VZCZCXRO1732
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHIHL #0089 1401756
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201756Z MAY 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0631
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0617
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0682

C O N F I D E N T I A L HILLAH 000089 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/20/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL IZ
SUBJECT: SADR LIEUTENANT KILLED AT IP CHECKPOINT, NAJAF REMAINS CALM 
AFTER CURFEW LIFTED 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas F. Cooney, A/DRC, REO Al Hillah, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. This is a SET NAJAF cable. 
 
¶2. (C)  SUMMARY:  On May 18, Abbas Al Chilabi, Mahdi Militia 
leader and member of radical cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr's personal 
security detail, was killed at a Najaf Iraqi Police (IP) 
checkpoint. Najaf IP Chief General Abbas Al Moadal stated IPs 
opened fire after the wedding party was stopped at the 
checkpoint and Chilabi brandished a pistol.  According to 
Al-Moadal, IP working the checkpoint were not aware of his 
identity.  The precise facts surrounding the episode are in 
dispute by those close to Muqtada Al Sadr and other members of 
the wedding party.  The governor of Najaf placed the city under 
a 12 hour curfew following the incident.  There have been no 
reports of violence in the wake of the killing.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (C)  Abbas Al Chilabi, a member of Muqtada Al Sadr's personal 
security detail and a reputed Mahdi Militia commander, was 
killed after allegedly brandishing a weapon in the direction of 
IPs manning the checkpoint.  The incident took place at an IP 
checkpoint in the vicinity of Camp David (where a small 
contingent of U.S. Special Forces are located) in the city of 
Najaf.  Chilabi was traveling with a wedding party that was 
moving at a high rate of speed.  When stopped by the IPs, 
Chilabi reportedly pulled a pistol and refused to relinquish it. 
 In the ensuing argument, IP reported that Chilabi waved his 
pistol and fired shots.  He was subsequently killed.  Another 
member of the wedding party was wounded and taken to Al Hakim 
hospital in Najaf. 
 
¶4. (C) In response to the incident, General Abbas Al Moadal, the 
IP Chief in Najaf, said that the party had been acting 
irresponsibly.  He further noted, "The IP have the legal 
authority to use deadly force."  He claims that the IP had no 
knowledge of Chilabi's identity.  Al Moadal said that a full 
investigation had begun and would continue until "we can verify 
all circumstances surrounding the incident." 
 
¶5. (C) Ja'afer Al Hakim, a prominent official in the Najaf 
branch of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI), the major party in Najaf's provincial government and 
Muqtada Al-Sadr's principal rivals, said, "We ask both sides to 
be calm and we ask for Muqtada Al Sadr's view of the incident." 
According to Al Hakim, "Sadr has always rejected any immature 
actions that might be perpetrated by his followers."  He went on 
to say that despite the fact that Chilabi was a Sadr bodyguard, 
he wasn't above the law.  Al Hakim noted further that he 
believed the incident was the work of Baathists trying to drive 
a wedge between Sadrists and SCIRI and asserted such attempts 
"would not work." 
 
¶6. (C) For their part, Sadrists called only for a full 
investigation into the incident.  Sheikh Hassan Al Adeli, a 
member of the Shaheed Allah organization, said that every 
indication he had was that the victim was unarmed.  (NOTE. 
Shaheed Allah is a charitable organization that works closely 
with Muqtada Al Sadr.  It is also reportedly a source of 
financing for licit and illicit Sadrist activity.  END NOTE.) 
Reaction by other prominent Sadrists has been restrained as 
well. At the Friday sermon at Kufa mosque, the main Sadrist 
mosque in the region, the preacher, made no mention of the 
incident.   There have been no reported protests or acts of 
violence related to the killing. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT.  It is unlikely that the IPs would knowingly 
kill a Sadr lieutenant.  As of May 20, it appears that this 
incident will not cause renewed fighting between the 
SCIRI-associated Badr Organization and Sadr's Mahdi Militia. 
SCIRI's denial and ritual accusation that Baathists instigated 
the incident seems to be enough to satisfy Sadr.  This denial is 
less convincing when one considers the Najaf IP are lead by 
SCIRI loyalists and there are no openly Baathist members in the 
province's IP force. END COMMENT. 
 
MEURS