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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 HONG KONG 002119 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/CM 
NSC FOR WILDER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2031 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PINR HK CH
SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM HALF A YEAR LATER: WHAT 
HAPPENED?  WHAT'S NEXT? 
 
REF: A. 05 HONG KONG 5625 
 
     ¶B. HONG KONG 1816 
 
HONG KONG 00002119  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General James B. Cunningham.  Reasons: 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  The dust has settled since the defeat by 
Hong Kong democrats of Donald Tsang's Constitutional Reform 
package in December.  Tsang's strategy failed because he 
didn't anticipate the ability of the pan-democrats to remain 
united on the call for a timetable for democracy.  He 
believed until the very end that he could split off the 
minimum votes necessary from the pan-democratic group.   He 
wasn't willing to make a deal, which might have been done, at 
the cost of giving the organized parties in the 
pan-democratic group (i.e., the Democratic Party (DP) and the 
Article 45 Concern Group) credit for an improved political 
reform package that would translate into political strength. 
Many Democrats were also unwilling to deal if that meant 
preserving a government proposal that would have expanded the 
democratic space but probably to their political 
disadvantage.  In the end, both sides preferred to preserve 
the status quo, with the pan-democrats playing to fight 
another day and to retain ownership of their only core issue 
-- democracy in Hong Kong. 
 
¶2.  (C) They may have overplayed their hand.  The failure of 
the Government's proposal has put both democratization and 
debate on universal suffrage on hold for the time being.  The 
incrementalist strategy that Tsang sold to Beijing )- we 
suspect on the grounds that he could use it to preserve 
stability and prosperity, maintain control, build support for 
pro-Beijing politicians and undermine the more extreme 
democrats )- has been sidetracked by his defeat.  But 
Tsang's public support, buoyed by a vibrant economy, is 
 
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stronger than ever, as is public confidence in Beijing.  The 
Democratic Party (DP) is widely blamed for the outcome and is 
now limping in the polls, despite predictions in December to 
the contrary.  Attempts by Beijing to curtail the "future of 
democracy" discussion (ref b) may give the pan-democrats an 
opening, however. 
 
¶3. (C) The pan-democrats are working now to prepare to 
challenge Tsang in the next round, the election of the Chief 
Executive on March 25, 2007, the maneuvering for which is 
already beginning.  (The members of the Election Committee 
will be chosen this coming December.)  They have no hope of 
defeating him, but hope to provoke a full debate on Hong 
Kong,s political future by securing nomination of a 
challenger -) which some hope will be the formidable and 
popular Anson Chan.  A campaign which produced a "win" for 
Chan in public opinion polls despite Tsang's (and Beijing's) 
control of the CE selection process would be a powerful 
symbol. 
 
¶4. (C) While Tsang may be sincere in his expressed desire to 
see movement toward universal suffrage during his time as CE, 
given what he himself calls his "masters" in Beijing, his 
continuing political priority is likely to be to cow the 
unruly pro-democracy forces that Beijing sees as a threat to 
Hong Kong,s "harmony," and which some Hong Kong elites see 
as a threat to Hong Kong's economic future.  As in December, 
the struggle between the pan-democrats and Tsang for 
political power is likely to take precedence over finding 
agreement on a way forward on democracy.  End summary 
 
Not prepared for Failure? 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Tsang Government failed both strategically and 
tactically: strategically by never articulating a vision and 
tactically by seeking to split off the votes of the six 
pro-democracy, independent Legco members, rather than seeking 
broader support among the pro-democracy legislators, 
particularly the two largest organized parties, the DP and 
 
HONG KONG 00002119  002.6 OF 005 
 
 
the Article 45 Concern Group.  Tsang's refusal to articulate 
an independent vision, especially when Anson Chan directly 
challenged him to do so, only reminded Hong Kong that Beijing 
really called the shots and set the limits.  All reports 
indicate that Tsang only ever made an effort to get the six 
independent, pro-democracy votes he needed to secure Legco 
passage.  This is all the more striking in that the elements 
of a compromise, including some sort of agreement on possible 
direct election of the Chief Executive in 2012 and agreement 
by Beijing to (albeit later, and separate from the reform 
proposal) formulate a timetable for universal suffrage, 
seemed achievable. 
 
¶6. (C) We believe that until the very end Tsang thought he 
would prevail, and so may have considered that allowing the 
pan-democrats to take credit for success would be worse 
politically than for his proposal to fail outright.  Indeed, 
an outcome perceived as strengthening Hong Kong's 
pro-democracy forces would have been hard to swallow in 
Beijing.  In the event, Tsang has suffered little politically 
from the proposal's defeat, although it may have raised 
doubts about his competence and political skills in Beijing, 
and it has driven him (at Beijing,s urging, it appears) 
closer to the pro-Beijing political parties.  The 
pan-democrats, on the other hand, are in their customary 
disarray.  The new Civic Party (CP, formed on the base of the 
Article 45 Concern Group), which has positioned itself closer 
to the center, may be able to supplant the DP as the core of 
the pan-democracy forces. 
 
