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Viewing cable 06JAKARTA5789, ASD RODMAN'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN FOREIGN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06JAKARTA5789 2006-05-09 06:23 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Jakarta
VZCZCXRO7898
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #5789/01 1290623
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 090623Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3867
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9414
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0798
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY 3057
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 1794
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005789 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2016 
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS MARR PHUM KDEM KAWC TT BM TW
ID 
SUBJECT: ASD RODMAN'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN FOREIGN 
MINISTRY SECGEN 
 
 
JAKARTA 00005789  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Political Officer David R. Greenberg, reason 1.4 (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs Peter Rodman met Department of Foreign 
Affairs Secretary General Imron Cotan on April 12.  Both 
expressed strong interest in expanding military ties.  Imron 
pressed for USG training for Indonesian Special Forces 
(Kopassus); ASD Rodman said the USG needed to proceed 
carefully with Kopassus.  ASD Rodman pressed for Indonesian 
participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
and for an Article 98 agreement; Imron indicated the GOI 
would not proceed with either at this time and specifically 
highlighted the parliament's role in endorsing international 
agreements, saying the Yudhoyono administration could not 
proceed "unilaterally."  ASD Rodman expressed interest in 
accountability for human rights violations in East Timor, and 
the Ambassador emphasized the importance of the Commission on 
Truth and Friendship building international credibility.  ASD 
Rodman explained the USG interest in supporting maritime 
security and safeguarding the Malacca Strait; Imron noted 
Taiwan had offered use of an AWACS aircraft to assist with 
aerial coverage of the Strait, but the GOI had not decided 
its response to the offer.  The Ambassador noted USG interest 
in pursuing a SOFA with the GOI, and Imron requested a draft 
for GOI study.  Imron also explained GOI efforts to press the 
government of Burma to democratize, voiced concern that 
Indonesians might try emulating recent demonstrations in 
Bangkok, and expressed hope for an improved relationship with 
Australia in coming months.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) ASD Rodman accompanied by Ambassador Pascoe, Brigadier 
General John Allen, OSD/ISA Country Director for Southeast 
Asia Peter Ipsen, the Embassy's Defense Attache, ODC officer, 
Poloff (notetaker), and ASD Rodman's Military Assistant 
called on Secretary General Imron, accompanied by two DFA 
officials. 
 
DESIRE TO REENGAGE 
------------------ 
 
3. (C) ASD Rodman opened the meeting by explaining the 
context of his visit and the ongoing USG effort to restore 
and expand security ties with Indonesia.  The USG wanted to 
be a reliable security partner and help the Armed Forces 
(TNI) become a modern, capable, and professional force; 
toward that end, the USG would explore ways for providing 
appropriate equipment and training.  Imron responded that the 
United States represented a valuable strategic partner for 
Indonesia.  The GOI welcomed USG assistance in both the 
security field and democratization. 
 
KOPASSUS TRAINING 
----------------- 
 
4. (C) On two separate occasions, Imron raised what appeared 
as one of his main points for the meeting, pressing ASD 
Rodman to allow potential leaders from the Special Forces 
(Kopassus) to receive U.S. training.  This would have the 
positive effect of exposing Kopassus soldiers to different 
values and norms than those prevailing in Indonesian military 
circles.  ASD Rodman acknowledged Imron's interest in 
training for Kopassus, but stressed the importance of 
proceeding in a careful manner.  Rodman noted the 
participation of the Kopassus Commander in the recent Pacific 
Area Special Operations Conference (PASOC), but indicated 
that sensitivities in Washington likely precluded robust 
engagement with Kopassus in the near future. 
 
PSI 
--- 
 
5. (C) ASD Rodman suggested the GOI consider participating in 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  Imron noted 
that FM Wirajuda had explained the GOI's legal reasons for 
not participating in PSI and added practical concerns 
underpinning the GOI's reluctance: as an archipelagic nation, 
Indonesia relied heavily on transportation by boat.  The 
Australian Navy already intercepted over 200 Indonesian ships 
each year; the GOI therefore did not want to take any further 
steps that could impede Indonesian shipping.  ASD Rodman 
 
JAKARTA 00005789  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
described PSI as a flexible program; every country could set 
the parameters for its own participation.  Rodman suggested 
that the U.S. and Indonesia could begin subject matter expert 
exchanges and proliferation-related elements could get 
injected into bilateral military exercises as a way to 
improve Indonesia's comfort with PSI.  Citing FM Wirajuda's 
views, Imron appeared pessimistic about the prospects of 
Indonesian participation in PSI, a step backwards from 
Indonesia's expressed willingness to do "PSI-like" activities 
while not actually joining PSI during the A/S Hillen visit in 
February. 
 
