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O 041125Z MAY 06
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6504
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 001863 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP AND EAP/CM 
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2031 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH HK
SUBJECT: ARTICLE 23 NATIONAL SECURITY DEBATE REAPPEARS IN 
HONG KONG 
 
REF: A. HONG KONG 1816 
     ¶B. HONG KONG 1862 
 
Classified By: E/P Section Chief Simon Schuchat; Reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On April 27, Professor Wang Zhenmin, a PRC 
member of the Hong Kong Basic Law Committee, publicly listed 
six prerequisites for implementation of universal suffrage in 
Hong Kong, one of which was enactment of Article 23 national 
security legislation (ref a).  Reaction in Hong Kong to these 
comments has been predictably varied, with pro-Beijing 
figures downplaying their significance, pan-democrats 
expressing some concern, and independent observers suggesting 
that Wang's views are not new.  In any case, it is not clear 
how authoritative Wang's comments are.  Civic Party leader 
Audrey Eu, a founding member of the "Article 23 Concern 
Group," said her party did not oppose Article 23 legislation 
in principle if it were "properly" executed, but also 
observed that PRC views of "national security" were 
fundamentally different from those of her party.  Eu believed 
new Article 23 legislation would be one of the first items on 
the agenda of a reelected Donald Tsang administration in late 
2007 or early 2008.  End Summary. 
 
Article 23 Security Legislation 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On May 7-18, former Hong Kong Secretary for Justice 
Elsie Leung, who retired from Hong Kong Government service 
last October, will lead a "Better Hong Kong Foundation" 
(BHKF) delegation to the U.S.; she has told the media here 
that she plans to explain to her U.S. interlocutors Hong 
Kong's progress on implementation of the "One Country Two 
Systems" principle since the 1997 handover to the PRC and 
other political and economic issues (ref b). 
 
¶3.  (C) Coincidentally, this visit will take place just as 
the long-dormant debate over Article 23 National Security 
legislation for Hong Kong may be reappearing.  In March, 
Leung was appointed Vice Chairman of the Hong Kong Basic Law 
Committee (BLC), which advises the NPCSC on interpretations 
and amendments of the Basic Law.  On April 27, Professor Wang 
Zhenmin, a PRC member of the BLC and Deputy Dean of the 
Tsinghua University Law School in Beijing, reignited the 
 
SIPDIS 
somewhat dormant Article 23 debate through his assertion that 
enactment of Article 23 legislation was one of six 
prerequisites for establishment of universal suffrage and 
full democracy in Hong Kong (ref).  That provision of the 
Basic Law requires, without specification of a timetable, the 
HKSARG to "enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of 
treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central 
People's Government."  It is not clear how authoritative 
Wang's remarks are, in particular whether the linkage he 
draws between Article 23 and universal suffrage -- which has 
no basis in the Basic Law -- is a new precondition, or merely 
a trial balloon. 
 
¶4. (C) In 2002-03, the Article 23 legislation was probably 
the most contentious political issue in Hong Kong. 
Opposition to the HKSARG's September 2002 proposals for an 
anti-subversion (Article 23) law, which had been prepared at 
the request of the central government in Beijing, culminated 
in a massive protest demonstration on July 1, 2003, after 
which the government first amended, then completely withdrew 
the proposed legislation.  In April 2004, then-Chief 
Executive Tung issued a report to the NPCSC that paved the 
way for the NPCSC's April 26 reinterpretation of the Basic 
Law to preclude implementation of universal suffrage for the 
2007 CE and 2008 Legco elections.  Tung's report listed nine 
factors requiring consideration as Hong Kong moved toward 
greater democratization; Article 23 was not one of them. 
 
Mixed Reactions in Hong Kong 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Initial local reactions to the reappearance of the 
Article 23 debate have varied widely but predictably.  Thus 
far the HKSARG has avoided public comment.  On May 3, 
Executive Council member Anthony Cheung, an independent 
democrat, told poloff that any mention of Article 23 would 
provoke controversy in Hong Kong.  That said, Cheung believed 
the issue could be viewed both positively and negatively.  On 
the one hand, he believed pro-democracy leaders such as the 
Civic Party's Ronny Tong would admit that some form of 
"national security" legislation is required by the Basic Law; 
the area of contention is simply what form that legislation 
would take.  On the other hand, however, Cheung recognized 
that some people in Hong Kong would view Professor Wang's 
 
HONG KONG 00001863  002 OF 003 
 
 
comments as interference in Hong Kong's autonomy in an effort 
to keep Hong Kong from "drifting away" from Beijing.  The 
crux of the issue, Cheung believed, was the relationship and 
level of mutual trust between the democratic camp in Hong 
Kong and the government in Beijing.  Cheung also said he saw 
nothing new in Professor Wang's remarks, which he believed 
merely signified mainland legal experts' concerns about 
universal suffrage in Hong Kong.  He told the press that the 
people of Hong Kong would not oppose enactment of Article 23 
legislation as long as it struck a "proper balance" between 
the interests of various sectors. 
 
