppy fields and eradicating a low percentage of the 
poppy plants."  The UNODC report included photos of 
partially eradicated fields in Dishu district.  One 
U.S. military advisor reported that, in some cases, 
the GEF eradicated only a portion of a poppy field 
but reported the entire field as eradicated, thus 
overinflating the eradication figures. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  We received anecdotal field reports from 
U.S. military and AEF that eradication in some cases 
was linked to various arrangements among farmers, 
district officials, and the eradication forces. 
Taliban forces also may have made arrangements with 
the local officials.  One report noted that 
eradication appeared to focus on poorer farmers, 
while skipping fields that belonged to government 
officials or better connected landowners.  One 
farmer complained to a U.S. military advisor that, 
despite paying a bribe, his poppy plants were 
nevertheless eradicated.  AEF officials reported 
that government officials led eradicators past many 
cultivated fields in a seemingly arbitrary manner. 
In one case, AEF officials said that government 
officials led the AEF forces past several 
unharvested fields to one already harvested.  (Note: 
Poppy fields can be harvested four to five times, 
depending upon the quality of the plants.  End 
Note). 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The eradication forces apparently paid 
minimal attention to the "poppy belt" in central 
Helmand, where most poppy is cultivated.  This is 
the area where it is more likely that powerful 
tribal leaders and officials have significant 
interests and influence. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
POSTIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPACT ON SECURITY 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The eradication effort may have helped 
improve security in certain areas on a temporary 
basis.  Another positive point is that, for the 
first time, the Afghan National Army and Afghan 
National Police undertook a joint operation.  In 
parts of the remote southern districts of Dishu and 
Khanoshin, where there is minimal government 
influence, eradication provided a government "show 
of force."  That said, not long after the GEF left 
Khanoshin, the district center was attacked. 
Conversely, security may have degraded in some 
areas.  The Governor informed PRToffs on April 15 
that significant numbers of police deserted in order 
to earn higher wages as day laborers harvesting 
poppy.  The eradication campaign also appears to 
 
KABUL 00002008  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
have attracted more Taliban to fight in Helmand, 
perhaps in an effort to protect their own financial 
interest and to win favor with the local population 
by "protecting" their poppy crops.  The Taliban were 
able to fulfill this pledge in Sangin district, 
resulting in a propaganda victory 
 
-------------------------------- 
EFFECT ON CFW PROGRAMS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  During the run-up to the eradication 
campaign, Governor Daud requested additional 
assistance in the form of Cash for Work 
(CFW)programs.  The Governor wanted to implement CFW 
programs to provide immediate cash relief for 
farmers whose fields were eradicated.  Both the PRT 
civil affairs unit and USAID stepped up its efforts 
in this area, quickly devising a number of CFW 
programs.  Spot checks to USAID CFW project sites in 
early April, however, revealed that there was an 
apparent shortage of workers.  In some cases, 
contractors were using heavy machinery rather than 
manual labor.  Contractors reported that many 
potential laborers were working in poppy fields for 
USD 25 to 40 per day.  Since CFW wages are USD 4-5 
per day, many potential workers found it more 
profitable to harvest poppy.  Governor Daud told 
PRToffs in early April that workers would return to 
CFW sites after 2-4 weeks, as poppy harvest work 
requirements diminish by mid/late May.  USAID has 
suspended use of heavy machinery for these 
activities and agreed with the Governor to reassess 
the labor situation and community support for the 
activities after several weeks.  Additionally, USAID 
will shift its CFW strategy in Helmand away from the 
eradication mitigation campaign requested by the 
Governor as a safety net in areas with large-scale 
eradication.  Instead, USAID will continue to focus 
on labor-intense CFW projects that build 
infrastructure critical to the long-term economic 
growth of the region. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  In addition to the impact on CFW, this 
economic dynamic negatively impacted other projects. 
PRT Civil Affairs supported work on the Helmand 
Madrassa (religious school) has temporarily halted 
until laborers return from the poppy harvest. 
Provincial government and religious officials have 
described the madrassa, a USD 325,000 project, as 
high priority. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU)  The overall impact of this year's 
eradication campaign is difficult to judge at this 
point.  The government did extend its reach; 
however, some of this extension may have reaffirmed 
long held beliefs among Helmand's citizens of the 
rampant corruption typical of the provincial and 
district governments.  However, it is important to 
note that Governor Daud only assumed his post in 
 
KABUL 00002008  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
December 2005. He was saddled with a Deputy Governor 
and Police Chief, both of whom are known to be very 
corrupt individuals.  Daud has said to some embassy 
officers that he would like to have both removed, 
but this will take some time.  The Ministry of 
Interior informed the embassy that two weeks ago 
they opened an investigation into allegations of 
corruption on the part of Deputy Governor Amir 
Mohammed while he led the Governor's eradication 
effort.  The Governor appears sincere about 
addressing the poppy issue in Helmand.  However, he 
will need additional national and international 
support for his future efforts. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) COMMENT (cont)  Since the amount of poppy 
eradicated appears relatively small compared to the 
cultivation, it is an open question whether the 
campaign has convinced farmers not to plant poppy 
later this year.  Regarding the CFW program, the 
lack of available CFW laborers during the harvest 
season appears to reflect the minimal economic 
impact of the eradication campaign against which the 
CFW projects were meant to play a supporting role. 
With the Poppy Elimination Program coming online, a 
much heavier UK military and civilian presence in 
Helmand, and the initiation of USAID long-term 
alternative agribusiness development activities, 
there is a better chance to improve security, 
governance, and the local economy - three key 
components for tackling the poppy problem. 
 
NEUMANN