VZCZCXRO2853
RR RUEHAG RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHDL #0530/01 1321521
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121521Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6905
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0090
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0037
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000530 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015 
TAGS: PREL PARM UN EUN MW SR BO IR IZ CG SU LI
EI 
SUBJECT: PRE-GAERC DEMARCHE: GOI EXPECTS PRELIMINARY 
DISCUSSION ON POSSIBLE IRAN PACKAGE 
 
REF: A. STATE 74555 
     ¶B. ROSENBERGER-USEU/BRENNER CORRESPONDENCE OF MAY 
        11-12 
 
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Mary E. Daly; Reasons 1.4 ( 
B) and (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: On May 11, Post delivered ref A pre-GAERC 
demarche to Jim Kelly, Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) EU 
correspondent, and, on May 12, further discussed ref A's Iran 
points with Stephen Dawson, DFA First Secretary for the 
Middle East and North Africa.  Dawson expected GAERC 
ministers to offer preliminary thoughts on a possible EU 
package of incentives/sanctions encouraging Iran to comply 
with the March 29 UNSC Presidential Statement, as reported 
May 11-12 in the international press.  Kelly anticipated that 
GAERC discussion on Iraq would be brief and keyed to 
conclusions welcoming the selection of Prime 
Minister-designate Nuri al-Maliki.  Regarding the DRC, Kelly 
observed that the Irish Cabinet had recently approved the 
assignment of 10 military personnel to MONUC to help oversee 
elections in July.  On Liberia, the GOI supported a trial for 
Charles Taylor under the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
mandate at The Hague, but could not provide incarceration for 
Taylor if convicted, as there was no bilateral legal 
instrument to effect such a transfer.  Kelly cited Ireland's 
support for a UN mission in Darfur, and he asked emboffs to 
clarify the form of support that NATO could offer AMIS, 
noting AMIS' misgivings about "NATO boots on the ground." 
Regarding the Balkans, Kelly related GOI hopes for a 
legitimate outcome in the Montenegrin referendum, but 
expressed GOI disappointment with Bosnia's failure to approve 
constitutional reform and with Serbia's lack of cooperation 
with ICTY.  End summary. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶2.  (C) The GOI expected GAERC ministers to offer preliminary 
thoughts on a possible EU package of incentives/sanctions 
encouraging Iran to comply with the March 29 UNSC 
Presidential Statement, as reported May 11-12 in the 
international press, said Dawson.  He noted that ministers 
would likely confer on the broad shape and possible subject 
areas of the package, as it was too soon to discuss the 
initiative in detail.  Dawson added that the EU-3 would 
carefully coordinate the evolving elements of any package 
with the United States, Russia, and China.  Separately, Kelly 
observed that GAERC consultations on Iran would also focus on 
the April 28 IAEA report and negotiations on a possible UNSC 
resolution.  Ireland's position on Iran, he added, had not 
changed; the GOI supported the EU-3 approach and preferred a 
diplomatic solution.  Kelly had not seen former Iranian 
nuclear negotiator Hassan Rohani's May 9 letter to Time 
magazine, but he described President Ahmadinejad's May 8 
letter to President Bush as another Iranian "feint" that in 
no way represented serious diplomatic engagement.  He said 
that the GOI had no current plans to approach Tehran 
bilaterally, but he promised to pass to DFA's senior 
leadership our request for EU Member States to bring 
influence to bear on the Iranian Government. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶3.  (C) Kelly anticipated a brief GAERC discussion on Iraq 
over lunch, keyed to conclusions that would welcome the 
selection of Nuri al-Maliki as Prime Minister-designate and 
urge continued progress toward a government of national 
unity.  Discussion would not likely range to possible 
additional EU assistance to Iraq, though the GOI and other 
Member States looked forward to more detail on evolving 
proposals for an international Afghan-style compact with the 
new government.  Reiterating past DFA points, Kelly observed 
that the security situation in Iraq made it difficult for the 
GOI to disburse assistance funds already committed, or to add 
to those commitments. 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) On May 9, the Irish Cabinet approved the assignment 
of 10 military personnel to the expanded United Nations 
Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC) to help oversee the 
DRC's July elections, recounted Kelly.  As the decision had 
only been made in recent days, he was unsure when the 
personnel would arrive in the DRC and what exact function 
 
DUBLIN 00000530  002 OF 002 
 
 
they would perform.  In terms of greatest potential threats 
related to the elections, Kelly highlighted, first, security 
at the polls and, second, the possible violent fallout if the 
electorate did not accept the results.  Regarding the Lord's 
Resistance Army, Kelly referred emboffs to Pauline Conway, 
DFA Counsellor for Africa, who noted that Irish Aid (the 
GOI's USAID-equivalent agency) had a long-standing 
relationship with the Great Lakes region that included 
assistance to areas victimized by the LRA. 
 
Liberia 
------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Kelly did not expect the GAERC to focus on Liberia, 
as the Africa point on the meeting agenda would cover the 
EU-Africa Ministerial Troika, Darfur, and elections in Chad. 
The GOI, he observed, favored a trial for Charles Taylor 
under the Special Court for Sierra Leone mandate at The 
Hague.  Ireland, however, could not provide incarceration for 
Taylor if convicted, as there was no bilateral legal 
instrument to effect such a transfer.  On this point, Kelly 
again referred emboffs to DFA Africa Counsellor Pauline 
Conway, who believed that Denmark and Austria had already 
turned down the Dutch on Taylor's possible transfer.  She 
added that Sweden had also apparently said "no," but was 
still reviewing possibilities under domestic legislation for 
taking Taylor. 
 
Darfur 
------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Ireland was pleased with the Darfur Peace Agreement 
and hoped that factions remaining outside the agreement could 
eventually sign on, said Kelly.  The GOI, he added, now 
looked to the international community to step up humanitarian 
assistance to Darfur and to move toward the establishment of 
a UN mission for the region.  Kelly cautioned, however, that 
AMIS participants had expressed misgivings about having "NATO 
boots on the ground."  He asked emboffs to clarify the form 
of support that NATO could offer, e.g., whether strengthened 
airlift capacity might be included.  (We intend to share with 
DFA ref B information that NATO could provide 4-500 soldiers, 
who would work primarily as trainers, observers, and 
advisors.  Twenty percent of this contingent would be 
American.) 
 
The Balkans 
----------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Regarding the Balkans, Kelly related the GOI's hope 
that the Montenegrin referendum would be conducted in a free 
and fair manner, with a result that could not be questioned. 
He also expressed GOI disappointment with Bosnia's failure to 
approve constitutional reform and with Serbia's lack of 
cooperation with ICTY.  Kelly anticipated that GAERC 
ministers would share views on prospects for Serbia's stalled 
SAA talks.  He did not expect that Balkan regional 
cooperation would feature in the GAERC discussions, and he 
added that EU Member States would likely follow the 
Commission's lead on amending the Stability Pact. 
Kenny