ARTICLE 98 
---------- 
 
6. (C) Noting that over 100 countries had signed Article 98 
agreements with the U.S., ASD Rodman suggested that the GOI 
consider following suit.  Imron said he would raise the 
matter with his DFA colleagues.  He implied that since the 
GOI had not become a party to the Rome Statute, the GOI 
questioned the need for an Article 98 agreement.  More 
significantly, however, he said that the administration could 
not "unilaterally" conclude such an agreement without the 
endorsement of the House of Representatives (DPR).  Dealing 
with the DPR, and especially Commission I (responsible for 
defense, foreign affairs, and information), proved difficult, 
painful, and time consuming for DFA.  When ASD Rodman asked 
if the GOI might conclude an executive agreement not 
requiring endorsement by the DPR, Imron said, "we cannot 
afford to do that here." 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EAST TIMOR 
----------------------------- 
 
7. (C) ASD Rodman noted the need to show that renewed 
military ties promoted progress on reform and accountability. 
 BGEN Allen asked for an update on the work of the 
Indonesia-East Timor Commission on Truth and Friendship. 
Imron, encouraged by the Commission's work, described the 
Commission as "the only alternative" for resolving the prior 
human rights abuses.  He predicted the Commission's work 
would lead to a South Africa style outcome, with people 
summoned to provide accounts, mutual forgiveness, and 
possible compensation for victims. 
 
8. (C) The Ambassador suggested the GOI work to ensure a 
sufficient international role in the process and noted the 
possibility of Carter Center involvement.  Imron acknowledged 
the importance of international involvement and consultations 
with NGOs.  The Commission, however, still had underway 
technical work, such as site visits and the collection of 
evidence and statements.  After this technical phase, the 
Commission would consider how to consult with other 
organizations.  The Ambassador explained that the Carter 
Center represented one alternative; others might seem equally 
credible, but some international involvement would appear 
needed. 
 
MALACCA STRAIT 
-------------- 
 
9. (C) ASD Rodman said the USG would like to support the 
efforts of Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia to ensure the 
security of the Malacca Strait.  Imron replied that the GOI 
would accept USG equipment and training toward that end, 
although he emphasized responsibility for the Strait lay with 
the littoral states.  Imron said Taiwan had offered to 
provide equipment as well, including an AWACS plane operated 
by a mixed team of Taiwanese and Indonesian pilots.  The GOI 
had not decided how to respond to this offer, however, as it 
felt concerned about the possible reaction from China.  Imron 
requested that the USG provide a document explaining what 
equipment it could provide. 
 
SOFA 
---- 
 
10. (C) Citing the upcoming visit of the hospital ship Mercy, 
as well as other training programs, the Ambassador mentioned 
the need for a permanent SOFA.  Imron requested that the USG 
provide a draft that the GOI could study; he promised to 
raise the matter with FM Wirajuda and discuss it with a 
"troika" consisting of the Secretaries General from the DFA, 
 
JAKARTA 00005789  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Defense Ministry, and Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 
BURMA, THAILAND, AND AUSTRALIA 
------------------------------ 
 
11. (C) When the Ambassador asked Imron for his sense of 
developments in ASEAN, Imron explained a growing sense of the 
need for a "code of conduct" for ASEAN states, stating that 
ASEAN could suspend Burma's membership if Burma failed to 
apply a roadmap to democracy.  A group of "eminent persons" 
had begun studying the possibility of an ASEAN Charter, 
including a provision for suspension of membership.  This 
would provide a useful source of pressure on Burma, which 
otherwise appeared likely to become an irritant in ASEAN's 
relations with the United States and EU.  Although the GOI 
sought to become more firm with Burma, Imron explained, 
engagement remained important, to expose the Burmese to the 
democratic drive within Southeast Asia, and to ensure Burma 
would not be left behind. 
 
12. (C) Imron noted recent mass demonstrations in Bangkok 
caused some officials in Indonesia to worry that democracy in 
the region could get "hijacked."  The GOI wanted to see 
whether similar (opposition) demonstrations would begin in 
Manila or Jakarta.  Imron expressed confidence that President 
Yudhoyono could control the situation in Indonesia. 
 
13. (C) Imron also noted that Indonesia currently had a "very 
delicate" relationship with Australia, but he said that 
relations had begun moving in the right direction, and he 
hoped that "things will be better" within one or two months. 
 
14. (U) ASD Rodman has cleared this cable. 
PASCOE