Why did Tsang fail? 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Why did the Government's plan fail?  It was striking 
that, on a number of occasions, the Government side -- 
including Beijing representatives -- came within a 
hairsbreadth of offering the pan-democrats what they wanted. 
Tsang was quoted on a number of occasions as saying he 
 
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personally wanted universal suffrage, as soon as possible, 
and would devote his next term to it, if re-elected.  Many 
speculated about possible universal suffrage for the election 
of the Chief Executive in 2012, with the more difficult issue 
of elections to the Legco deferred until 2016.  And at a 
December 2, 2005 Shenzhen meeting, NPC Standing Committee 
Secretary General Qiao Xiaoyang told Legco members that 
 
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Beijing would agree to a timetable -- but not to setting a 
timetable before the Government proposal passed. 
 
¶8.  (C) It is clearer now that neither the HKG nor Beijing 
were ever willing to present these concessions in a way that 
the pan-democrats could take as a "victory," nor were they 
willing to strengthen them to the point where Beijing really 
did appear to be compromising.  Nor were the pan-democrats 
willing to advance their own proposal for a compromise way 
ahead.  Tsang's decision to not lobby all 25 
democracy-identified legislators, but to focus on the 
"undecided" six, indicates that from the outset he did not 
need or want majority support from the Democrats, nor want to 
share political credit for success. And from the 
pan-democrats' perspective, voting down the reform package 
and maintaining the status quo was clearly preferable to 
allowing Tsang to co-opt their most important, and some would 
argue, their only policy position, the fight for universal 
suffrage. 
 
Not enough stakeholders in the concept 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) On the Government side, there was not that much 
enthusiasm within Legco among the so-called pro-Government 
parties.  It was no secret that neither the DAB nor the 
Liberals really liked the proposal.  In fact, there was real 
concern among some of them that the Legco reforms would 
actively disadvantage their parties in the next elections, 
 
HONG KONG 00002119  003.6 OF 005 
 
 
and both parties likely would have lobbied strongly against 
any additional concessions to the democrats.  (Interestingly, 
some younger, non-Legco members of the Democratic Party 
wanted to support the Government proposal, since they 
believed it would have enhanced their own chances to win 
Legco seats in the future.  But the party leadership 
concluded from the outset that their political influence 
would be diluted under the Tsang proposal.)  From the 
so-called pro-Government parties' point of view, and, many 
thought, from Beijing's point of view, it was all the same, 
whether the proposal passed, or whether the status quo was 
unchanged. (Some here believe, however, that at least some 
senior leaders in Beijing were unhappy with the proposal,s 
failure, and wanted to see some limited movement.)  But only 
the Tsang administration had prestige or power at stake in 
the success of the proposal. 
 
¶10. (C) The large turnout at the December 4 march was 
important, and the united appearance of the pro-democracy 
legislators was probably even more important in cementing 
their commitment.  The unexpected participation of former 
Chief Secretary Anson Chan, who had not previously identified 
herself with pro-democracy efforts, transformed the dynamic, 
placing at the movement's head a figure as clearly 
"mainstream" and popular as the CE himself.  This had a 
powerful impact on public opinion and provided pro-democracy 
legislators with broad political cover. 
 
Counting the votes 
------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) The Government needed to secure six votes in addition 
to the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong 
(DAB) and Liberal Party (LP) members that Beijing presumably 
told to line up behind Tsang.  Those votes existed in a block 
of six pro-democracy but independent Legco members, where 
Tsang focused all his lobbying effort.  To prevail, the 
 
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Democrats merely needed to hold at least one of them.  The 
pro-democracy independents, who had been elected by tying 
themselves to the slogan of democracy, feared betraying their 
constituents.  If they stayed in opposition to Tsang, they 
could be seen as standing for a simple, clear principle: 
universal suffrage, as soon as possible.  But Tsang worked 
hard to win them over to his incrementalist approach, arguing 
that defeat of a proposal that Beijing accepted would be a 
serious setback to democracy in Hong Kong.  Before the vote, 
the mainstream Democrats were keeping watch on the waverers, 
ready to intervene at the slightest sign of weakness. 
 