¶6. (C) On May 3, BLC member and Hong Kong University 
Professor of Law Albert Chen told poloff that the recent 
remarks by his BLC colleague Professor Wang "did not merit 
too much attention."  They did not signify any change in 
Beijing's position on the issues of Article 23 and 
democratization in Hong Kong.  Furthermore, Chen said 
inclusion of Article 23 as one of six prerequisites for 
universal suffrage was not new.  In fact, he believed 
enactment of some form of Article 23 legislation, required by 
the Basic Law, was "long overdue" and would need to be 
addressed after the 2007 election.  Chen said it would not be 
a "big problem" as long as some concessions to the 
pan-democrats were included. 
 
Democrats Concerned 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Hong Kong's pro-democracy leaders have expressed 
varying degrees of concern and skepticism about revival of 
the Article 23 debate.  On May 4, Audrey Eu, leader of the 
newly formed Civic Party (which originally was formed as the 
"Article 23 Concern Group") told poloff that while her party 
did not oppose Article 23 legislation in principle, any 
initiative in this area would need to be done "properly." 
She differentiated her party's views from those of the 
Democratic Party, which she said demanded deferral of 
consideration of the legislation until universal suffrage and 
a fully democratic system were in place in Hong Kong.  That 
said, however, she also observed that PRC views of "national 
security," entailing for example restrictions on internet 
access and jailing of internet users who circumvent those 
restrictions, were fundamentally different from those of her 
party.  Eu believed new Article 23 legislation would be one 
of the first items on the agenda of a reelected Donald Tsang 
administration in late 2007 or early 2008. 
 
¶8. (C) Also on May 4, HKCTU Legco member Lee Cheuk-yan told 
poloff that the recent comments by Professor Wang coincided 
with the agenda of Hong Kong's Commission on Strategic 
Development (CSD), to which Chief Executive Tsang has 
delegated responsibility for consideration of political 
reform.  Lee said the CSD, of which he is a member, was a 
"stupid organization" whose members were hand-picked by the 
HKSARG to protect the interests of Hong Kong business during 
the political reform process.  In addition to avoiding 
election of an unacceptable Chief Executive, Lee believes the 
CSD and Hong Kong's business community also want to maintain 
Hong Kong's low-tax regime, which they fear a democratically 
elected leadership would undermine to fund more social 
welfare benefits. 
 
Pro-Beijing Leaders: Article 23 Reasonable, Not Urgent 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶9. (C) On May 1, Tsang Hin-chi, Hong Kong's sole member of 
the NPCSC, told the pro-Beijing "Wen Wei Po" newspaper that 
he fully endorsed Professor's Wang's views and believed that 
enactment of Article 23 legislation should be a prerequisite 
for universal suffrage in Hong Kong.  "Concerning such an 
important matter as national security, it will hardly be 
deemed acceptable if Article 23 legislation cannot be passed. 
 It will not be viable if one talks about universal suffrage 
on one hand, while failing to protect national security on 
the other.  I believe the six conditions proposed by Wang 
Zhenmin are quite reasonable."  Tsang also emphasized, 
however, that Hong Kong's foremost priorities should be 
economic development and advancement of livelihood issues; 
the timetable for action on Article 23 should be based on the 
views of the Hong Kong people, and there was no urgency to 
its enactment. 
 
¶10. (C) BLC Vice Chair Elsie Leung also addressed the Article 
23 issue in a somewhat cautious and non-committal manner. 
Leung, who as Secretary for Justice managed the Article 23 
legislative process in 2003, told "Wen Wei Po" that 
implementation of universal suffrage required a community 
 
HONG KONG 00001863  003 OF 003 
 
 
consensus.  As such, there must be coordination of not only 
Article 23 but also various "other conditions" to comply with 
the principle of "gradual and orderly progress" toward 
democracy.  She said it would be up to the HKSARG to 
determine how to handle the Article 23 issue. 
 
¶11. (C) BLC member and local NPC delegate Raymond Wu took a 
somewhat stronger view of the importance of the Article 23 
legislation, arguing that the conditions of universal 
suffrage should be based on the "underlying significance" of 
the legislation rather than on its actual enactment.  Wu said 
that "national security" is based on loyalty, and failure to 
enact Article 23 legislation implies that the central 
government cannot effectively exercise its sovereignty in 
Hong Kong.  The key to universal suffrage, he believed, was 
to instill a sense of nationalism in the people of Hong Kong 
so they could support a genuine exercise of sovereignty by 
Beijing.  That said, however, Wu told poloff that his PRC 
colleagues on the BLC did not understand Hong Kong and did 
not understand western concerns about democracy.  Even the 
Hong Kong BLC members, he claimed, had a "very immature 
political level."  Wu believed that the primary concern of 
the central government was whether implementation of 
universal suffrage in Hong Kong would lead to selection of 
the "right" person as Chief Executive; whereas the U.S. and 
other western countries had a long history of democracy, Hong 
Kong "could not allow this kind of mistake" in its leadership 
selection. 
 
Cunningham