VZCZCXRO1185
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHIHL #0076/01 1221833
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021833Z MAY 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0615
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0601
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0666

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/2/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PTER KISL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: WASIT SADRISTS: SISTANI EDICT ON MILITIAS DOES NOT APPLY 
 
REF: A.  2005 HILLAH 262 REF B. 2006 HILLAH 74 
 
HILLAH 00000076  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alfred Fonteneau, Regional Coordinator, REO 
Hillah, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY. The head of the Wasit Sadr Office, Bashaar 
Al-Mousawi, in an April 30 meeting with Regional Embassy Office 
(REO) Al-Hillah staff, insisted that the April 27 statement on 
militias from Grand Ayatollah Sistani does not apply to Sadrist 
Jaysh Al-Mahdi forces in the province.  JAM forces are too 
disorganized and poorly armed to be properly considered a 
militia, according to Al-Mousawi. Therefore, Sistani's statement 
was applicable only to the Badr Organization and Kurdish 
Peshmerga militias. Al-Mousawi was confident that the "Sadrist 
Current" would continue to gain in influence and power in Wasit. 
 Relations between Wasit Sadrists and local branches of the Badr 
Organization and Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in 
Iraq (SCIRI) would remain stable, Al-Mousawi said, but violence 
between the two remained a possibility. END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
WASIT SADRISTS CONFIDENT SISTANI'S MILITIA EDICT DOES NOT APPLY 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (C) The April 30 meeting, held at the request of Al-Mousawi 
in the Wasit Provincial Council Building in Al-Kut, was the 
first face-to-face contact in over ten months between Wasit 
Sadrist representatives and Regional Embassy Office staff. Also 
present at the meeting were Sadrist Provincial Council members 
Ahmed Hussain Abrrah and Ahmed Shebab Hamad. They were joined by 
Nassar Al-Husseini, who identified himself as the 
"Administrative and Financial Manager" for the Sadr Office in 
Wasit. 
 
¶3. (C)  Al-Mousawi said he interpreted Grand Ayatollah Sistani's 
declaration that weapons must be only in the hands of 
"government forces" (ref A) as applying exclusively to the Badr 
Organization and the Kurdish Peshmerga. The Wasit Jaysh Al-Mahdi 
(JAM), according to Al-Mousawi, are "disorganized" and focused 
solely on protecting themselves. Further, since the JAM are not 
supported by "a foreign state", they could not be considered a 
militia. Al-Mousawi, backed enthusiastically by Sadr Office 
administrator Al-Husseini, said the JAM would continue to bear 
arms and "resist" as long as foreign forces were present in 
Iraq. 
 
------------------------------------- 
SADRISTS EXPECT LARGER ROLE IN FUTURE 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The tensions-occasionally violent--that characterize the 
relationship between Sadrists and members of SCIRI/Badr in Wasit 
have largely subsided, according to Al-Mousawi. He admitted that 
while Sadrists were responsible for the last major outbreak of 
violence in August, 2005 (ref B), relations between the two 
groups would hinge largely on national-level developments.  So 
long as Sadrists are treated fairly and with respect in the 
national government, Al-Mousawi said, he did not foresee 
problems in the near-term. NOTE: Al-Mousawi originally described 
SCIRI and Badr organization officials in the province as his 
"enemies," then immediately corrected himself and used the more 
neutral "other groups." To the amusement of his colleagues, 
Al-Mousawi then said, "When I say enemies, I only mean the 
American occupation forces." END NOTE. 
 
¶5. (C) Al-Mousawi, supported by PC members Abrrah and Hamad, 
predicted that provincial elections, regardless of when they are 
held, will lead to a much more powerful role for the Sadrists in 
Wasit. One of the Sadr Office's largest problems is that some 
independent members of the PC pretend to speak on behalf of the 
Sadr Office to Coalition Forces in the province, according to 
Al-Mousawi. Abrrah and Hamad both asserted that only the Sadr 
Office and its sympathizers have a successful record of helping 
the poor and disadvantaged in the province.  In their opinion, 
when voters compare the track record of the allegedly 
"incompetent" SCIRI-dominated PC to the Sadrists, sentiment will 
overwhelmingly favor the Sadrists. 
 
¶6. (C) Sadr Office administrator Al-Husseini and PC member Hamad 
both asserted that the presence of Coalition Forces in the 
province was hurting the security situation. Al-Husseini in 
particular protested that Coalition Forces do not respect the 
Sadrists and have repeatedly tried to provoke a confrontation 
between the Coalition Forces and JAM. Hamad angrily questioned 
why there are still foreign military forces in the province. In 
his opinion, U.S. forces are intentionally allowing terrorists 
to cross into Iraq through Syria to provide a base for the 
insurgency, and thus a rationale for the continued presence of 
U.S. and Coalition Forces.  NOTE: Husseini insisted that U.S. 
forces "raided" his office during the week of April 25th and 
 
HILLAH 00000076  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
that only his "restraint" prevented a larger conflict. According 
to U.S. military contacts and in the judgment of REO staff, this 
"raid" did not occur as Husseini described. END NOTE. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT: Wild conspiracy theories and unwarranted 
allegations notwithstanding, the April 30 meeting provided a 
clear picture of the growing confidence of the Sadrist movement 
in Wasit province. Previously, Sadrist contacts in the province 
would cancel planned meetings at the last second, or refuse 
outright to speak to REO personnel. However, this meeting took 
place in the heavily trafficked Provincial Council building. 
 
¶8. (C) Though Al-Mousawi is respected as the political "face" of 
the Sadrist movement in the province, it is unclear what 
standing he has in the broader, Najaf-based Sadrist hierarchy. 
The Sadrists assessment of their provincial election prospects, 
while optimistic, has some basis in fact, as there is widespread 
discontent with the current provincial government. Less 
believable, however, is Al-Mousawi's optimistic assessment of 
Sadrist relations in the province with SCIRI/Badr. Regardless of 
the situation in Baghdad, it is difficult to imagine that 
SCIRI/Badr will stand idle to Sadr's challenge when maneuvering 
for the provincial election begins in earnest. END COMMENT. 
FONTENEAU