¶12. (C) Most of our sources agree that Tsang had long 
believed he would get the six additional votes, and in fact 
had convinced 5 of the 6 to support him.  One of them, 
pro-democracy Tsang confidante Albert "Taipan" Cheng, on the 
eve of December 4 pro-democracy march, published a thinly 
veiled protest at pressure from within the democracy movement 
to maintain a united opposition to the plan. 
Then-independent, now Civic Party member, Mandy Tam, who 
represents the accountancy functional constituency, was the 
sixth vote and seemed just before the vote to be moving to 
the Tsang side.  But at the last minute she withdrew from 
negotiations with the Government after an emotional meeting 
with a close Democratic colleague.  Tam has confirmed this to 
us, adding that the Government seems to blame her above all 
others for the proposal's defeat. When it became clear that 
her vote would defeat the government, the other five moved 
back into opposition so as not be charged with betraying 
their democratic principles. 
 
Who won, who lost? 
------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) Immediately after the December 21 failure of the 
Government's plan (ref a), the conventional wisdom was that 
Chief Executive (CE) Donald Tsang had been hurt, and that the 
 
HONG KONG 00002119  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
Democrats had only won a "small victory."  In retrospect, 
Tsang has emerged unscathed and even strengthened.  He 
 
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retains his public popularity and has been able to win 
convincing testimonials of support from key tycoons, as well 
as the Beijing leadership, including an endorsement from the 
newly arrived Foreign Ministry Commissioner in Hong Kong. 
His greatest political challenges have come from his putative 
supporters, in the "pro-Beijing" parties, who have objected 
to some of his personnel decisions and his "go-it-alone," 
autocratic governing style.  The DP and Civic Party are not 
enthusiastic about being pushed into opposition status, as 
Tsang seems tempted to do, and have demonstrated that they 
 
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will support the government on specific issues. 
 
¶14. (C) Within the pan-democrat camp, the initiative and lead 
seems to be slowly but surely passing from the Democratic 
Party to the newly formed Civic Party.  The Civic Party is 
consciously positioning itself closer to the center, and is 
also presenting itself as a potential negotiating partner for 
Beijing.  It pointedly omitted criticism of the June 4 1989 
Tiananmen massacre from its founding platform, and withheld 
criticism of the HKG's budget, even as all other parties 
argued that the proposed tax cut was too small.  Thus, if 
this process continues, we can expect the Civic Party to seek 
to lead the majority of pro-democracy voters towards a better 
relationship with Beijing -- assuming that Beijing 
reciprocates in some way. 
 
What does this mean for future of Hong Kong's democracy? 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶15. (C) No one has yet offered a concrete vision of what 
universal suffrage and democratic politics in Hong Kong might 
look like, although Tsang is on the hook to propose a 
"roadmap" for universal suffrage late this year or early in 
¶2007.  That report is likely to present a series of issues 
which need to be resolved, and may be either obstructionist 
or constructive.  In part because of the conflictual nature 
of the discussion, there is little emerging consensus. 
Because the pro-democracy camp has the simpler, clearer 
position -- despite their own lack of concrete detail -- they 
are likely to retain the initiative in the overall debate. 
But it is also not very likely that either side will be able 
to propose reforms that are acceptable to the other. 
 
¶16. (C) The Democrats will try to deflect Tsang's reelection 
campaign, and force him to address political reform and the 
future of Hong Kong.  For now they seem confident that they 
can get the 100 out of 800 votes in the CE Election Committee 
needed to nominate a challenger.  Anson Chan is probably the 
candidate who could best confront Tsang on both political and 
governance issues and efforts are underway to persuade her to 
run (in public she says she's not interested).  The 
pan-democrats' goal will be to turn the reelection into a 
virtual referendum on universal suffrage.  Beijing apparently 
is already working to thwart this by trying to stack the 
Election Committee membership even more strongly in Tsang's 
favor.  Tsang will probably be able to win reelection without 
making any specific commitments.  Tsang will instead seek to 
strengthen ties with the pro-Government parties.  Beijing, 
Hong Kong's tycoons, and other players as well, appear 
satisfied with the status quo. 
 
¶17. (C) We expect the democrats will again attempt to force 
Tsang and Beijing to make a commitment to a timetable for 
 
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universal suffrage.  If they were to succeed in fielding a 
strong candidate and campaign which triumphs in the public 
opinion polls even as the Chief Executive is securing 
re-election in the Beijing-dominated Election Committee, that 
would provide a powerful symbol of the political limitations 
under which Hong Kong operates.  Tsang and Beijing will 
continue to undermine Democrats who they regard as opposing 
them.  As in December, Tsang and Beijing will not want to 
reward their political opposition and a continued struggle 
 
HONG KONG 00002119  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
for political power is likely to take precedence over finding 
a compromise to move forward on democracy. 
Cunningham